The issue in this difficult case is whether a father has a cause of action against a sister and brother-in-law for inducing a son to reject his father and refuse his father’s entreaties to return to the father’s home.
I agree fully with the majority that the appellant father cannot maintain an action for the mere alienation of his son’s affections. Because the reasons for disallowing such a cause of action are sound, I would not circumvent them by allowing a similar action under the guise of a tort action for intentionally inflicted emotional distress.
However, I would hold that where there is an intentional interference with a parent’s custody of his or her child, the injured parent is entitled to a remedy. Interference with custody rights of a parent has been recognized as a tort by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 700 as follows:
One who, with knowledge that the parent does not consent, abducts or otherwise compels or induces a minor child to leave a parent legally entitled to its custody or not to return to the parent after it has been left him, is subject to liability to the parent.
Under this rule, liability arises from interference with the parental relationship. See: Wood v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 123 (Iowa 1983); Kramer v. Leineweber, 642 S.W.2d 364 (Mo. Ct.App.1982); Plante v. Engel, 124 N.H. 213, 469 A.2d 1299 (1983). See also: Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F.Supp. 15 (E.D. N.Y.1978); Brown v. Brown, 338 Mich. 492, 61 N.W.2d 656 (1953) , cert. denied, 348 U.S. 816, 75 S.Ct. 27, 99 L.Ed. 644 (1954) ; LaGrenade v. Gordon, 46 N.C.App. 329, 264 S.E.2d 757 (1980). There is no requirement that the plaintiff-parent have a custody order or that the defendant be a parent *66or spouse. See: Brown v. Brown, supra; Kramer v. Leineweber, supra; Plante v. Engel, supra. The right of action is based not only on the loss of the child’s services but also on the parent’s right to the companionship of the child. See: Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, supra; Wood v. Wood, supra. Damages recoverable in such an action include the loss of society of the child and mental distress. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 700, comment g. See: Kramer v. Leineweber, supra; Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, supra.
Does the complaint in the instant case aver a cause of action for interfering with the appellant’s custodial rights? An order granting a demurrer cannot be entered unless the complaint discloses on its face that the plaintiff’s claim cannot be sustained because the law will not permit recovery. If there is any doubt, the doubt must be resolved in favor of overruling the demurrer. Wicks v. Milzoco Builders, Inc., 503 Pa. 614, 623, 470 A.2d 86, 91 (1983), quoting Gekas v. Shapp, 469 Pa. 1, 5-6, 364 A.2d 691, 693 (1976); Chorba v. Davlisa Enterprises, Inc., 303 Pa.Super. 497, 500, 450 A.2d 36, 37 (1982).
Applying this standard to the averments of the complaint in the instant case, I am forced to conclude that preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer were improperly sustained. Appellant, after being divorced from his wife, agreed that his infant son should be raised by appellant’s sister and brother-in-law in Avella, Pennsylvania because appellant was on foreign assignment for the United States Government. It has been alleged in the complaint that appellant faithfully sent money for the support of his son, purchased insurance for his son and established a trust fund for him. Appellant retired in 1972 and moved back to Avella. There he maintained a close relationship with his son, but his son continued to live with appellant’s sister and her husband. A dispute arose when appellant requested that his son return to the home of his father. It will serve no good purpose to recite here the many factual averments pertaining to this dispute. They have been alleged fully in the complaint. Suffice it to quote paragraph 53 of the complaint where it is alleged:
*67That the co-defendants have enticed and persuaded the plaintiffs son to stay away from his father, to have nothing to do with him and in particular to leave his father’s home and not to return although they know it is the wish and desire of the father to have his son with him.
These averments are sufficient to state a cause of action.
It may well be, in view of the history and relationship which has existed among the parties for such a long period of time, that appellant will be unable to prove a cause of action. His claim, based as it is on highly emotional family issues, will certainly be controversial. It may also be, as appellees assert, that appellant has too long delayed seeking redress in the courts. The difficulties with which appellant will undoubtedly be faced in proving his cause of action, however, do not permit a summary disposition which would deprive him of his day in court.
Therefore, I concur in the decision to reverse and remand for further proceedings. However, the cause of action stated, in my opinion, is for inducing a child not to return to the custody of his parent. I would not recreate a cause of action for alienation of affections by calling it an intentional infliction of emotional distress.