(dissenting) — I dissent. The question raised by this appeal is whether Judge Ringold abused his discretion in allowing Professor Junker, Mr. Burnstin, a third-year law student, and Mrs. McBroom, a graduate student in sociology, to examine 189 randomly selected mental illness files in the King County clerk’s office.
The Domestic Relations and Family Court Committee of the King County Superior Court is established by local Rule 0.6, which provides that the department shall be under the direction and supervision of the committee which shall conduct the business of the department and set policy in conjunction therewith, including matters relating to involuntary hospitalization hearings. This committee, consisting of Judge Ringold and two other superior court judges, “unanimously agreed that the policy of the Committee would permit interviews . . . and viewing of files [in involuntary commitment proceedings] if it served a valid research and educational purpose, and providing confidentiality were maintained.”
*28On November 26, 1969, Professor Junker presented a motion to Judge Ringold requesting access to 189 randomly-selected involuntary commitment case files. The motion stated that among the research objectives was the collection of empirical data regarding:
1. The relationship (family, social, etc.) between the applicant for involuntary hospitalization and the alleged mentally ill persons.
2. The age, race, sex, marital status and other characteristics of alleged mentally ill persons.
3. The relationship between the applicant’s allegations of mental illness and the diagnosis, or lack thereof, of mental disorder.
4. The character of mental disorders diagnosed in those persons for whom involuntary hospitalization is ordered.
The motion further stated that it was essential to the achievement of these objectives that a random sample of cases be examined. The motion was granted and resulted in an order signed by Judge Ringold which provided that the inspection and examination of such files would be conducted in the King County clerk’s office, and it contained this proviso:
[T]he confidentiality of such files shall be strictly maintained by such persons and that any report of the research will preserve the anonymity of any person, whether an alleged mentally ill person, witness or otherwise, who may be identified in such files; . . .
During the month of December, 1969, and the first week of January, 1970, Mr. Burnstin and Mrs. McBroom examined such files and made written and tape recorded notes of their contents. From December, 1969, through March, 1970, Mr. Burnstin and Mrs. McBroom also observed the involuntary hospitalization hearings, and took notes of the proceedings similar to those taken from the files. The observation of the commitment hearings was accomplished with the permission of Commissioner Donald M. Niles, the judicial officer at the proceeding, and two guardians ad litem, including Herbert I. Lakefish (intervenor), and in *29accordance with the decision of the Domestic Relations and Family Court Committee.
The purpose of the project undertaken by Mr. Burnstin and Mrs. McBroom under the supervision of Professor Junker was not only to fulfill certain University of Washington Law School course requirements, but likewise to compile valuable data regarding commitment procedures under the statutes of the State of Washington, including evidence of what type of people are being committed and where they are from, what evidence was used to commit them, and for how long they were hospitalized and their rate of relapse or successful cure. The resulting information and statistical conclusions would be available to those such as the legislature of the State of Washington and others, for use in the enactment of legislation, as well as a supplement to other scholarly works in this field.
In order to determine the ultimate question on appeal of this case, it is necessary to ascertain as nearly as possible the intention of the legislature in the enactment of the statutes applicable to this portion of the mental illness commitment procedures. Two statutes of necessity must be considered jointly, for the information and data with which we are concerned are available to the same degree in both the mental illness commitment hearings, RCW 71.02.160, and in the files compiled as a result of the hearings, RCW 71.02.250. RCW 71.02.160 as originally enacted as Laws of 1949, ch. 198, § 9, p. 607, insofar as applicable here, provided:
For the purpose of conducting hearings pursuant to commitment the Court may be convened at any time and place within the county suitable to the mental and physical health of the person, and such hearing shall be a regular open hearing as in any civil action, . . .
(Italics mine.) This statute was later amended by Laws of 1951, ch. 139, § 33, p. 352, into the form which it now takes, and insofar as applicable here, provided:
For the purpose of conducting hearings and examinations under this act, court may be convened at any time and place within the limits of the county in which the court resides: Provided, That hearings and examinations *30under this act may be closed to the general public unless the guardian, attorney, or guardian ad litem representing the alleged mentally ill person demands an open hearing as in other civil actions, or unless a jury is demanded.
(Italics mine.) The majority contends this statute “provides for closed mental illness hearings unless an open hearing is demanded.” This is obviously an incorrect interpretation and becomes critical when, as here, it is in part the basis of the majority decision. It is obvious to me from a reading of this statute and its amendment that originally the legislature provided for open hearings, as evidenced by the language “shall be a regular open hearing,” and thus left no discretion in the trial judge to close them. The amendment, however, leaves the hearings open, but allows the court in the exercise of its discretion to close them unless the guardian attorney or guardian ad litem of the patient demands that the hearing be an open one. The natural inference that arises from the language of the statute originally, as opposed to the amended language (“shall” vs. “may”), is that the judge is vested with a wide discretion so that he might conduct the hearings consistent with the patient’s welfare, but at the same time allow observation of the hearings by those who have a legitimate interest in the proceedings, including doctors other than the ones directly involved with the patient, or nurses or social workers attached to the state hospital, or other individuals conducting works of scholarship for some future use. By the amendment of 1951, the legislature permitted the judge at his discretion to close the hearings, if not objected to by the guardian of the patient, so that idle curiosity seekers, neighborhood busybodies, or other intruders, whose purpose for being present was illegitimate and whose presence was unnecessary, would not be present to cause the patient any undue embarrassment or hardship. The statute does not require the judge to allow only those present who are absolutely necessary to the conduct of the hearings, such as witnesses, parties, and attorneys. This is apparent from the fact that by statute the hearings are open, but may be *31closed by the judge if not objected to by the guardian of the patient. The majority, however, Chooses to ignore this obvious interpretation of the statute in order to give some legal legitimacy to its decision.
The other statute that must be considered in this matter is R.CW 71.02.250 which provides for disposition of the files in the mental illness cases. That statute as originally enacted was Laws of 1949, ch. 198, § 13, p. 609, and, insofar as applicable here, provided:
All files in these cases shall be closed files subject to examination only by the person alleged therein to be mentally ill or his representative until such time as an order of mental illness and commitment is made, at which time those facts required for the Clerk’s index as hereinafter set forth, shall become a public file. The County Clerk shall keep an index, alphabetically arranged, which shall show the name and age of each person examined and declared to be mentally ill, the date of the order of commitment or hospitalization and the name of the licensed hospital or sanitarium to which the person was ordered confined and cared for, or the name of the desig-All medical reports and case histories shall be available as part of the record for the use of the hospital wherein the person is to be confined, but no such record shall be a part of the public records and their contents shall be deemed subject to the physician patient privilege.
Now, this statute in its original form provided that the files would be closed at all times except for examination by the patient, or his representative, and further provided that certain information relating to the name, age, date, and placement of commitment of the patient would be part of the public record in the clerk’s office. It further provided, however, that the medical reports and case histories should be deemed subject to the physician-patient privilege. The court was given no discretion in these matters and the imposition of the physician-patient privilege by the legislature is evidence of its ‘intent to strictly limit the inspection of the files. The statute was amended by Laws of 1951, ch. 139, § 38, p. 353, by eliminating the physician-patient privilege *32provision regarding inspection of the medical files and records, thereby substantially reducing the secrecy surrounding the files. The amendment further provided that the files were closed subject to examination only on court order, with such examination not strictly limited to the patient or his representative. This statute was later amended by Laws of 1959, ch. 51, §§ 1 and 2, p. 418, to the extent that duly authorized representatives of the Department of Institutions would be permitted to examine data other than medical reports to determine the financial responsibility for the extensive care and treatment of the patient without first obtaining a court order. Section 1 provides:
All files in these cases shall be closed files subject to examination only on court order: Provided, however, That this shall not apply to duly authorized representatives of the department of institutions designated by the director insofar as it may be necessary for the department to examine data, other than medical reports, to determine financial responsibility for the expense of care and treatment of the patient. Where a person is found mentally ill the clerk shall cause the following facts to be noted in his probate docket: Name and age of such person, date of order of hospitalization, place of hospitalization, date of parole and date of discharge. Where a person is found not to be mentally ill the clerk shall cause such proceedings to be noted in an alphabetically arranged index, which index shall contain the following information: Name of person filed against, date of order dismissing proceedings, and probate cause number. This index shall be open to inspection only under court order. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the forwarding of all case histories, physicians’ reports, and other case data to the state hospital or other agency in which a mentally ill person may have been ordered hospitalized.
It is most apparent from reading the original statute covering these files and the amendment thereto, that the legislature has liberalized the extent to which inspection thereof would be allowed. The progression has been from a position where the court had no discretion to open the files, and examination limited to the patient or his representative, to one where the court could allow examination on its order *33without limitation to the patient, as well as the statutory authorization of the inspection of certain portions of the files by the Department of Institutions without court order. Obviously the legislature has progressively vested wider discretion in the courts to determine on a case-by-case basis whether or not examination of the files should be allowed. The legislature’s intent has been to prevent, as in the hearings, those with an invalid purpose from inspecting the file of a patient, and in this regard its policy toward mental illness hearings and files has been consistent. In addition, the information in the files relating to the name and age of the patient, the order of hospitalization date, place of hospitalization, date of parole, and date of discharge, is all part of the public record since it appears in the probate index in the county clerk’s office, and is subject to public observation. When the foregoing statutes are compared to the adoption statute controlling disposition of the files, RCW 26.32.150, the difference in the degree of confidentiality of the files and discretion accorded the trial judge by the legislature becomes immediately apparent. The latter provides:
Unless otherwise requested by the adopted, all records of any proceeding hereunder shall be sealed and shall not be thereafter open to inspection by any person except upon order of the court for good cause shown, and thereafter shall be again sealed as before.
That language requiring good cause be shown before the files may be opened and requiring the sealing of the files is much more restrictive of the discretion accorded the court with regard to allowing examination of files by third parties. No such restriction appears in the mental illness statutes.
The committee in establishing the policy for the judges of the King County Superior Court, certainly had the foregoing statutes in mind when it formulated such policy permitting Professor Junker, Mr. Bumstin, and Mrs. McBroom to examine the 189 randomly selected files.
The purpose of the statute with reference to the privacy of the patient and the confidentiality of the files is to pre*34vent those with no useful purpose in mind from reading a patient’s medical history and other data 'and associating it with that patient’s name. The statute intends to protect the patient’s medical history when associated with the patient’s name, from the public, even though the patient’s name and the fact of mental illness as found in the clerk’s index is a matter of public record as authorized by the statute. Likewise, to read the medical history and data contained in the file without the name is not an invasion of privacy at least to any harmful extent unless that information is associated with the particular patient. Only then could there be any resulting invasion of the patient’s rights. The order entered by Judge Ringold permitting the examination of the files by Professor Junker, Mr. Burnstin, and Mrs. McBroom explicitly provided that the confidentiality of the files and the anonymity of the patients be maintained. My brethren of the majority seem to feel that this is not ’an adequate safeguard for the maintenance of such confidentiality and anonymity, and that lacking such adequacy, it constitutes an abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Ringold. With this I cannot agree.
To assert an abuse of discretion implies a lack of use of any discretion at all. The exercise of an honest judgment, regardless of its erroneous appearance, is not an abuse of discretion, and simply because judicial opinion differs as to the exercise of one’s discretion, does not make such exercise an abusive one. Balise v. Underwood, 71 Wn.2d 331, 428 P.2d 573 (1967); Stroup v. Raymond, 183 Pa. 279, 38 A. 626 (1897); Belock v. State Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 Vt. 435, 175 A. 19 (1934); Malfait v. Malfait, 54 Wn.2d 413, 341 P.2d 154 (1959).
Judge Ringold, in my view, provided for adequate safeguards for. the maintenance of confidentiality and anonymity in that a breach of the order and a disclosure of the names of the patients, or any other information in the file in association with a patient’s name could result in the offender being cited for. contempt of court. In addition, we must assume that Judge Ringold was satisfied as to the *35reliability of the parties conducting the examination, as there appears nothing to suggest their unreliability, or any illegitimacy of purpose. The person who must determine the propriety of allowing someone to examine the files, and his purpose in doing so, is the individual judge, who has all the facts pertaining to such an examination including the reliability of the examiners before him at the local level, and it is improper for the Supreme Court to usurp the exercise of judicial discretion allowed him by statute. As a practical matter, all of these files are available for inspection by any clerk’s office employee who wishes to do so. They are also available by statute to designated representatives of the Department of Institutions who can look at the information in the files,
If we are to assume that everyone who looks in the files is going to associate the information therein with the patient’s name, then there is no hope of retaining the confidentiality of the files or the anonymity of the patients in association with the information. Mr. Burnstin and Mrs. McBroom are scholars engaged in graduate work not only for the purpose of their own education, but for the purpose of providing information resulting from their research which would benefit society generally. It must also be assumed, and I do assume, that Professor Junker is a rehable professor who is interested in proper supervision of this project with the assurance that it is conducted according to his scholastic aims. In the absence of a showing of unreliability of these scholars or an improper purpose of their project, the majority by its decision appears to be imposing its view of how the situation should have been handled, rather than determining whether or not Judge Ringold in light of the statute abused his discretion. I am unable to understand how the majority feels that any harm could result by permitting the project to be conducted. The names are not to be used in any publication or divulged to anyone. In addition to the order prohibiting it, there is no reason for these two scholars and their professor to divulge the names as it would be inconsistent with the project purposes. *36On the other hand, the project provides a source of information and statistical study that can very likely be of value to other scholars in the same field, and conceivably to the legislature of this state in its constant review of the mental illness statutes. There must be a balancing between the mental patient’s right of privacy on the one hand, and the public benefit to be derived from scholastic endeavors conducted by responsible, rehable, and concerned graduate student scholars, on the other hand. In a case such as this, the latter must prevail over the former where in fact proper safeguards are taken to insure that the benefit to the public would not be gained at the undue expense of the patient.
There is no requirement of due process that requires the giving of notice to the patient or anyone else concerned with the mental illness proceedings before a superior court judge may enter an order allowing the examination of a file pursuant to such order. The majority cites no authority for such a procedural rule as set forth in its opinion simply because there is no such authority. The majority is attempting to judicially graft some rules onto the procedures for disclosures of the files other than those contemplated by the legislature. The legislature properly vested the trial court with discretion to be exercised on a case-by-case basis in determining the propriety of file disclosure.
The majority states that one of the reasons for the legislature’s directing that the files be closed is that the witnesses, members of the family, and others interested in or participating in the proceedings may act and speak with candor and forthrightness with knowledge that the confidentiality associated therewith would be kept secure. If that be the case, and I believe it is, then if notice is required to be given to the patient, as contended by the majority, must not notice be given to every witness present at the hearings or a participant whose name appears within the particular patient’s file, perhaps as a complaining witness who signed the application for commitment, or any other person at the trial all of whom might have based their participation on the confidentiality of the proceedings? Consequently, the *37notice requirements as stated by the majority are not explicitly definitive soi as to allow their practical application.
The requirements of notice, if extended to all those concerned with a mental patient’s file, would result in a series of impractical delays and most probably and necessarily a full-scale hearing before a judge would be allowed to exercise his discretion to order a mental illness file opened as allowed him by statute. The practical effect would be to destroy his discretionary duty. In short, the majority’s notice requirement lacks direction and practicality.
The majority’s requirement of notice in all third-party research projects will effectively prohibit these projects in the future despite their potential value. The characteristic of randomness of the file selection is the essence of a research project such as the one before the court, and in a random selection of cases there will be a number of objections necessitating hearings under the guidelines established by the majority, indecisive though they may be. If the courts then prohibit the use of the files of the objecting patients, the systematic random selection of the files would be obstructed resulting in a frustration of the scientific authenticity of the study. Also, if we are to take the evidence in this case as indicative of the number of objections that would be made in future studies, then the hearings alone required by the majority guidelines would impose an unbearable burden on the trial courts of every jurisdiction in this state. This would result in an unjustified and regrettable termination of all academic studies of these files and remove certain situations in which the trial court is authorized to exercise a statutorily granted discretion. That apparently is what the majority really is attempting to accomplish. The effect of it is to amend the statute which constitutes judicial legislation of the most obvious kind.
Even assuming that Judge Ringold abused his discretion, nevertheless to make the temporary injunction permanent accomplishes no constructive purpose whatsoever at this late date, because the research project has substantially been completed, and the confidentiality of the files legally *38breached. To impose the permanency of the injunction at this time would result only in the needless destruction of a scholarly work, the future use of which is of value to the general public. It is impossible by judicial decree in the form of a permanent injunction to extract from the minds of Professor Junker, Mr. Burnstin, and Mrs. McBroom the information they obtained from the files and hearings pursuant to the court order, and this will undoubtedly be the situation in nearly every case arising under these statutes which comes before this court. This is probably another reason the legislature granted a wide discretion to the trial judge in determining who should view the files. The publication of the results of that investigation would not include the names of the patients, and therefore would not constitute a violation of the statutory rights of privacy of the patients whose files were randomly selected. Thus, there is no need to prohibit the publication of the statistical results of that research. The purpose of the statute is not to prevent the publication of statistical information concerning some anonymous person. On the contrary, it is simply to prevent the examination of the files in conjunction with the names contained therein.
Apparently the majority feels that this court should establish certain guidelines for the trial judges of this state in its exercise of discretion in connection with the examination of mental illness files and attendance at mental illness hearings. If that be the case, although I do not agree that that is the proper function of this court in this area, nevertheless, this can be accomplished by affirming the judgment entered in the trial court and permitting the publication of the statistical and informational results of the project undertaken by Mr. Burnstin, Mrs. McBroom, and Professor Junker, which results contain no names of any mental patients and thus cannot be harmful to them or constitute 'an invasion of- their privacy, and then further establish some broad guidelines in its opinion. In this way, the majority’s objectives would be fulfilled, and at the same time the results of the project undertaken b'y the threé scholars would *39not be unnecessarily destroyed. This would better solve the problem raised by this case and would not be so patently unfair to those scholars who conducted their research in a legal manner, in good faith, and with no ulterior motives.
For the foregoing reasons I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the trial court on the basis that Judge Ringold was acting within the powers given him by the statute, and he in no way abused his discretion in the exercise of those powers.
Finley and Neill, JJ., concur with Williams, J. Pro Tern.
Justice Williams is serving as a justice pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Const, art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38).