(dissenting). I cannot agree with the majority’s view that the residents on South Shore Drive will receive special benefits from the proposed improvements over and above those conferred on the community in general.
In order to levy a valid special assessment for a public improvement, there must be a special benefit conferred upon the property assessed over and above that conferred upon the community itself. Brill v City of Grand Rapids, 383 Mich 216; 174 NW2d 832 (1970); Fluckey v City of Plymouth, 358 Mich 447; 100 NW2d 486 (1960).
In this case the trial court found that the amount of traffic on the street in question makes it practical for the residents to back out of their drives onto the shoulders in order to gain a safer entrance to a traffic lane. These shoulders are used for parking by adjacent residents. The purpose of improving the street is to facilitate the movement of traffic over it. However, while the widening, resurfacing and general improvement of the street will attract more use, the trial court found that such increased use will also increase the hazards in getting on and off the street for its residents. The installation of curbs and gutters will eliminate the present practice of backing out of drives onto the shoulders before entering a traffic lane, thus increasing the danger of entering the street. At least two businesses will be adversely affected by the elimination of presently used parking space for their customers. Furthermore air and noise pollution will be increased and moved closer to the homes on this street. The proposed improvements will tend to increase traffic and its speed which will not be beneficial to the abutting owners but more likely than not will be detrimental to residential property.
These are the factors upon which the trial court *227based its conclusion that the residents on South Shore Drive will receive no special benefits from the proposed improvements.
In the recent case of In re Hartman Estate, 51 Mich App 192, 203-204; 215 NW2d 202 (1974), we explained our duty in regard to reviewing equity cases de novo when we quoted from our Supreme Court’s decision in Biske v City of Troy, 381 Mich 611, 613-614; 166 NW2d 453, 455 (1969):
"' "We hear and consider chancery cases de novo on the record on appeal. Johnson v Johnson, 363 Mich 354; 109 NW2d 813 (1961); Osten-Sacken v Steiner, 356 Mich 468; 97 NW2d 37 (1959); Futernick v Cutler, 356 Mich 33; 95 NW2d 838 (1959); A&C Engineering Co v Atherholt, 355 Mich 677; 95 NW2d 871 (1959); Straith v Straith, 355 Mich 267; 93 NW2d 893 (1959); Ball v Sweeney, 354 Mich 616; 93 NW2d 298 (1958). This Court, however, is inclined to give considerable weight to the findings of the trial judge in equity cases. This is primarily because the trial judge is in a better position to test the credibility of the witnesses by observing them in court and hearing them testify than is an appellate court which has no such opportunity. We do not ordinarily disturb the findings of the trial judge in an equity case unless, after such an examination of the entire record, we reach the conclusion we would have arrived at a different result had we been in the position of the trial judge.” ’ Christine Building Co v City of Troy 367 Mich 508, 517-518; 116 NW2d 816, 820 (1962).”
In considering this equity cause de novo according to the rule enunciated above, this writer agrees with the trial court’s decision that the residents bordering on South Shore Drive will receive no special benefits from the proposed improvements to South Shore Drive over and above that conferred on the community in general.
Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment permanently enjoining the defendant from levying a special assessment.