concurring specially, with whom MACY, Justice, joins.
This appeal must be dismissed, and the district court’s order should be vacated for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. I am concerned because of the silence of the majority opinion with respect to the jurisdictional amount. That silence could lead to a legal inference that the claims against the officer defendants could be aggregated to achieve the requisite amount in controversy to establish jurisdiction in the district court. My investigation persuades me that the claim against each of the police officers would have to exceed $7,000 in order for the district court to be vested with jurisdiction. I am also satisfied that there is an additional reason for concluding that Bird’s pleading fails to state a claim.
Bird alleges in his Complaint:
2. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Article 5, § 10, of the State of Wyoming Constitution and the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Plaintiff has made a claim unto both defendant Rozier’s and defendant Tre-nary’s respective employers, as is required by W.S. § 1-39-101 et seq., and said claims were denied.
In Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769, 771-72 (Wyo.1993) (emphasis added), we said:
In this instance, Amrein alleged the filing of the claim, but we expand upon the rule articulated in Bell [Board of Trustees of University of Wyoming v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410 (Wyo.1983) ] and now hold that, in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court, such an allegation must encompass a statement of the date the claim was filed to demonstrate the filing of the claim within two years of the date of the “alleged act, error or omission” or, alternatively, the statutory ground for the late discovery of the “alleged act, error or omission.” Since Amrein failed to make this allegation, the complaint was subject to dismissal for failure to allege the jurisdiction of the court with *894specificity. We recognize dismissal is within the discretion of the trial court, and it would generally be appropriate to enter that dismissal without prejudice. Boller v. Key Bank of Wyoming, 829 P.2d 260 (Wyo.1992); Johnson v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. of Hartford, Connecticut, 608 P.2d 1299 (Wyo.1980), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1118, 102 S.Ct. 961, 71 L.Ed.2d 105 (1981), reh’g denied, 455 U.S. 1039, 102 S.Ct. 1748, 72 L.Ed.2d 157 (1982); Breazeale v. Radich, 500 P.2d 74 (Wyo.1972). In this ease, it appears from the file that it would be impossible for Amrein to present the requisite allegations and, consequently, we affirm the order of dismissal as to Dr. Swanson.
The allegation in Bird’s Complaint is insufficient under Amrein.
In the Answer of Steve Rozier in His Official Capacity (emphasis added) it is alleged:
2. To the extent that Paragraph No. 2 of Plaintiffs Complaint calls for legal conclusion, all allegations therein are denied. Defendant Rozier in his official capacity denies that there has been compliance with Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. All other allegations in Paragraph No. 2 of Plaintiffs Complaint are denied.
As an affirmative defense the same pleading alleges:
3. There has been no compliance with the Wyoming Governmental’s [sic] Claims Act.
In the Answer of Defendants Steven Rozier and Monty Trenary, Individually, it is alleged:
2. These answering defendants have insufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of paragraph 2 and therefore deny the same.
In the Answer of Monty Trenary in His Official Capacity, it is alleged:
2. Inasmuch as Paragraph No. 2 calls for legal conclusion, the allegations contained therein are denied. All other aver-ments expressed or implied contained within Paragraph No. 2 of the Plaintiffs Complaint are also denied.
* *****
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
* ⅜ * * * *
4.The Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Wyoming Government [sic] Claims Act; therefore, this claim is barred.
In the Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of Steve Rozier, one of the grounds stated is:
3. The Complaint fails to state a claim for relief pursuant to W.S. § 1-39-101 et seq.
The claims, if there were any, are not included in the Record on Appeal. Other than the quotations above, the matter of the filing of claims in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court is not addressed in the Record on Appeal. The appeal should be dismissed and the order of the district court vacated because the failure to properly allege the timely filing of any claim deprives the trial court of jurisdiction.
As a further ground for dismissal, I note that our statute provides:
(a) Each county court has exclusive original civil jurisdiction within the boundaries of the state for:
(i) An action where the prayer for recovery is an amount not exceeding seven thousand dollars ($7,000.00), exclusive of court costs; * * *
WYO. STAT. § 5-5-131(a) (1992). The effect of this statute is to deprive the district court of jurisdiction over such claims. Joslyn v. Professional Realty, 622 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Wyo.1981). See Daulton v. Daulton, 774 P.2d 635 (Wyo.1989).
In pertinent part, the relief sought by Bird is described by him in his Complaint:
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Chester L. Bird, prays for and otherwise demands judgment against the defendants, jointly, severally and in their official and individual capacities, as follows:
# * # ‡ * ⅜
(b). Compensatory Damages in the amount of three hundred and ninty-two [sic] dollars and five cents ($392.05) from defendant Heppner for replacement of the Plaintiffs payroll check, plus 1½ % per *895month in prejudgment interest and 1⅞ % per month in postjudgment interest.
(c). Punitive Damages in the amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) from defendant Heppner, defendant Rozier and defendant Trenary in their individual capacities, each.
(d). Nominal Damages from defendant Rozier and defendant Trenary in the amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) each, in their official capacities. * ⅜ *
None of the parties raised the question of subject matter jurisdiction, but this Court has the right to consider the question of jurisdiction on its own motion. Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769 (Wyo.1993); Kurpjuweit v. Northwestern Development Co., Inc., 708 P.2d 39 (Wyo.1985); Hayes v. State, 599 P.2d 569 (Wyo.1979); Jackson v. State, 547 P.2d 1203 (Wyo.1976); Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen’s Compensation Dept. v. Niezwaag, 444 P.2d 327 (Wyo.1968); Big Horn Coal Co. v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 67 Wyo. 300, 224 P.2d 172 (1950). Indeed, we have a duty to do so. Niezwaag; Big Horn Coal Co.
I turn to federal cases for authority that I find eminently persuasive in this instance. In cases brought in the federal courts based upon diversity of citizenship between the parties, the statute provides, with respect to the jurisdictional amount:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between —
(1) citizens of different States; * * *
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994). At various times the jurisdictional amount has been $3,000 and $10,000, but almost without exception the federal courts have ruled that, in the absence of joint liability, claims against several defendants cannot be aggregated to achieve the minimum jurisdictional amount. Davis v. Schwartz, 155 U.S. 631, 15 S.Ct. 237, 39 L.Ed. 289 (1895); Walter v. Northeastern R. Co., 147 U.S. 370, 13 S.Ct. 348, 37 L.Ed. 206 (1893); Libby, McNeill, and Libby v. City Nat. Bank, 592 F.2d 504 (9th Cir.1978); U.S. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 676, 683 n. 9 (9th Cir.1976); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 404 F.2d 511 (7th Cir.1968), cert. den. 394 U.S. 988, 89 S.Ct. 1470, 22 L.Ed.2d 763 (1969); Oikarinen v. Alexian Bros., 342 F.2d 155 (3rd Cir.1965); Jewell v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 290 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.1961); Reason v. General Motors Corp., 896 F.Supp. 829 (S.D.Ind.1995); North American Mechanical Services Corp. v. Hubert, 859 F.Supp. 1186 (C.D.Ill.1994); Crouch v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 834 F.Supp. 596 (N.D.N.Y.1993); Corporate Resources, Inc. v. Southeast Suburban Ambulatory Surgical Center, Inc., 774 F.Supp. 503 (N.D.Ill.1991); Hatcher v. Emergency Medical Specialty Services, Inc., 643 F.Supp. 1124 (D.N.J.1986); Carpenter v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co., 524 F.Supp. 249 (M.D.La.1981); Welker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 502 F.Supp. 268 (C.D.Cal.1980); Payne v. Volkswagen (sic) of America, Inc., 70 F.R.D. 565 (W.D.Okla.1976); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Heller, 65 F.R.D. 83 (S.D.N.Y.1974); United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Parke, 293 F.Supp. 1350 (E.D.Mo.1968); Fratto v. Northern Ins. Co. of New York, 242 F.Supp. 262 (W.D.Pa.1965), aff'd on other grounds sub nom, Fratto v. New Amsterdam Fire Ins. Co., 359 F.2d 842 (3rd Cir.1966); Smith v. Abbate, 201 F.Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y.1961); Bree v. Mutual Ben. Health and Acc. Ass’n, 182 F.Supp. 181 (E.D.Pa.1959); Whit-ford v. Boston Ins. Co., 163 F.Supp. 819 (E.D.Ill.1958); Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Rosen, 115 F.Supp. 146 (N.D.Ill.1953); Fechheimer Bros. Co. v. Barnwasser, 146 F.2d 974 (C.C.A.6 1945). One state court has arrived at a similar conclusion. Crane v. Fulton, 270 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 1978).
Bird pleaded an intentional wrong with respect to Rozier and Trenary in their individual capacities. Nothing in the Complaint suggests any joint activity by them or any agency relationship. Rozier was a police officer employed by the City of Gillette, and Trenary was a deputy sheriff employed by the Sheriff of Campbell County. While Bird asserts joint and several liability of the two officers, no fact is alleged that would serve to make either of them responsible for the conduct of the other. Under the federal rule set forth above, it would not be possible to aggregate the damages of $5,000 plus the punitive damages of $1,000 pleaded as to each of *896them so as to go beyond the $7,000 level as to which the county court has exclusive jurisdiction.
I would remand this case to the district court with instruction that it must be dismissed because exclusive jurisdiction over Bird’s claims as to each of the defendants is assigned to the county court.