(dissenting) :
I concur in the conclusion that no error should be cast upon the court below because of the court’s action in refusing to permit the witness Bagley to give the reasons why he entered a plea of guilty to second degree manslaughter.
The basis of my conclusion is the rule set out in Lee v. State, 37 Ala.App. 321, 69 So. 2d 467, which rule was supported by citations of opinions of this court, and is to the effect that the exception to the rule of excluding testimony as to mental operations, which exception permits a witness to testify as to his motive in making discrediting statements brought out by an opponent’s examination, should have no operation where a witness is discredited by showing his conviction for crime. This has been the view enunciated by this court, and by the Court of Appeals in many cases. See, Waters v. State, 117 Ala. 108, 22 So. 490; Fuller v. State, 147 Ala. 35, 41 So. 774; Ellis v. State, 244 Ala. 79, 11 So.2d 861; Kendrick v. Cunningham, 9 Ala.App. 398, 63 So. 797; Formby v. Williams, 17 Ala. App. 24, 81 So. 360; Nelson v. State, 35 Ala.App. 179, 44 So.2d 802.
A judgment or decree of a court which has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, and which possesses the power to render the particular judgment or decree should be, and is, immune from a collateral attack. Constantine v. Constantine, 261 Ala. 40, 72 So.2d 831.
The rule in Lee v. State, supra, is clear and certain in application. Exceptions sought to be engrafted onto a clear and workable rule are often overrefined and tend to lead to confusion in applying them to slightly differing facts. Confusion thus replaces certainty, an element to be devoutly sought in law and cherished when obtained.
If justice demands a gloss of exceptions be grafted on a legal rule, then well and good. I cannot see, however, that departing from the rule enunciated in Lee v. State, supra, would with any degree of probability tend to favor or insure the rendition of justice to any greater extent than would adherence to the Lee rule.
To depart from the rule is but to invite confusion as surely as night follows day. For an example of such a development one need but to examine our cases dealing with the Rule of Exclusion prevailing in this state, and only in this state, and the chaos wrought by engrafting exceptions thereon. Many of these exceptions present distinctions without a difference, and render application of the rule impossible with any degree of certitude. A thorough analysis of this situation is presented in an article by Judge McElroy, in 1 Ala. Lawyer 221, and the dissenting opinion authored by then Chief Justice Livingston in McGuff v. State, 248 Ala. 259, 27 So.2d 241.
Nor do I agree that this is a type of situation in which discretion should be vested in the trial court. Such rule would again invite uncertainty as to what evidence is to be considered admissible in a situation as is here presented.