dissenting:
I question whether the District of Columbia statute, quoted by the majority, empowers a trial judge to order the seizure, from a “designated person,” of property other than that found “upon” the person.1 See D.C. Code 1973, § 23-522(b). I question whether appellant has had an “adversary hearing” in a real sense, where the trial court, over the objection of defense counsel that there had been insufficient time to prepare or secure medical testimony on behalf of appellant, found “probable cause” on Friday, denied a *1342continuance, scheduled a hearing for the following Monday morning and ordered that the operation be performed on Wednesday morning.2 I question the necessity for the haste by this jurisdiction in executing a search warrant of such an unusual nature, on behalf of the State of Maryland, when extradition proceedings are scheduled to be heard in less than two weeks.3
These matters I question, but my disagreement with the majority is based upon a firm conviction: in my view, the surgical exploration and extraction of any object, for evidentiary purposes, from the body of a nonconsenting suspect, is per se an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See Judge Robinson’s dissenting opinion in United States v. Crowder, 177 U.S.App.D.C. 165, 171, 543 F.2d 312, 318 (1976) (en banc). See also Adams v. State, 260 Ind. 663, 666, 299 N.E.2d 834, 837 (1973).
. While the three metallic objects in appellant’s body were described as being so close to the skin that they could be felt, the objects could not be seen except through x-ray. They were described as being in subcutaneous fat — no more than a centimeter or two below the skin. Therefore, the degree of the intrusion required to recover the objects is a quantum leap from the intrusions approved by the Supreme Court. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973) (sample of scrapings from fingernails); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 93 S.Ct. 774, 35 L.Ed.2d 99 (1973) (handwriting exemplars); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973) (voice exemplars); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (blood test). Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), condemning forced stomach pumping.
. The trial court denied a stay, characterizing any appeal as “frivolous.” This court granted a temporary stay on Tuesday evening.
. In its application for the search warrant, government counsel represented that there was a possibility of the bullets deteriorating. On oral argument in this court, government counsel expressed the fear that appellant might remove the bullets himself, citing precedent. At the time of the hearings in the trial court and at the time of oral argument in this court, appellant was being held under close supervision in the D.C. jail infirmary as a result of surgery extending from his breastbone to his pubic area.