(dissenting). I agree that the order of the lower court must be reversed. However, I would reverse with prejudice because the undisputed facts clearly establish that plaintiffs engaged in “wilful noncompliance” with a condition precedent to maintaining an action on the insurance contract.
It appears that the majority is trying to engage in rule making for which it has no authority. People v Sallee, 63 Mich App 146, 149; 234 NW2d 180 (1975). See also Const 1963, art 3, § 8. The majority hopes that “henceforth” its legal conclusions will be applied to prospective cases. Nevertheless, the rule of law *57that the majority endorses, but does not apply, is mere dicta. As the Supreme Court stated in Hett v Duffy, 346 Mich 456, 461; 78 NW2d 284 (1956), quoting with approval People v Case, 220 Mich 379, 382-383; 190 NW 289 (1922):
“Statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand, are, however illuminating, but obiter dicta and lack the force of an adjudication.”
The majority does not apply its rule of wilful noncompliance because “the actions and nonactions of the Thomsons’ counsel were taken before the decision in Yeo, when the extent of the obligation of an insured under an insurance policy with provisions substantially similar to those at issue in this case was perhaps questionable.” Ante at 52. I respectfully disagree. The provision of the insurance policy in dispute is the “plain English” version of the statutorily mandated language contained in all fire insurance contracts until January 1, 1992. 1990 PA 305; see former MCL 500.2832; MSA 24.12832. Over eighty years ago in Gordon v St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co, 197 Mich 226, 230-231; 163 NW 956 (1917), the Supreme Court held that this policy provision is valid and is a condition precedent to maintaining an action on an insurance contract:
The provision of the policy above quoted is a valid one and as a general rule enforceable, and one who without cause refuses to submit to examination should be precluded from maintaining an action on the policy. The purpose of the examination is to elicit the facts in order that *58the company may determine whether it will defend or adjust the claim. . . .
. . . Under the circumstances of this case the request of the plaintiff that her attorney be present when such examination took place did not amount to a refusal to submit to an examination so as to preclude her right of recovery.
On this issue, Yeo v State Farm Ins Co, 219 Mich App 254; 555 NW2d 893 (1996), did not change our insurance law, but, rather, reaffirmed the existing law as set forth in Gordon, supra. See also 5A Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, § 3549, pp 549-553; 13A Couch, Insurance, 2d (rev ed), § 49A:361, pp 759-762; anno: Requirement under property insurance policy that insured submit to examination under oath as to loss, 16 ALR5th 412.
Additionally, the majority has erred by mischaracterizing the facts of Yeo. As stated by the Yeo panel, plaintiff Yeo’s failure to comply with the defendant’s request for an examination under oath (euo) was not a “flat refusal.” Yeo, supra at 259. Rather, among other defenses, the plaintiff in Yeo argued in her appeal brief that the timing of the defendant’s request was not reasonable under the circumstances (scheduled only twenty days after the plaintiff was interrogated by the defendant’s representative for a thirty-two-page transcribed statement). Therefore, the plaintiff in Yeo asserted that her failure to appear for the euo should be excused. In contrast to Yeo, the present case involves no proffered excuses regarding the timing or location of defendant’s multiple EUO requests, but, rather, plaintiffs’ “flat refusal” to comply.
In my view, an insured’s “wilful noncompliance” with the EUO condition precedent constitutes a mate*59rial breach of the insurance contract thereby mandating dismissal with prejudice. In regard to the term “wilful,” I would adopt the Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed) definition:
A willful act may be described as one done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly, or inadvertently. A willful act differs essentially from a negligent act. The one is positive and the other negative.
This well-articulated standard is consistent with our prior definitions of the term. See Pavlov v Community Emergency Medical Service, Inc, 195 Mich App 711, 716; 491 NW2d 874 (1992), and cases cited therein.
The majority has formulated a two-pronged definition for wilful noncompliance: “a deliberate effort to withhold material information ... or a pattern of noncooperation with the insurer.” Ante, at 55. While this definition may be helpful in other cases in which only circumstantial evidence of intent is present, in the instant case the proposed test is irrelevant in light of the direct evidence of plaintiffs’ intent not to comply. There is no genuine factual dispute that plaintiffs’ noncompliance regarding defendant’s numerous requests for an EUO was committed “intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, [and] without justifiable excuse . . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary, supra.1 On this *60basis, I would hold that plaintiffs’ noncompliance was wilful thereby mandating dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice.
Finally, I note that the relief ordered by the majority appears moot. The one-year period of limitation contained in the policy ostensibly bars the refiling of this action. Further, a sworn examination at this late date would not fulfill the purposes of an EUO. See Watson v Nat’l Surety Corp of Chicago, Illinois, 468 NW2d 448; 16 ALR5th 1047 (Iowa, 1991).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the order of the trial court and remand for entry of an order dismissing the action with prejudice.
Defendant’s numerous euo requests and warnings of the consequence of noncompliance are detailed in footnote number three of the majority opinion. In his letter of May 14, 1996, plaintiffs’ counsel wrote that his clients would not submit to an euo unless defendant could convince them that an euo would serve a useful purpose. Consistent with this letter, plaintiffs have represented the following facts in the introduction of their appeal brief:
*60Despite the information Appellees had already provided, State Farm requested further examination under oath. State Farm’s adjuster indicated to Appellees that State Farm did not believe their claim. Appellees believed, therefore, that submitting to further investigation with State Farm would be pointless. Consequently, appellees did not submit to examination under oath.