specially concurring:
The constitutional questions involved in this controversy are of utmost importance, and the determination thereof by this court must be far-reaching in its consequences to those engaged in the automotive business. Hence, while concurring in the opinion of Justice Hall, an expression of opinion on other facets of the problem which appear equally important to the writer hereof seems desirable and appropriate at this time.
*185A declaratory judgment was entered by the lower court, holding that Chapter 81 Session Laws of Colorado 1955 was a valid enactment except for one matter not material to this case. Reversal of this judgment is sought.
The act in question is set forth in extenso in the opinion of Justice Hall. It prohibits the sale of motor vehicles, as therein defined, on Sunday.
Invalidity of the act is asserted on the ground that it is a special law, and hence in contravention of (1) Art. Y, Sec. 25 of the Constitution of Colorado, and (2) the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
That the assailed act is not a special law so as to infringe upon these constitutional provisions has been settled by pronouncements of this court. Rosenbaum v. Denver, 102 Colo. 530, 81 P. (2d) 760; McClelland v. Denver, 36 Colo. 486, 86 Pac. 126. And that the Supreme Court of the United States would hold the act not to be in conflict with the 14th Amendment to the federal constitution is clearly indicated in its decision in Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164, 20 S.Ct. 666, 44 L.Ed. 716. Where the Supreme Court of the United States has declared a statute similar to the one under attack here inoffensive to a provision of the federal constitution, we should be chary in refusing to accept its decision as authority. Lindsley v. Werner, 86 Colo. 545, 283 Pac. 534; American Federation v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P. (2d) 145.
Since the general and permissible subject matter of legislation of the character under consideration is the establishment of a periodical day of rest, it would be possible, no doubt, to include in such legislation every activity of the people which tends to interfere with or prevent that objective. But it is not necessary to the licitness of such legislation that it shall include every possible activity which might be included in the subject matter. “The fact * * * that * * * in the judgment of some [it] does not go far enough, and should include all *186other avocations, or be general, is no reason why it should not be upheld to the extent it does go, when, though limited in its application, it affects alike all persons following the particular avocation inhibited on Sunday.” McClelland v. Denver, supra. The demands of the Constitution are satisfied if all similarly situated are included and none is omitted whose relationship to the subject matter cannot by reason be distinguished from that of those included.
At the core of this problem is public policy. Has the statute sanction in the declared policy of this state? Does it bear some reasonable, appreciable relation to the public health, safety, morals or welfare?
Public policy is not only revealed by the whole body of the existing statutory and constitutional law, but is adumbrated in traditional concepts of the common law as the same matured in the climate of the culture, customs, manners, maxims and Judeo-Christian ethic of the people, and thus became part and parcel of the warp and woof of the fabric of government. Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S.&R. Rep. (Pa.) 394; Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb. (N.Y.) 548; State v. Ambs, 20 Mo. 214; Rosenbaum v. State, 131 Ark 251, 199 S.W. 388, L.R.A. 1918 B 1109; Harrison v. McLeod, 141 Fla. 804, 194 So. 247; Rogers v. State, 60 Ga. App. 722, 4 S.E. (2d) 918. See People v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 610. To gainsay the traditional aspects of the common law is to deliberately deny historical fact — indeed, is to shake confidence in the common law itself, which definitely is nothing more than a bundle of traditional principles evolved from judicial experience.
Let us first consider the statutory law as it evinces an established policy of this state. The body of our statutory law has unmistakably set apart Sunday from other days of the week.
Thus, we note that Colorado Revised Statutes 1953 contains a number of provisions giving due recognition to the observance of Sunday as a day of cessation from *187secular, activity. Sec. 27-1-4 (5) forbids cleaning and dyeing establishments to remain open on Sundays and other holidays. Sec. 40-8-14 provides that “any person who shall knowingly disturb the peace and good order of society, by labor or amusement on the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, works of necessity and charity excepted, shall be fined . .
Sec. 40-8-15 makes it a misdemeanor for one who “shall be guilty of any noise, rout or amusement on the first day of the week, called Sunday, whereby the peace of any private family may be disturbed, or who shall, by a disorderly or immoral conduct, interrupt or disturb the meeting, processions or ceremonies of any religious denomination, on either a Sunday or week day . . .”
Sec. 40-12-20 and 21 makes it a misdemeanor subject to fine “for any person to carry on the business of barbering on Sunday in any city of the first or second class.”
By Sec. 67-1-1 Sunday is recognized as a holiday. Certain holidays are designated, and it is ordained that if one of them fall on Sunday, the Monday following becomes such holiday, and the section concludes with the provision that nothing therein shall “prevent the issuing or serving of process on any of the days above mentioned or on Sunday.”
Additional holidays are created by Sec. 67-1-2 with like provision for Monday following Sunday being a holiday in the event the holiday falls on a Sunday. A reasonable construction of this section permits banks of various kinds to operate on the holiday, and inferentially indicates they shall not operate on Sunday. It also permits the issuance or service of process on any holiday or on Sunday.
According to Sec. 37-1-20, courts shall not be open and shall not transact any judicial business on Sunday or any legal holiday except in certain emergency situations.
The- sale of intoxicating liquors is permitted on Sun*188day by Sec. 75-2-3 (4) on a more restricted basis than on other days of the week.
Our Rules of Civil Procedure, in computing time, make provision in case certain events fall on or include Sunday. (Rule 6, R.C.P. Colo.)
By Rule 102 (i) R.C.P. Colo, a writ of attachment may be executed on a Sunday or a legal holiday in the event it is made to appear that it is necessary to do so on such day.
So much for the statutory law which evidences public policy concerning Sundays. We will now consider the constitution of the State of Colorado on this matter.
Our constitution begins with a noble preamble. It pays due homage to the “Supreme Ruler of the Universe” in these words:
“We, the people of Colorado, with profound reverence for the Supreme Ruler of the Universe, in order to form a more independent and perfect government; establish justice; insure tranquility; provide for the common defense; promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution for the ‘State of Colorado.’ ”
By Art. II, Sec. 4, “The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall forever hereafter be guaranteed . . .” The same section provides that “the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to dispense with oaths or affirmations . ..”
It is provided by Art. IV, Sec. 18, that the seal of the territory of Colorado become the “Great Seal of the State of Colorado.” The motto thereon is “Nil sine Numine” — “Nothing without the Deity.” This territorial seal required that there appear thereon as a crest “above the shield, the eye of God.”
From what did this public policy, evidenced by the constitution and the statutes hereinabove considered, spring? The answer to this question requires a brief *189analysis ■ of history as the same forms the traditional background in which they were conceived.
These constitutional and statutory provisions had their beginnings in an atmosphere impregnated with the religious spirit of the times and with the moral law. Updegraph v. Commonwealth, supra; Lindenmuller v. People, supra; State v. Ambs, supra; Rosenbaum v. State, supra; Harrison v. McLeod, supra; Rogers v. State, supra. Insofar as Sunday laws are concerned, it has been said that they “have been on the books for more than three thousand years and have been the law of this country since Captain John Smith poured cold water down the sleeves of the cavaliers at Jamestown as a punishment for swearing.” Harrison v. McLeod, supra. The Decalogue is exceedingly high and very old authority for rest from toil one day in seven and making that day of rest a sacred day. With the advent of Christianity, the old Sabbath under the Hebrew dispensation was, as to Christians, changed to Sunday, commemorative of and associated with the divine event of Easter. Thus, it came about that the common law and the statutes and constitutions of our states were colored with JudeoChristian concepts.
As time went on, the religious aspects of Sunday laws lost most of their efficacy because of the constitutional provisions requiring separation of church and state; however, they were recognized as a valid exercise of the police power of the state. Their sanction as a proper exercise of the police power is well stated in the case of McClelland v. Denver, supra, in these words: “Keeping open places of business on Sunday, works of necessity and charity excepted, is a public and serious interference with the observance of the day. Such conduct is offensive to the moral sense of the community. It disturbs the peace and good order of society, and invites others to violate the law on the subject. The stability of government, as well as the welfare and interest of society, render it necessary that the day of rest should be uni*190form, and that its observance should be compulsory, not by way of enforcing the conscience of those upon whom the law operates, but by way of protection to those who desire, or are entitled to, the day, and who, unless protected by a law requiring usual secular pursuits' to be suspended at regularly recurring intervals, would be deprived of the full benefits which the law contemplates shall result from the observance of Sunday as a .day of rest.” ■
We cannot ignore or impugn the religious and moral motivations that gave warmth, tone and color to the policy of this state as found in the quoted constitutional and statutory provisions. A court that fails or refuses to read these laws in the background of tradition or construes them contrary to their historical setting fails of performing its solemn function.
Even though Sunday laws are “essentially civil and not religious, and the statutes are not to be regarded, in the present day, as religious ordinances,” 88 C.J.S. §3, pg. 801, yet the tradition from which they sprung has overtones of importance when we realize that a maior segment of our society is still a religious people. This non-religious view arose, be it remembered, to establish and maintain the constitutional severance between church and state, not to overthrow or subvert religion, but to leave religion unfettered, thereby fostering the public policy of complete religious freedom. It is axiomatic that government is invigorated as religion flourishes, since the morals and ethics taught thereby tend to promote order. In view of the policy of the state, evinced by the constitutional and statutory provisions herein cited and their historical setting, we should be reluctant to overthrow McClelland v. Denver, supra, and Rosenbaum v. Denver, supra. Particularly should this be true because it might cast doubt upon the validity of that part of the body of our statutory law regulating secular activities on Sunday.
There is overwhelming reason why this court should *191follow the doctrine of precedents, frequently referred to as the rule of stare decisis. Those who would overthrow Rosenbaum v. Denver, supra, and McClelland v. Denver, supra, overlook an important aspect of Sunday laws. True, it has not been touched upon in the briefs, but any consideration of the act in question would be to little purpose were we to leave untouched the point.
The arm of the civil power, under our public policy as made manifest in the constitutional and statutory law, foreshadowed by traditional concepts of the common law, is interposed to assist “the mild voice of Christianity * * * to secure the due observance of Sunday as a day of rest.” State v. Ambs. supra. The statutorily imposed day of rest is consonant with and obviously necessary to the constitutional concept of religious freedom. The “free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession, without discrimination, shall forever hereafter be guaranteed.” This is the mandate of our constitution. This fundamental right the courts have always zealously guarded. Constructions of laws which result in hampering persons from attendance at religious services have been scrupulously avoided. Hamilton v. Montrose, 109 Colo. 228, 124 P. (2d) 757.
The language of State v. Ambs. supra, is particularly pertinent and should be followed. It demonstrates why the questioned law should be held valid. “They [the framers of the constitution], then, who engrafted on our constitution the principles of religious freedom therein contained, did not regard the compulsory observance of Sunday as a day of rest, a violation of those principles. They deemed a statute compelling the observance of Sunday necessary to secure a full enjoyment of the rights of conscience. How could those who conscientiously believe that Sunday is hallowed time, to be devoted to the worship of God, enjoy themselves in its observance amidst all the turmoil and bustle of wordly pursuits, amidst scenes by which the day was desecrated, which they conscientiously believed to be holy? The *192Sunday law was not intended to compel people to go to church, or to perform any religious act, as an expression of preference for any particular creed or sect, but was designed to coerce a cessation from labor, that those who conscientiously believed that the day was set apart for the worship of God, might not be disturbed in the performance of their religious duties. Every man is free to use the day for the purpose for which it is set apart or not, as he pleases. If he sees proper to devote it to religious purposes, the law protects him from the disturbance of others; if he will not employ himself in religious duties, he is restrained from interrupting those who do. Thus the law, so far from affecting religious freedom, is a means by which the rights of conscience are enjoyed. It cannot be maintained that the law exacting a cessation from labor on Sunday compels an act of religious worship. Because divines may teach their churches that the reverential observance of the Lord’s day is an act of religious worship, it by no means follows that the prohibition of wordly labor on that day was designed by the general assembly as an act of religion. Such an idea can only be based on the supposition of an entire ignorance in the legislature of the nature of the worship which God exacts from his creatures. A compliance with the law, induced by a fear of its penalties, could never be regarded as an act acceptable to the Deity. No act of worship, unless dictated by heartfelt love, can be pleasing to the Almighty. God listens alone to the voice of the heart.” (Emphasis supplied.) To the same effect, see State v. Barnes, 22 N.D. 18, 132 N.W. 215, 37 L.R.A.N.S. 114, Ann. Cas. 1913E 930.
There is another phase in which it may be said that there exists an appreciable relation to morals and welfare in the instant Sunday law. A spouse has a natural right to the society and companionship of the working spouse; the children have a natural right to the society and companionship of the working parent. Daily v. Parker, 152 F. (2d) 174; Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, *19337 N.W. (2d) 543; Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E. (2d) 811. See Individual Interests in the Domestic Relation, Dean Pound, 14 Mich.L.Rev. 177. Conceivably these rights may to some extent, if the act is held invalid, be taken away from the non-working spouse and the children. We have read much in recent times in connection with causes for divorce and causes for juvenile delinquency. One of the important causes for divorce is the lack of companionship between husband and wife, resulting in the spouses almost being total strangers to each other. Parents who have working and social engagements to keep to the extent that their children are left to shift for themselves create a condition conducive to juvenile delinquency. This court should be the first to fortify the family against widening the wedge by which causes for divorce or delinquency may be given additional impetus to reach flood stage.
A final point should be discussed. “It has been the policy of this commonwealth since 1868 to inhibit all labor on Sunday, works of charity and necessity excepted.” McClelland v. Denver, supra. Thus spoke the court in citing C.R.S. ’53, sec. 40-8-14. There have been cases in which courts have treated as a question of fact what constitutes a work of charity or necessity. It has been held that the legislature has the power to remove certain activities from a doubtful category, as being works of charity or necessity. The legislature may say that certain activities shall not be carried on on Sundays and thus remove them from the possibility of being asserted as works of charity or necessity. This was the holding of the court in Petit v. Minnesota, supra. There as here, they had a general law forbidding labor on Sunday, works of charity and necessity excepted, and later an amendment was adopted forbidding barbering on Sundays. The Supreme Court of the United States held the law not in violation of the federal constitution. It is submitted that, by the Sunday law now being considered, the designated motor vehicle dealers may not *194invoke the exception of the general law, to-wit, that they are carrying on a work of necessity.
The foregoing represent reasons why we should follow stare decisis, and hold that the case of Rosenbaum v. Denver remains the law of this jurisdiction. If courts set themselves to zigzagging, to backing and filling, to building then tearing down, to knitting then ravelling, to deciding and then setting aside their own solemn pronouncements, they destroy the virtue of the law, which is that principles be applied uniformly and consistently. Only where the application is palpably wrong should we change position. People v. Schaefer, 129 Colo. 215, 268 P. (2d) 420. This is not such a case.
These are additional reasons why I concur in the opinion of Justice Hall.