dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
It is undisputed that for at least the last 10 years, Wayne Clements has engaged in conduct that makes a normal person’s skin crawl (exposing himself while masturbating). It is easy to lose one’s objectivity while dealing with such a highly emotional situation.
The question is not whether the prosecuting attorney and/or the trial judge would personally feel threatened or endangered if confronted with such disgusting behavior; the question is whether Clements is a psychopathic personality and dangerous to the general population, or at least to the female portion thereof. That is probably why there is a provision for the use of the testimony of expert witnesses by both sides in such cases. But the experts should be genuine, and not chosen to bolster the already-determined opinion of either side. It is interesting to note that one of the county’s experts, Richard Seely, did not agree with the county’s opinion that the respondent-appellant, Clements, is dangerous within the meaning of the statute and should receive an indeterminate commitment to the State Security Hospital in St. Peter.
The court-appointed expert was Dr. Roger Sweet. It is true that the determination as to whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert is almost solely within the province of the trial court; however, the weight to be given his or her testimony should be determined by the extent of his or her qualification. In my opinion, the full faith and credit given by the trial court to his testimony far exceeded the qualification of Dr. Sweet, who had never before been involved in examining an adult alleged psychopathic personality. The objectivity of the testimony of experts Richard Seely and Douglas Fox was weakened by their very familiarity with the inner workings of the state institution at St. Peter; but both agreed that Clements was not a psychopathic personality and should not be given an indeterminate commitment.
The best qualified expert, in my opinion, for a case such as this, was Dr. James Jacobson, who had experience working with truly dangerous psychopathic personalities serving time in state prisons for murder and other violent crimes. In his opinion, Clements’ condition did not qualify as psychopathic personality, and did not warrant an indeterminate commitment, which is the closest thing to a life sentence we have in Minnesota today. Even a murderer can look forward to a parole after 17 years, in a manner best characterized by that much-misused word, “hopefully.”
We should not ignore the references in the testimony to “warehousing” and “hopelessness.” The diagnosis for Clements under an indeterminate commitment is that he would lose hope and be warehoused, i.e. consigned to the class of' the hopeless, which would mean that on the “treatment” side he would be sedated enough to keep him from becoming violent, and be permitted to “exist” in the institution until he died a natural death or ended his own life.
The most unjust thing that could happen to Clements at this point would be for this court to use the trial court’s original order of commitment and this court’s affirmance *138of that order to rubber-stamp the outcome of the 60-day hearing, and thus deprive Clements of the protection the legislature intended to give him by statute, a course of action advocated by the prosecuting attorney and not discouraged by the trial court. Because of the prosecutor’s reference to the first order and its affirmance, I have made a thorough examination of the transcripts of both hearings. It seems clear from both records that there are treatment plans that would be effective in Clements’ case, and that the indeterminate commitment could be used as a threat to encourage him to complete the treatment.
I would reverse.