(dissenting).
It is appreciated that this case is not without difficulty. Nevertheless, I believe that there was a sufficient foundation in the evidence to justify submitting the matter to the jury on the basis of the instruction, which is fairly and properly set forth in the next to the last paragraph of the main opinion.1 It will be seen therefrom that the trial court carefully set forth the prerequisites to finding responsibility upon the defendant. Inasmuch as both parties have had a full and fair opportunity to present their evidence and their contentions, and the jury has so found the facts, and the trial court has also given his approval, I think the matter should not now be approached from a different point of view and the whole case ripped asunder by reversal of the judgment.
In that connection it seems appropriate to again state a doctrine of review about which we do not disagree in the statement, but about which we do frequently disagree in application: that it is the duty of the reviewing court to assume that the jury believed those aspects of the evidence and *174. drew- whatever reasonable inferences they could fairly deduce therefrom in the light favorable to support their verdict; and ^ore specifically applicable here: that the court should not pass over lightly nor ignore any aspect of the evidence important to the verdict reached by the jury.
The plaintiffs had, for approximately 18 years, carried fire insurance on their home through policies obtained from an insurance, man, Noble Kimball. During all of this time the custom and practice had been .that just prior to the expiration of a poli- ■ cy, Mr. Kimball would notify the plain.tiffs, either by. mail,, or in person; and ■would keep the insurance in effect by renewal, and bill the plaintiffs and they ■ would pay the premium. A few months •. before ¡the policy in issue here was written, ■Mr. Kimball- advised the plaintiffs that he was, retiring and' introduced them to Richard Salisbury, an employee of defendant •Diversified Insurance Agency, who would 'be talcing over his business. Mr. Salisbury assured them that the insurance would be handled exactly as it had been in the past. He obtained the policy in question for the 'plaintiffs. It covered from October 1, 1964, to October 1, 1967. On October 19, 1967, the fire occurred which damaged plaintiffs’ home. The plaintiffs had received no notice concerning the expiration of the policy, and received no word’ about it until four days after they phoned Diver- ' sified to notify them of the fire loss.
The law relating to contracts is a vast field of many rules wherein one may be selected as seeming to apply to either side of 'practically any controversy. Such rules are of course all right if properly applied • to the facts. But the matter of importance is to see that the rule selected and applied as controlling is so specifically applicable to the facts that it does justice between the parties; and this is the consideration which transcends all others in determining the correct rule to be applied.
With respect to insurance that is periodically renewed by the payment of a premium, there is abundant authority supporting the rule that where an established custom between the insurer and the insured leads the latter to believe that he will be notified before his renewal premium is due, and no notice is given, the insurer will be estopped from asserting the lapse in the policy when claims are presented to cover losses incurred after the term of the policy.2 A leading case on this issue is Seavey v. Erickson,3 wherein the court stated:
* * * where it has been established that it is the custom and the practice of the insurer to give notice of the time for payment of a renewal premium and *175knowledge of such custom is acquired hy an insured in dealings with the insurer, the insured has a right to rely on such notice, and, in the absence thereof, the policy may not be terminated or forfeited withotit giving the insured some notice that such custom has been abandoned. [Emphasis added.]
This court has approved a similar rule in a case involving a personal accident insurance policy:4 that where through the practice of accepting past due premium payments, the insurer has led the insured to believe that the policy will not immediately be' forfeited for the nonpayment of premiums, the insurer may not disclaim its liability under the policy for claims arising during a period when a premium 'was due. Although I realize there are differences between fire and accident insurance policies, it is of little or no consequence to the insured whether an existing policy is continued or extended, or a new policy of the same import is written. His objective is to keep insurance coverage and he does this through the insurance man whom he assumes to have specialized knowledge and who is better able to handle the- matter than himself. It is for this reason that the plaintiffs here, just as in the Seavey case, supra, could claim the benefit of relying upon the practices of the insurer..
The accuracy of the statement in the main opinion that the insurance man is acting as the agent of the insured and not of the insurer depends upon the facts of the given case. He is often acting as agent for both. There was adequate proof presented concerning the facts- vital to holding the company responsible for the ■acts of the insurance agent to providé a reasonable basis for the view necessarily taken by the jury in imposing responsibility upon the defendant company. In that connection, it is to be kept in mind that it was the insurance company who selected the agent and entrusted the handling of its business to him. It was its purpose to take the benefits of his conduct favorable to the company by issuing policies and collecting premiums. Accordingly, it should be bound by his conduct in all aspects thereof reasonably apparent to and relied upon by the customer, the same as if the company had acted through any of its officers; and it should not be permitted to take the inconsistent position of accepting the advantages of what he would do for them, but insist that they are not responsible for any unfavorable aspect of his doing business with the customers.5 Whatever other limitations there may have been upon the agent’s authority were effective only as between him and the company, unless it was *176made known to the plaintiffs. I think it is quite impractical and unreasonable to impose upon a customer the duty of inquiry as to the nature and extent of any specific limitations an insurance company may have placed upon an agent with whom he does business.6
To avoid repetition, I refer to my views on the importance of paying more than lip service to what we keep referring to as “the right of trial by jury” as set forth in my dissenting opinions in Roylance v. Davies, 18 Utah 2d 395, 424 P.2d 142; Memmott v. United States Fuel Co., 22 Utah 2d 356, 453 P.2d 155; and DeMille v. Erickson, 23 Utah 2d 278, 462 P.2d 159, and authorities cited therein, including the statement of Justice Murphy in Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752, 62 S.Ct. 854, 86 L.Ed. 1166, about the right of trial by jury being, “ * * * fundamental and sacred to the citizen * * * [and which] * * * should be jealously guarded by the courts.”
This -reversal deprives the plaintiffs of a verdict obtained in the procedure prescribed by law and through the expenditure of the time, trouble and expense of a jury trial where each side had a fair opportunity to win. It is my opinion that this decision unfairly and improperly takes from them what in morality and justice they are entitled to. I would sustain the jury verdict and affirm the judgment of the trial court thereon.7
. Seavey v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 232, 69 N.W.2d 889, 52 A.L.R.2d 1144.
. Couch on Insurance 2d, Sec. 32:369 et seq. and authorities therein cited. •
. Footnote 1 above.
. Loftis v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 38 Utah 532, 114 P. 134.
. O. S. Stapley Co. v. Logan, 6 Ariz.App. 269, 431 P.2d 910; and see Farrington v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co. et al., 120 Utah 109, 232 P.2d 754.
. A field representative of a benefit society 'lias been held to be the agent of the general society in spite of a provision in the by-laws that he would be considered ■ the agent of the individual members, Knights of the Maccabees of the World v. Johnson, 79 Okl. 77, 185 P: 82.
. See statement in Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P.2d 822, affirming verdict for defendant; and in Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121, affirming verdict for plaintiff.