concurring in result as to issue IIL.
I agree with my colleagues that Hay-craft's convictions should be affirmed and his sentence revised. However, I write separately to suggest a different analysis regarding the admissibility of opinion testimony given by Officer Scarber.
Judge Brook contends that Officer Sear-ber's testimony is admissible under Indiana Rule of Evidence 701, as a skilled witness. Judge Kirsch disagrees, arguing in part that "it is anomalous to admit opinion testimony by a witness unqualified as an expert without a showing of scientific reliability when one qualified as an expert would not be allowed to give such testimony." Slip opinion at 18. I agree with Judge Kirseh's conclusion that it was error to admit Officer Scarber's testimony, but for different reasons.
I agree with Judge Kirsch that the trial court decision to admit Officer Scearber's testimony under Indiana Rule of Evidence 701 effectively changed the status of his opinion to that of a qualified expert, without first satisfying the requisite safeguards of Indiana Rule of Evidence 702. But standing alone this statement fails to acknowledge the specialized knowledge continuum upon which Rule 702 and Rule 701 assessments may properly be made. See 13B Miunumr, Inorana EvineNcs at 196 (1996) (defining a "skilled witness" as a person with "a degree of knowledge short of that sufficient to be declared an expert under Rule 702, but somewhat beyond that possessed by the ordinary jurors"). Clearly, the determination of whether a lay witness may be qualified as a skilled witness under Rule 701 remains within the discretion of the trial court, and may on occasion be strictly a question of assessing knowledge based on training, experience, education or the like. However, to ensure that Indiana juries retain control of matters squarely within their province, the parameters of Rule 701 must be strictly adhered to, lest lay opinions become expert opinions in the process causing juries to give undue weight to select testimony. Here, where Officer Scearber's testimony regarding the "priming" factors used by child molesters remains separate and apart from the facts he perceived in Hay-craft's home, his testimony fails to meet the criterion of Rule 701 as interpreted by recent caselaw.
Rule 701 states in part that opinion testimony by a lay witness "is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)rationally based on the perception of the witness ..." (Emphasis added.) Wessrer's Nintgk NEw Dictronary (1989) defines perception as follows:
1 obs: CONSCIOUSNESS 2 a: a result of perceiving: OBSERVATION b: a mental image: CONCEPT 3 a: awareness of the elements of environment through physical sensation <color> b: physical sensation interpreted in the light of experience 4 a: quick, acute, and intuitive cognition: APPRECIATION b: a capacity for comprehension syn see DISCERNMENT ...
In accord with the above definition, recent caselaw affirming the use of opinion testimony under Rule 701 has involved testimony that blends the witness's physical observations and specialized knowledge, such *217that the inference or opinion is not solely premised upon that witness's training or area of specialty. See e.g. O'Neal v. State, 716 N.E.2d 82, 89 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) trans. denied (holding that an officer familiar with drug transactions was qualified to offer his opinion on the issue of defendant's intent to sell crack cocaine based on his observation that the defendant was carrying sixty-six grams of cocaine and $1128.00 on his person;17 Hanson v. State, 704 N.E.2d 152, 155 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (holding that an officer could offer opinion testimony where he was experienced in handling firearms, had consulted a book regarding the at-issue gun, and "most importantly, [had viewed] the P380 handgun found in [defendant's] bedroom."); Mariscal v. State, 687 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (holding that a reserve police officer's opinion that some of defendant's injuries were self-inflicted was admissible because the officer had observed the knife fight); Wagner v. State, 474 N.E.2d 476, 494 (Ind.1985) (holding that police officers could only "testify about what they observed and in the use of their senses[,]" but not to the defendant's thought process); Dudley v. State, 480 N.E.2d 881, 898 (Ind.1985) (holding that a police officer could opine about bullet paths and powder burns in the defendant's car); Almodovar v. State, 464 N.E.2d 906, 910-11 (Ind.1984) (holding that a police officer could testify regarding the caliber of particular weapons he observed).
The aforementioned cases are also consistent with the intent of Article VII of the Indiana Rules of Evidence. Article VII was created against a common law backdrop that "long preferred factual testimony to opinion testimony." 183 Inpmana EvinpencE at 310-11 (2d ed.1995). "The general rule is that witnesses are confined to testifying to specific statements of fact but opinion testimony in certain situations is allowed as an exception to the rule." Wagner, 474 N.E.2d at 494. Moreover, this Court has shown even greater reservation for the admissibility of profiling testimony in general, expressing "concern for juries placing excessive weight on character assessments made by experts." Buzzard v. State, 669 N.E.2d 996, 1000 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (holding was within the context of Rule 702). Nevertheless, the trial court permitted Officer Scarber to testify regarding general priming techniques typically used by child molesters and the description of physical objects already easily appreciated by the jury, and in doing so blurred the lines of distinction between Rules 701 and 702, and failed to treat Article VII as containing exceptions to the common law rule.
For the above stated reasons I concur with the majority on issues I., II., IV, and V., but concur in result only with issue IIL.
. I disagree with the O'Neal panel's conclusion that the police officer's opinion testimony was admissible to determine intent. See Evid. R.704(b) ("Witnesses may not testify to opinions concerning intent, guilt, or innocence in a criminal case; ..."). However, had the officer simply opined that the amount of cocaine and cash found on the defendant exceeded that of a typical drug abuser I would have agreed that such testimony was within the confines of Rule 701.