dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s order affirming the Michigan City Human Rights Commission’s (“Commission”) determination that Filter Specialists, Inc. (“Filter”) unlawfully terminated the employments of Dawn Brooks (“Brooks”) and Charmaine Weathers (“Weathers”). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Commission’s decision was not supported by sufficient evidence, and I believe that the majority’s burden-shifting analysis requires clarification. In addition, I write to express my position on one preliminary matter addressed by the majority. Specifically, I believe that the majority’s resolution of Filter’s challenge to the Commission’s recognition of local law, *584while reaching the correct result, is problematic.
Filter argues that Brooks and Weathers did not prove the terms of Michigan City Ordinance No. 3283 (the “Ordinance”) during the Commission’s agency proceeding and that, therefore, we must conclude that the plaintiffs failed to prove that Filter violated the Ordinance’s terms. As the majority explains, a “court may take judicial notice of ... ordinances of municipalities.” Op. at 566 (quoting Ind. Evidence Rule 201(b)). The majority reasons that it is inconsequential that neither party asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the Ordinance because an appellate court, even absent a request to do so, may take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance. Ind. Evidence Rule 201(c), (f). Therefore, the majority elected to take judicial notice of the Ordinance.
Although we are permitted to take uninvited judicial notice of an ordinance under Evidence Rule 201 sections (c) and (f), appellate courts should do so only sparingly. Under Evidence Rule 201(e), a party, upon request, is “entitled ... to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed.” Further, “[i]n the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial notice has been taken.” Ind. Evidence Rule 201(e). Therefore, if an appellate court opts to exercise its right of judicial notice absent a request from a party and the corresponding opportunity of the adverse party to voice its opposition, one of two situations will arise. Either we must be prepared to give the parties an opportunity to be heard on the issue after we have already handed down our appellate decision, which brings with it a host of procedural problems,23 or we must be prepared to deny litigants their right to be heard as granted by Evidence Rule 201(e). Both of these options are worrisome, and thus I believe that we should do what the majority has done today only in rare circumstances. Further, I do not believe that we need to take judicial notice of the Ordinance because, under the facts of this case, we can infer that the Commission was aware of the Ordinance and took judicial notice of it. This is for the simple reason that, but for the Ordinance, the Commission would not exist. In essence, we can impute judicial notice of the Ordinance to the Commission. Given my concerns about the interplay between Evidence Rule 201 sections (c) and (f) with section (e), this is far preferable to taking judicial notice of the ordinance sua sponte.
This matter aside, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Brooks and Weathers failed to carry their ultimate burden of persuasion. Because the majority resolved this case upon the third step in the applicable burden-shifting analysis, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (“McDonnell Douglas” ), it did not need to address the first two steps of the analysis in detail. Therefore, in order to explain why the Commission’s decision should be affirmed, I will begin at the first step of our analytical framework.
*585As explained by the majority, when evaluating a claim of employment discrimination, we apply the three-step burden-shifting analysis expounded in McDonnell Douglas. Op. at 572 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). This analysis placed the initial burden of production squarely upon Brooks and Weathers to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. In a case alleging race-based employment discrimination, a prima facie case consists of four essential elements: evidence that “1) [the plaintiff] is a member of a protected class; 2) [the plaintiff] was meeting [the] employer’s legitimate performance expectations; 3) [the plaintiff] suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) other similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected class were treated more favorably.” Fane v. Locke Reynolds, LLP, 480 F.3d 534, 538 (7th Cir.2007) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)); see also Ind. Dep’t of Natural Res., Law Enforcement Div. v. Cobb, 832 N.E.2d 585, 591 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
Whether a prima facie case has been presented is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Ind. Civil Rights Comm’n v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 648 N.E.2d 674, 683 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied. While Brooks and Weathers’ claim cannot proceed if they fail to present sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case, we must remain mindful that “[t]he burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.” Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089). There is no question that prongs one, two, and three of this step are satisfied. It is undisputed that Brooks and Weathers are African American and that they were both terminated from Filter’s employ. Additionally, Filter makes no argument on appeal that Brooks and Weathers did not meet legitimate job expectations. Indeed, testimony before the Commission reflected that “they were both good employees,” Appellant’s App. p. 123, and that “they had good work ethics,” id. at 124.
The only dispute regarding whether the plaintiffs established a prima facie case is whether they sufficiently evidenced that “similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected class were treated more favorably.” Fane, 480 F.3d at 538. This “normally entails a showing that the ... employees dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in similar conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them.” Cobb, 832 N.E.2d at 592 (quoting Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617 (7th Cir.2000)). While the' ultimate question of whether plaintiffs have made a prima facie case is a question of law, whether employees are similarly situated is “ordinarily ... a question of fact.” George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 414 (D.C.Cir.2005) (quoting Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.2000)). We are thus faced with a factual finding from the Commission that the evidence “demonstrate^] that other Caucasian employees of the company who engage[d] in far more egregious behavior than that the Claimants were accused of received far less severe forms of discipline by the company for their actions,” Appellant’s App. p. 11, and “[w]e may not substitute our judgment on factual matters for that of the agency and are bound by the agency’s findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence,” Cobb, 832 N.E.2d at 590 (citing Weatherbee v. Ind. Civil Rights Comm’n, 665 N.E.2d 945, 947 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), reh’g denied, trans. denied). We cannot disturb the determination that Filter unlawfully terminated the plaintiffs un*586less it was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or in excess of its statutory authority.” Ind. Dep’t of Env’t Mgmt. v. West, 888 N.E.2d 408, 413 (Ind.2005).
The majority examines discipline administered by Filter upon several Caucasian employees24 and makes the following observations:
The Employees have failed to introduce evidence that Filter treated similarly situated employees differently from the Employees. Initially, we note that the Employees have pointed to no evidence of the other employees’ position within the company, and the Commission made no findings on this point. However, as the dissent points out, we may glean from materials in the appendices that all four employees occupied production, and not management positions. Whether or not non-management employees, who have been employed for an un-identified duration, where we have no evidence of the qualifications or skills required for each particular job, may be considered “similarly situated” is debatable. However, it is a debate in which we need not engage, as the other employees were not disciplined for the same or even similar misconduct.
Op. at 580 (citations omitted).
In my view, the evidence contained in the parties’ appendices25 is sufficient to support the Commission’s finding that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably than the plaintiffs. In reviewing this conclusion, “[fjactors to consider include whether the employees 1) had the same job description, 2) were subject to the same standards, 3) were subject to the same supervisor, and 4) had comparable experience, education, and other qualifications.” Salas v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 493 F.3d 913, 923 (7th Cir.2007) (citing Bio v. Fed. Express Corp., 424 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir.2005)). On the date of their terminations, Brooks and Weathers both held the position of “packer” at Filter, and they both reported to production manager Michael Forbes (“Forbes”). Appellant’s App. p. 121-22. Weathers had been a seven-and-one-half-year employee of Filter, and Brooks was a two-and-one-half-year employee. Id. at 103, 114. Forbes, as their manager, terminated them, with the urging of human resources manager Diana Wirtz (“Wirtz”). Id. at 124, 147. Contrary to the majority’s assertion that we know nothing about the positions of other previously disciplined employees, we do know, for example, that employee J.M.26 was a felt line worker who received a written warning, upon which Forbes “signed off,” id. at 125, for making “discriminatory” “racial remarks” to an Af*587rican American employee, id. In a separate incident, J.M. threw a crowbar past another employee’s feet in anger. Id. at 132. Forbes and Wirtz approved a three-day suspension for this transgression. Id. at 163. Employee J.S. also worked in a production, rather than supervisory, capacity for Filter. See id. at 165 (noting that his supervisor asked him to run a particular machine). He received a verbal warning from Wirtz for walking off of the job, id. at 165, and a written warning from Wirtz and Forbes for a separate incident involving “substandard,” “very poor quality” work, id. at 166. Finally, the record contains relevant evidence regarding a disciplinary action taken toward long-time Filter employee R.H., also a non-supervisory employee. In response to a heated verbal altercation between R.H. and an African American employee that apparently stemmed from R.H.’s “use of racial epithets,” id. at 128, 171, Wirtz was involved in making the decision to reassign the other employee to a different area of the plant rather than impose any sanctions or issue warnings. Id. at 128.27 From these facts, we are presented with evidence of how other non-supervisory employees working under the supervision of Forbes and/or Wirtz were, at various times, disciplined.
Although the majority correctly notes that we cannot second-guess Filter’s determination of what constitutes a serious offense, and, indeed, Filter’s employment handbook provides a framework for the ramifications of employees’ behavior, testimony before the Commission indicates the seriousness, in Filter’s management’s perspective, of these other employees’. conduct. In response to the question, “And you can’t tolerate discriminatory or harassing comments made by any employee to another, can you?,” Forbes testified, “That is correct.” Appellant’s App. p. 125. He acknowledged, however, that J.M. received nothing but a written warning for making racially inflammatory remarks to a fellow employee. Id. Forbes’ testimony also contained the following exchange regarding R.H.’s altercation:
Q. Use of racial epithets in the workplace is pretty severe, isn’t it?
A. Correct....
Q. And it can cause real problems in a mixed work force, can’t it, if — if, in fact, somebody’s using racial epithets? Isn’t that right?
A. Absolutely.
Id. at 128. Further,’ when asked, “In fact, some individuals with some longstanding time with the Company that we’ve talked about were allowed to go one, two and three occurrences on terminable offenses and, yet, others, such as [Brooks and *588Weathers], were discharged immediately; isn’t that correct?,” Forbes responded, “That is correct.” Id. at 129.28 Indeed, the record reflects that employee J.M. committed at least one terminable offense prior to the offense for which he was terminated. Id. at 163. Employee J.S. committed a terminable offense — walking off of the job — but received only a verbal warning regarding his conduct. Id. at 165. The following month, the same employee performed such substandard work that products were rejected by Filter’s customers. This, on the heels of his terminable offense, resulted in nothing more than a written warning. Id. at 166. It was only after he committed another terminable offense that Filter terminated J.S.’s employment. Id. at 167. Further, employee R.H. committed a terminable offense, was not disciplined at all, id. at 171, and was only terminated later after apparently stealing a tractor from the president of Filter, id. at 177-78.
I cannot say that the Commission, presented with testimony regarding the severity of other employees’ transgressions and relative leniency toward other employees, erred in reaching the conclusion that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably than Brooks and Weathers. On appeal, we are bound to “read the record in the light most favorable to the administrative proceedings,” and “we neither substitute our judgment on factual matters for that of the [Commission], nor do we reweigh the evidence.” Regester v. Ind. State Bd. of Nursing, 703 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind.1998). Whether we, as an appellate court, might draw different eonelu-sions from the evidence is irrelevant. State v. Carmel Healthcare Mgmt., Inc., 660 N.E.2d 1379, 1384 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. The Commission, faced with substantial evidence that other non-supervisory employees were disciplined less harshly than Brooks and Weathers by the same individuals for offenses considered “severe,” made a valid factual determination. We cannot reweigh the evidence. I perceive no error.
Once Brooks and Weathers presented a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifted to Filter to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for their discharge. West, 838 N.E.2d at 413. The Commission does not make an explicit finding of fact on this issue, but its document entitled “Michigan City Human Rights Commission Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law[ ] Decision and Award[]” carefully details the time clock incident in question. See Appellant’s App. p. 5-13. Brooks and Weathers do not contest whether Filter sufficiently articulated its nondiscriminatory reason— Wirtz’s allegation of time card fraud — for their firings, and I agree with the majority that Filter met its burden of production at this step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
Finally, we reach the question of whether Filter’s “nondiscriminatory reason was merely pretext for its discrimination.” West, 838 N.E.2d at 413. In a thoughtful analysis, the majority examines the honest belief rule. However, I am concerned that the majority’s pretext analysis may not sufficiently apply an objective component.
*589The majority examines several Indiana cases and concludes, “it remains clear that Indiana courts, like all federal courts, follow the ‘honest belief rule.” Op. at 574 (citing Purdy v. Wright Tree Serv., Inc., 835 N.E.2d 209, 214 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied; Powdertech, Inc. v. Joganic, 776 N.E.2d 1251, 1260 (Ind.Ct.App.2002)). I agree with this conclusion.
Certainly, this Court has previously referenced the need for an employer’s honest belief in the reason given in support of an employment decision. Purdy, 835 N.E.2d at 214; Powdertech, 776 N.E.2d at 1260. The question becomes how our courts should examine what an honestly-held belief is. A close read of Purdy and Powder-tech reveals language instructing an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of a proffered reason in addition to an examination of the subjective honest belief of the employer. For example, while Purdy declares, “[0]ur inquiry [into pretext] is limited to whether the employer gave an honest explanation for its decision.... The court need only address the issue of whether the employer honestly believes in the explanation it offers,” 835 N.E.2d at 214, it also explains that an employee can prove pretext “by showing, for example, that the employer’s proffered reason is factually baseless, is not the actual motivation for the discharge, of is insufficient to motivate the discharge,” id. at 213 (citing Powdertech, 776 N.E.2d at 1262). Thus, both of the cases supported delving beyond inquiry into the subjective belief of an employer to examinations of the objective reasonableness of the belief. Further, we have previously expressly articulated that pretext should be identified by examining the “context of the surrounding circumstances.” S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 648 N.E.2d at 682 (quoting Ind. Civil Rights Comm’n v. Wellington Vill. Apartments, 594 N.E.2d 518, 530 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), trans. denied, overruled on other grounds); Ind. Dep’t of Corr. v. Ind. Civil Rights Comm’n, 486 N.E.2d 612, 618 (Ind.Ct.App.1985), reh’g denied, trans. denied. Thus, we have long advocated for examining an employer’s beliefs against an objective reasonableness standard. Imposing an objective standard upon this final step in the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis thus facilitates the sort of review that the Supreme Court envisioned when it described the McDonnell Douglas test as a “sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.” S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co,, 648 N.E.2d at 681-82 (emphasis added) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978)). Therefore, I agree with the majority that Indiana should expressly adopt an honest plus objective reasonableness approach to gauging whether an employer’s reason for firing an employee was pretextual.
In addressing the question of whether the Commission erred in finding that Filter’s proffered reason for Brooks’ and Weathers’ terminations was pretextual, however, I believe that the majority has espoused the correct test but applied another. Rather, the majority’s analysis employs a heavily subjective test, which, in my view, does not sufficiently consider the requisite objective reasonableness component. See, e.g., op. at 577-78 (discussing honest belief and “true motive” but containing no mention of objective reasonableness). Not only has the majority’s analysis underemphasized the role of objective reasonableness in this inquiry, I believe that the majority has reweighed the evidence. Again, if. the agency’s finding on this point is supported by “any substantial evidence,” “the court may not disturb the *590board’s or agency’s decision.” Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 486 N.E.2d at 616 (emphasis added). The Commission made the following relevant finding: “It is clear from the evidence in this matter that the stated reasons by the company for termination were pretextual and it was in fact the Claimant’s [sic] race which was the motivating factor behind their discharge.” Appellant’s App. p. 13. This is supported by the Commission’s recognition of “the lack of eyewitnesses to the alleged incident, the fact that the time clock records reflected other employees punching in at the same time on occasion and the lack of discipline for those employees,” id. at 12, and its apparent skepticism of Wirtz’s account of the incident and her investigation, id. at 10. Comparing the disciplinary action taken against Brooks and Weathers to the disciplinary actions described earlier in the context of the claimants’ prima facie case, see id. at 11, the Commission determined that Brooks and Weathers succeeded in showing that Filter’s proffered legitimate non-discriminatory reason for their terminations was pretextual. The Commission’s observations are supported by the record, and it credited the testimony of certain witnesses and weighed the evidence in reaching its conclusion. Indeed, the Commission, simply put, did not believe Wirtz. We cannot disturb the Commission’s finding on this point. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 486 N.E.2d at 616.
This brings us to the ultimate question of whether Brooks and Weathers carried their burden of persuasion to show that they experienced discrimination. As the Supreme Court explained in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), “The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.” Here, Brooks and Weathers successfully made a prima facie case. Additionally, the Commission heard conflicting testimony regarding the alleged time clock incident, expressed skepticism toward the depth of management’s investigation, and was presented with relevant evidence of significantly lesser punishments imposed for conduct deemed serious by one of the supervisors involved in Brooks’ and Weathers’ terminations. The Commission found this evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that Brooks and Weathers suffered employment discrimination, and the trial court agreed. In fact, in a preliminary order, the trial court observed, “The agency record is replete with evidence that could support inferences leading to a conclusion that the Petitioner illegally discriminated against the Respondents on the basis of race. As such, the factual findings and conclusions made by the Michigan City Human Rights Commission were supported by substantial evidence.” Appellant’s App. p. 14. In short, I believe that the majority has impermissibly reweighéd the evidence. I would affirm the trial court.
We are left with the question of damages. Pursuant to its authority under the Ordinance, the Commission initially awarded $22,157.69 to Brooks and $12,090 to Weathers for lost wages. Id. at 12. These amounts were based upon calculations submitted to the Commission by the complainants. Upon review, the trial court remanded the matter of damages to the Commission for recalculation because the findings did not take into account the unemployment benefits received by both Brooks and Weathers. Id. at 18. The trial court ordered the Commission to
*591make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions as it relates to the damages suffered by each of the Respondents herein. Those findings should detail how those damages are arrived at by the Michigan City Human Rights Commission and should further take into consideration any unemployment compensation benefits that may have been received by [Brooks and Weathers].
Id. In response, the complainants and the Commission filed a Joint Request for Entry of Judgment, asking the trial court to simply subtract each complainant’s unemployment benefits from her initial damages award. Id. at 69. Granting this request, the trial court entered judgment for Brooks in the amount of $17,469.79 and $5,613.00 for Weathers. Id. at 20.
Filter appeals the amounts of damages awarded to Brooks and Weathers, arguing that the awards are arbitrary and capricious. West, 838 N.E.2d at 415. I would affirm the trial court’s award to Brooks but remand the matter of Weathers’ award to the trial court for recalculation. Regarding Brooks’ damages award, I would not disturb the Commission’s apparent factual determination pertaining to lost overtime compensation. The Commission was presented with conflicting evidence regarding the availability of overtime for Filter employees and made a credibility determination. Appellant’s App. p. 149, 158. In regard to Weathers’ award, I agree with Filter that Weathers’ initial award of $12,090 was unsupported by the evidence. Appellant’s Br. p. 40. The document upon which this amount was based indicates that Weathers’ lost wages for the relevant period29 totaled $5,136, not $12,090. Appellant’s App. p. 155. It is apparent that Weathers’ earnings from other employment during this time period should have been subtracted from her anticipated earnings from Filter. This is bolstered by the fact that the Commission, in initially determining Brooks’ damages ($22,157.69), reduced her anticipated earnings from Filter ($39,312) by the amount that she earned through subsequent employment ($17,154.31). Id. at 158. I would direct the trial court to recalculate Weathers’ award.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s order affirming the Commission’s determination in favor of Brooks and Weathers but would remand with instructions to recalculate Weathers’ damages.
. Parties would be forced to respond to our decision in Petitions for Rehearing, which is troubling. Our longstanding rule is that "new claims or issues ... cannot be presented for the first time in a petition for rehearing." N. Ind. Commuter Transp. Dist. v. Chicago SouthShore & South Bend R.R., 685 N.E.2d 680, 686 (Ind.1997); see also State, Ind. Dep’t of Revenue v. Meadowood I.U. Ret. Cmty., Inc., 428 N.E.2d 791, 794 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) ("This question was not briefed or urged in appellees' brief on appeal, and it cannot be raised for the first time on petition for rehearing.") (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Wynn, 239 Ind. 567, 159 N.E.2d 572, 573 (1959)).
. The majority’s discussion of Filter’s discipline of other employees is in the context of whether Brooks and Weathers established pretext under prong three of our test.
. It is worth note that we are presented with an incomplete record. Specifically, we have only part of the transcript of the Commission’s fact-finding hearing. In compliance with Indiana Appellate Rule 50(2)(g), both parties have included portions of this transcript in their appendices. Ordinarily, however, we would also have at our disposal a full transcript and a bound exhibit volume allowing us to review without confusion the evidence that was before the Commission. See Ind. Appellate Rules 11, 12, 29. We have neither. It is unclear why the full transcript is absent from the record. In fact, Filter's Notice of Appeal notes, "A transcript of the evidence presented at the hearing before the Michigan City Human Rights Commission is the only transcript needed, and is a part of the existing record.” Appellant's App. p. 97. Lack of a full transcript in this case has hindered a thorough review of the evidence upon which the Commission relied.
.Initials will be used to identify other Filter employees whose disciplinary records are referenced.
. Brooks and Weathers present evidence of several disciplinary actions that are superfluous to our review. Felt plant worker W.R. received an oral warning for sleeping during his shift and later received a written warning for a separate incident involving the same conduct. Appellant's App. p. 168. However, there is no indication that either of these disciplinaty measures was overseen by Forbes or Wirtz, the two supervisors involved in the instant case. Id. Similarly, employee R.H. received a three-day suspension for reporting to work under the influence of alcohol, although this disciplinary action was not imposed by Forbes or Wirtz. Id. at 127, 170. These disciplinary actions taken toward W.R. and R.H. are therefore difficult to include in our evaluation of Brooks and Weathers’ prima facie case. See Cobb, 832 N.E.2d at 592 (quoting Radue, 219 F.3d at 617-18 ("Different employment decisions, concerning different employees, made by different supervisors, are seldom sufficiently comparable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination for the simple reason that different supervisors may exercise their discretion differently. These distinctions sufficiently account for any disparity in treatment, thereby preventing an inference of discrimination.”)).
. In a footnote, the majority explains that we are unable to discern from the record whether Brooks had any previous disciplinary violations and points out that Weathers had acquired "points” for previous violations. However, my reason for including this quotation from Forbes is to show that, according to one of the people involved in firing the plaintiffs, this was each of the plaintiffs first terminable offense.
. The record only contains evidence of wages lost between January and July 31, 2004. Appellant’s App. p. 155. It is unclear why other evidence of lost wages was not presented, but it was incumbent upon Weathers to present her allegations of damages to the Commission.