Dissenting.
(24) I respectfully disagree with the majority’s opinion reversing the conviction of the Defendant. The jury is the fact-finder and this Court does not reweigh the evidence and will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. State v. Sutphin, 107 N.M. 126, 131, 753 P.2d 1314, 1319 (1988). On appeal, the Court looks to see whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, not whether the jury could have reached a different conclusion. State v. Apodaca, 1994 NMSC ¶ 4, 118 N.M. 762, 766-67, 887 P.2d 756, 760-61. Further, I do not believe that this case involves a substantial question of law under the Constitution of New Mexico or the United States, or presents an issue of substantial public interest and therefore, certiorari should be quashed. Rule 12-502 C(4)(e) and (d) NMRA 1997; State v. Tackett, 78 N.M. 450, 452, 432 P.2d 415, 416 (1967).
(25) Regarding the question of prosecutorial misconduct, I agree with the Court of Appeals’ analysis. The State couched any reference to the Defendant’s legal history in general terms consistent with the State’s theory of the case. The State elicited this evidence only to prove that the defendant was knowledgeable in legal matters. The State only briefly mentioned the Defendant’s legal history and then in context. After the defense attorney’s objection, the prosecutor quickly moved to the facts of the case. Moreover, because the State rarely prosecutes bigamy, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to explain the policy reasons behind the crime. See Rule 11—403 NMRA 1997; Behrmann v. Phototron Corp., 110 N.M. 323, 326, 795 P.2d 1015, 1018 (1990).
(26) The alleged prosecutorial misconduct, even when viewed cumulatively, is not enough to outweigh the evidence of guilt in this matter. State v. Larson, 107 N.M. 85, 86, 90, 752 P.2d 1101, 1102, 1106 (Ct.App. 1988). Further, there is a question what defendant urges as prosecutorial misconduct rises to that level at all. State v. Ramming, 106 N.M. 42, 47, 48, 738 P.2d 914, 919-20 (Ct.App.1987).
(27) For these reasons, I respectfully DISSENT.