Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bell:I concur in the Opinion of the Court as to Defendant Moore; however, I would enter judgment on the verdict for Defendant Price.
It is clear from all of the evidence that Moore’s negligence was the proximate and superseding cause of the accident and that if Price were negligent his negligence was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries. Moreover, the jury obviously and undoubtedly believed that the accident was not Price’s fault.
Price arrived at the bridge before Moore. As Price came up to the bridge, Moore slowed down and thus lulled Price into believing he could safely cross the bridge. When Price was committed to the bridge, Moore suddenly quickened his speed at a time when Price was already on the bridge. Price testified that at the speed he was travelling two automobiles can go through the bridge at the same time and as he started to cross the bridge it seemed safe to him to proceed at the same rate of speed at which he was travelling. *52However, when Moore quickened his speed there was nothing for Price to do ¡but go a little faster so that he could traverse the bridge before Moore got on it.
Moore testified that he was familiar with the road and with the bridge and that he did not see Price’s car until he, Moore, was 10 feet from the bridge, at which time Price was nearly across the bridge and about '20 feet from him. Moore further testified that if he had seen the Price car before he was 10 feet from the bridge he could have avoided the accident. When Price was already almost across the bridge and Moore had not yet reached it, instead of bringing his vehicle to a stop, Moore continued driving and ran into the abutment of the bridge and injured the plaintiffs.
The trial Judge granted a new trial because in his judgment the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and he was shocked, believing that both defendants were equally guilty and that the verdict represented a miscarriage of justice.
No Judge on this Court has championed the right of a trial Judge to grant a new trial where in his opinion Justice requires it, as frequently or as vigorously as I. In Bellettiere v. Philadelphia, 367 Pa. 638, 81 A. 2d 857, I said (page 645) : “I would, therefore, hold that where a trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses grants a new trial, not for an error of law or because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, but solely because of his conscientious conviction that the interest of justice requires it, an appellate court will not, in the absence of fraud or collusion, reverse such action.”
Unfortunately that is not the law. However, I believe it would have been better expressed if after the words “fraud or collusion” the words “a very palpable abuse of discretion” had been added. In other words, I would sustain a lower Court in 98% or 99% of tiie times where s> trial Judge grants a new trial because *53of bis 'conviction that “the interest of justice” requires it. However, I am convinced that this is the one hundredth case. It was natural for the trial Judge to be shocked at the verdict in favor of Moore, but certainly not as to Price. Even if it be assumed that the evidence was sufficient to take the question of Price’s negligence to the jury, it would have been a gross miscarriage of justice for the jury to have returned a verdict for plaintiff against Price. For the above mentioned reasons 1 would reverse the grant of a new trial in Hancock et al. v. Price because of a very palpable abuse of discretion by the lower Court, and I would here enter judgment on the verdict in favor of Price.