(dissenting).
The majority have upheld the rulings and the conduct of the trial by the lower court in reference to all the assignments of error with the exception of the assignment which is addressed to the failure of the trial court to exclude evidence of an oral confession made by the defendant to the investigating officers. In that regard it is my opinion that the officers did not violate A.R.S. § 8-221 in obtaining the confession voluntarily made by the defendant.
I am in substantial agreement with the facts outlined in the majority opinion. However, I find that the following material facts were not mentioned in the opinion *51which I believe should be included. For instance, the majority fails to state that when the defendant was arrested it was by Officer Joe Dunn, an investigator for the Juvenile Division of the Sheriff’s Office, and that at the time of the arrest defendant’s father and mother were present and were told the reasons for his being taken into custody. After his arrest defendant was detained at the sheriff’s office from about 1:00 a. m. to 3:30 a. m. September 12, 1961, and during the time of his detention the defendant made a voluntary statement concerning his participation in the alleged crime which the lower court allowed in evidence over the objection of defense counsel. The facts show that the officers did not threaten or coerce the defendant into making the statement nor did they make any promise to him as a matter of inducement for him to make said statement. The defendant gave some evidence that one of the officers said if he would give them a statement he would be taken to the hospital. However the testimony of the officers was otherwise, and the jury being the judges of the fact resolved this issue in favor of the state and against the defendant.
The majority hold that when the arresting officers failed to notify the probation officer of the detention of the juvenile they violated the provision in A.R.S. § 8-221 (A), which states:
“A peace officer * * * who arrests a child under the age of eighteen years shall forthwith notify the probation officer * * (Emphasis supplied.)
In support of their position the majority cites the case of Olivera v. State (Okl.Cr.1960), 354 P.2d 792 for the proposition that “confessions of juveniles obtained in the absence of parents or guardian or counsel are inadmissible in evidence, because such defendants are deemed incapable of waiving constitutional and statutory safeguards.” But rather than support the position taken by the majority it supports the position I am urging. I note on page 794 of that opinion that failure to advise a juvenile of his rights prior to his answering questions
“should be considered as affecting the admissibility of any statements made by him purporting to be a confession of guilt.” 1
*52It does not say that it will bar the admission •of the confession and in that case the confession was admitted and the Supreme •Court held this was harmless error if error at all.
The circumstances surrounding the taking of the confession from Shaw including the fact that the arresting officer was assigned to juvenile work and that the parents of the defendant were present at the time of the arrest and were told the reasons for taking the defendant into custody were before the trial court. In the absence of an abuse of discretion, or at least being shown an abuse, we should conclude that the court considered all the facts and felt none were compelling enough to bar admission of the confession.
Next the case of Gallegos v. State of Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962) is cited in support of the majority opinion. Again I disagree that the divided opinion handed down by the Supreme Court is authority for the ruling the majority are making in this case since the facts are entirely dissimilar. There the child involved was 14 years of age and had been held for five days during which time he saw no lawyer, parent, or other friendly adult. A conviction was reversed by the U. S.- Supreme Court but in a split decision of four to three. This is vastly different from the facts involved in this case where a 17-year-old boy voluntarily made a confession during a short two and one-half hour period.
The final case relied on by the majority is the case of Felder v. State, 17 Ala.App. 458, 85 So. 868 (1920). In my opinion this old case does not support the ruling of the majority. There the juvenile involved was a female child 15 years of age and in cross-examination the deputy sheriff who had the juvenile in custody testified as follows:
“Q Did you make any promise to her?
“A Yes, sir, I told her, I said: ‘You got the ring, and I know it. If you don’t give me up the ring, you might have to go off for it. If you get me the ring, I will turn you over to the juvenile people’ — and she went around the house and got it.”
It is apparent that this statement, made by the officer while the child was in his custody, was a threatening, coercive statement and the Supreme Court unquestionably was right in ruling it out as not voluntary.
The majority recognizes that the extremely liberal rule adopted in the opinion will be difficult to adhere to in the rural counties of Arizona. It is pertinent to note that 10 to 12 of the 14 counties of the state have only one probation officer, and in many *53situations it will be almost impossible to contact the probation officer within a period of several hours or even a day. However, I take it from the tone of the opinion that if a voluntary statement was made during such time the statement would be admissible.
It is fundamental that the law must be administered uniformly in all of the counties of the state and the law should not be interpreted so as to put special emphasis on a strict interpretation as to what constitutes a reasonable time in Maricopa County as distinguished from a rural county. The crux of the case is whether the officers did “forthwith” report the matter to the probation officer as that expression has been interpreted by the courts.2 8 Applying that interpretation of this term “forthwith” to the circumstances of the case at bar there seems to have been no violation of the law by the mere holding of the defendant for only two and a half, hours during the early morning hours while the officers had other matters to which they had to attend. This was not an unreasonable delay in complying with the provisions of the statute.
One of the arresting officers who held the defendant at the sheriff’s office from 1 to 3:30 a. m. stated he had not contacted the probation officer during this period because “I didn’t think it was necessary.” The majority makes inferential comment on this fact. The record does not disclose nor did either of the attorneys question him as to why he didn’t think it was necessary. The *54record shows that both officers were busy questioning the two adult prisoners who were arrested at the same time as the juvenile, and it is more reasonable to conclude that the officer didn’t think it was necessary at that hour of the night — when they were busily engaged in discharging their duties — than it is to conclude that they were deliberately acting in defiance of the law. Every presumption should be made in favor of an officer discharging his duty, and every inference from the testimony should be given to maintain the integrity of the officer. Lorenzen v. Superior Court, 150 Cal.App.2d 506, 310 P.2d 180 (1957).
The judgment should be affirmed.
. In the Oklahoma case the facts are significant. I quote from page 794: “The defendants offered no proof as to the contention of the involuntary character of the confessions, and the contention that they were obtained by promises made by the officers. To the contrary, the officers clearly established that the confessions were not only voluntarily made, but that they were not the result of promises, threats, intimidation, or abuse. * * * There is nothing in the State’s case that supports the defendant’s contentions, except that they were 17 and 18 years of age. We are of the opinion that this fact standing alone is not sufficient to void a confession when the same is validly made under the law.”
Such is the case before us. The fact that a probation officer was not contacted *52sooner than two anti one-half hours after the arrest “standing alone is not sufficient to void a confession when the same is validly made under the law.”
. This court, in a civil case involving a statute authorizing the seizure of cattle by inspector for purpose of determining .title, defined the term “forthwith” as used in the statute with regard to the time the inspector should report the seizure to the clerk of the superior court as follows:
“The word ‘forthwith’ does not mean within any particular time, but substantially with as much speed as is reasonably possible under the circumstances of the case.” State v. McEuen, 42 Ariz. 385, 397, 26 P.2d 1005, 1009 (1933). See United States v. Bell, 48 F.Supp. 986 (1943) in which the Federal District Court, Southern District, California, used the same definition in a criminal action. In a criminal action in North Carolina as recently as 1961 it was said with regard to the meaning of the terms “forthwith” and “immediately”:
“Such terms never mean the absolute exclusion of any interval of time, but tnean only that no unreasonable length of time shall intervene before performance.” State v. Ball, 255 N.C. 351, 121 S.E.2d 604 (1961).
In State v. Smith, 32 N.J. 501, 161 A.2d 520 (1960) in which a confession was taken from a juvenile during a period in which he claimed to have been illegally detained it was said at page 537 of 161 A.2d:
“ * * * [W] e do not conceive that R.R. 6:8-3(b) and (c), in speaking of an officer who has taken a juvenile into custody without process making ‘immediate arrangements’ to have him removed to his home or place in an approved detention facility, requires that such must necessarily be done before the police are afforded a reasonable opportunity to question, where that course is desirable or important." (Emphasis supplied.)