(dissenting, with whom Lynch, J., joins). I dissent. The court today has held that a trial judge may not consider perjury committed by a defendant, who has elected to take the witness stand, as a factor in his sentencing. The result is disturbing. Every jurisdiction which has considered the issue (there are twelve) holds to the contrary, i.e., a trial judge may consider a defendant’s perjury, among other things, as a factor in assessing his character and disposition for rehabilitation.1
The court asserts that the judge should not have considered the perjury of the defendant “without the procedural safeguards of an indictment and trial.” Supra at 810. However, the court concedes that the sentencing judge may consider hearsay evidence of the defendant’s “character, family life, and employment situation,” and “indictments or evidence of similar or recurrent criminal conduct if it is relevant in assessing the defendant’s character and propensity for rehabilitation.” Supra at 805. It seems to me that these factors are hardly more reliable as indices of the defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation than his commission of perjury in the judge’s presence. See Grayson v. United States, 438 U.S. 41, 52 (1978). Further, a sentencing judge may consider the evidence presented at trial and the demeanor of the defendant at trial.
*812There is no good reason why a judge whose task it is so often to act as a trier of fact cannot make a finding as to whether a defendant has committed perjury in testifying before him. He is as suitably equipped to make this finding as he is to appraise the defendant’s demeanor and all the other factors which are important in sentencing.
The court says that to permit a sentencing judge to consider a defendant’s perjury chills the defendant’s right to testify in his own behalf. The short answer to this is that he has no right to commit perjury and if his predisposition to commit perjury is chilled, so much the better for the administration of justice. The right of the defendant is to testify truthfully in accordance with the oath taken by all witnesses. See United States v. Grayson, supra at 54. This right is not chilled.
I would hold that where a trial judge is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant has committed perjury in the judge’s presence, he is entitled to consider the perjury in sentencing the defendant as one factor, among others, in assessing his prospects for rehabilitation and restoration to a useful niche in society.
Coleman v. State, 621 P.2d 869, 883 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1090 (1981). People v. Redmond, 29 Cal. 3d 904, 913-914 (1981). Peoplev. Wilson, 43 Colo. App. 68, 71 (1979). Hector v. Florida, 370 So. 2d 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). People v. Meeks, 81 Ill. 2d 524, 536-537 (1980). State v. Smith, 407 So. 2d 652, 657 (La. 1981). State v. Plante, 417 A.2d 991, 996 (Me. 1980). Atkins v. State, 40 Md. App. 461, 463-465 (1978). Matter of Jones, 176 Mont. 412, 419-420 (1978). State v. Thompson, 62 N.C. App. 38, 43 (1983). Commonwealth v. Thurmond, 268 Pa. Super. 283, 287-289 (1979). In re Luft, 21 Wash. App. 841, 853 (1979).