dissenting:
I find the reasoning of the majority as to the construction of the Contribution Act difficult, if not impossible, to understand. As I read the opinion, it states that, since an employer may have a judgment entered against him in a negligence action if he does not establish the employer-employee relationship, then he is “subject to liability in tort” and the right of contribution exists. Theoretically, the same reasoning can be applied to any situation. A complete stranger to a transaction may have a judgment entered against him if he is served with process and takes no action to defend himself and permits a judgment to be entered. Under the reasoning of the majority, I suppose that the complete stranger would be a person “subject to liability in tort.” Such a construction renders the limitation of the applicability of the act to persons “subject to liability in tort” meaningless.
The opinion, in support of its reasoning, cites several opinions of this court which are inapposite to the issue in this case. Robertson v. Travelers Insurance Co. (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 441, states:
“This court has held the failure to plead and prove such a defense [under section 5(a) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act] decisive only where there was a factual question as to whether the injury alleged arose out of and in the course of the work ***. In this case the necessary factual allegations *** appear in the record or were advanced by Robertson himself at trial, and the underlying injury was the subject of a proceeding which led to a workmen’s compensation recovery. The question of whether Robertson’s [injury] was covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act was therefore purely a legal one, and no purpose would have been served by requiring its pleading before the jury as long as it came to the attention of the trial judge and Robertson was given a chance to respond.” (Robertson v. Travelers Insurance Co. (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 441, 451-52.)
In Hindle v. Dillbeck (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 309, the controlling question was whether the injured plaintiffs were in the line of their duty, that is, the course of their employment, at the time of the accident. This court held that the employer was required to plead and prove that defense which, in that case, this court held had been done and the plaintiffs therefore were not entitled to recover for negligence against their defendant employer. In Meador v. City of Salem (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 572, there was a question of fact whether the plaintiff at the time of the injury was engaged in the line of his duty as an employee of the defendant. The question had been resolved adversely to the employer by the jury’s answer to a special interrogatory. The defense of section 5(a) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act therefore did not bar the negligence action against the defendant. The other cases cited in the opinion are to the same effect.
I do not dispute that the defendant in a negligence action must raise the defense of section 5(a) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and it must be proved just as any defendant must plead and prove any defense. But when it has been established that the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant and that he was injured in the line of duty, the employer is not “subject to liability in tort.” Section 5(a) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 138.5(a)) provides:
“No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer *** for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee other than the compensation herein provided, is available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act ***.”
We are not in this case confronted with any question of fact. It is undisputed that the plaintiff Doyle was an employee of the third-party defendant Rein, Schultz & Dahl. In fact, the majority opinion at the outset, in setting forth the nature of the action under consideration, says:
“The original plaintiff, Charles L. Doyle, sued the defendant, Kathleen C. Rhodes, in the circuit court of Winnebago County seeking recovery for injuries he received while at work as a highway flagman employed by Rein, Schultz & Dahl, a highway contractor.” (Emphasis added.) (101 Ill. 2d at 4.)
Thus, all the factual questions have been resolved. The issues involved in the cases discussed above are not present. In fact, as stated in the language in Robertson quoted above, the question of whether the employer is "subject to liability in tort” is purely a legal one. Under section 5(a) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, where there is no question that the plaintiff was injured in the line of his duty as an employee, the employer is not “subject to liability in tort.” The reasoning of the majority opinion, in an attempt to circumvent section 5(a) and hold that an employer is subject to liability in tort, is strained and not convincing.
In attempting to ascertain the legislative intent that is expressed in the Contribution Act, the majority looks at the legislative debates and concludes that nothing in those debates even remotely suggests a desire to modify Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 1. In my reading of the debates, I find that only two members of the House of Representatives mentioned the Skinner decision. Nowhere in the debates does anyone discuss or even allude to the interrelationship between the Contribution Act or the Skinner decision and section 5(a) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The holding of Skinner that an employer can be held responsible for contribution-was only one small part of the total Skinner holding. The fact that two members of the House of Representatives stated simply that the Act is a codification of Skinner does not indicate to me that the 122 members of the House who voted for the Act intended that it codify all aspects of Skinner, including that small part of the decision relating to contribution by an employer. This is particularly so when the Act plainly limits its application to persons who are “subject to liability in tort.”
The language of the Contribution Act is clear and unambiguous. It is the language of the statute itself which affords the best means of ascertaining legislative intent. If legislative intent can be ascertained from the language of the statute, that intent must prevail and will be given effect without resorting to other aids for construction. (Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 342, 350; People ex rel. Mayfield v. City of Springfield (1959) , 16 Ill. 2d 609, 614-15.) In Franzese v. Trinko (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 136, 139-40, this court stated “[tjhere is no rule of construction which authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports.” (People v. Moore (1978), 69 Ill. 2d 520, 523; Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer (1960) , 19 Ill. 2d 342, 350.) It is only where the language is unclear or ambiguous that a court may indulge in the process of statutory construction and consult other indicia of legislative intent. 2A A. Sutherland, Statutory Construction secs. 45.02, 46.04 (4th ed. 1973).
The language of the Contribution Act appeared clear and unambiguous to Professor Larson, who, as noted in the majority opinion, criticized the Skinner decision (101 Ill. 2d at 12-13) and then stated that the language of the Contribution Act “clearly does not support contribution on the Skinner facts.” (Emphasis added.) (2 A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation sec. 76.39, at 14 — 626 (1983).) I am not willing to disregard the language which Professor Larson deems to be “clear” and look to the statements of two members of the House of Representatives made during debate that the Act codifies Skinner to ascertain legislative intent, especially when no reference was made in the debate to that very small part of the Skinner decision that the majority relies on in this case.
For the reasons stated, I must respectfully dissent.