OPINION
STEPHENSON, Justice.This is a workmen’s compensation case in which the trial court entered judgment for the claimant which was, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the claim was not timely filed. Section 59-10-13.6 (A), N.M.S.A., 1953 (Supp.1969) (Laws 1959, ch. 67, § 10; amended, Laws 1963, ch. 269, § 6 and Laws 1967, ch. 151, § 1) Duran v. The New Jersey Zinc Company, 82 N.M. 742, 487 P.2d 170 (Ct.App.1971). We granted certiorari, reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
The period of limitations does not commence to run until it becomes reasonably apparent, or should become reasonably apparent, to the workman that he has an injury for which he is entitled to compensation. Noland v. Young Drilling Company, 79 N.M. 444, 444 P.2d 771 (Ct.App.1968).
The trial court found as a fact that:
“All physicians who treated the plaintiff for the accidental injury described herein released plaintiff to return to his full employment duties. It did not become and should not have become reasonably apparent to plaintiff that he had an injury on account of which he would have been entitled to Workmen’s Compensation benefits.”
The Court of Appeals in its opinion says that it was reasonably apparent to the claimant that he was partially disabled on and after January 4, 1964, the date that he returned to work after his first injury. In making this statement, the court has attributed to an uneducated laborer a knowledge of the human body which apparently transcends that possessed by the attending physician. It has succumbed to the vice of weighing the evidence.
The doctor who treated the claimant and performed two operations on him, on each occasion was of the view that he could thereafter perform the duties required by his regular employment. It was not until September of 1968 that claimant’s physician felt that his workload should be lightened. The claimant testified, inter alia:
“A. I didn’t feel too good but the doctor and the company keep telling me it takes about two years or three years before I can feel normal in my arm so I just kept working, * * * ”
There is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s quoted finding.
“* * * [W]e are bound to view the evidence, together with all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, in the light most favorable to support the findings. All evidence unfavorable to the findings must be disregarded and no unfavorable inferences will be drawn.” Oberman v. Oberman, 82 N.M. 472, 483 P.2d 1312 (1971).
The rule is the same in workmen’s compensation cases. Irvin v. Rainbo Baking Company, 76 N.M. 213, 413 P.2d 693 (1966); Gammon v. Ebasco Corporation, 74 N.M. 789, 399 P.2d 279 (1965); Montano v. Saavedra, 70 N.M. 332, 373 P.2d 824 (1962).
The Court of Appeals opinion places principal reliance upon Cordova v. Union Baking Company, 80 N.M. 241, 453 P.2d 761 (Ct.App.1969). A notable point of distinction between that case and this one is that in Cordova the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s determination that because it was reasonably apparent to the injured workman that he had a compensable injury, the period of limitations had therefore expired. Here, ignoring the substantial evidence rule, it has weighed the evidence and reversed.
Finally, the court, in speaking of the trial court’s finding that we have quoted, says that there is a lack of evidence that claimant relied upon the doctor’s statements.. In accordance with our substantial evidence rule, such reliance, if it be consequential, is easily inferred in support of the trial court’s finding and judgment. The inference arises from the fact that following, and in accordance with, the doctor’s statements, the claimant did in fact twice return to his duties.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the trial court is directed to reinstate and give full force and effect to its judgment.
It is so ordered.
COMPTON, C. J., and McMANUS, and MONTOYA, JJ., concur.