Like the majority, I agree with the findings of misconduct made by the Commission on Judicial Performance (Commission). I nonetheless believe this misconduct is not serious enough to warrant public censure. I therefore concur in rejecting the Commission’s disciplinary recommendation.
Unlike the majority, however, I take the 1987 “offensive remark” incident into account when reaching my conclusion that no discipline by this court is *180warranted. In my view, the California Constitution, as applicable to this case, allows this court to impose discipline for any misconduct within six years before commencement of the “current term” the judge was serving when the Commission set its formal hearing process in motion. The Commission gave notice of formal proceedings against petitioner on January 27, 1994, and, sometime before August 17, 1994, the Commission requested the appointment of special masters to hear the case.1 (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 907.) At the latest of these times, petitioner was still serving a term which had commenced on January 1, 1989. Because the 1987 incident occurred less than six years before that date, the incident was a proper subject for our discipline. It makes no difference that petitioner has since been reelected and has started a new term.
In its pre-Proposition 190 form applicable to this case, the Constitution provided that “[o]n recommendation of the Commission ... the Supreme Court may . . . censure or remove a judge for action occurring not more than 6 years prior to the commencement of the judge’s current term.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18, former subd. (c).)2 The majority find this language “unambiguous” in providing that the “current term” is the one the judge happens to be serving when “the Supreme Court” finally acts on the Commission’s recommendation. The result is that charges of serious misconduct, although properly made and proved before the Commission, and properly a basis for the discipline it proposes, may nonetheless suddenly drop away if the errant judge wins election to a new judicial “term” before we can act on the Commission’s recommendation. I cannot agree that those who drafted and adopted the important provisions for judicial discipline “unambiguous-fly]” intended such an unusual and anomalous result.
At the outset, I dispute the majority’s assertion that the plain language of the constitutional provision compels their interpretation. The opposite is true. Article VI, section 18, former subdivision (c) of the California Constitution does not explicitly say whether the “6 years [before] current term” within which this court may remove or censure a judge is determined at the time wé take final action or at some earlier stage of the disciplinary process. But when all the constitutional provisions for judicial discipline are read together, the flaw in the majority’s construction is exposed.
*181The Constitution gives this court no unilateral power to censure or remove a judge; we may act only upon a “recommendation” of the Commission. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18, former subd. (c).) The Commission’s recommendation, in turn, depends entirely on its assessment of all the charges properly before it. This integrated disciplinary process, in which the Commission proposes and we merely dispose, cannot operate as contemplated by the literal constitutional language if charges which were timely when addressed by the Commission are no longer so by the time we act upon the Commission’s findings and recommendations.
Indeed, even if there were literal support for the “plain language” construction the majority advance, we would thus be obliged to reject that construction under the well-settled rule that “[t]he literal language of [constitutional] enactments may be disregarded to avoid absurd results and to fulfill the apparent intent of the framers. [Citations.]” (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].)
Moreover, periods of limitation, such as that provided by California Constitution, article VI, section 18, former subdivision (c), are typically measured from the formal commencement of proceedings, not from the later time when a final judgment or determination is rendered. We should not assume the framers and adopters of this constitutional provision “silently, or at best obscurely,” decided an “important and controversial” public policy issue by adopting so radical a departure from prevailing legal principles. (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 782 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574].)
The history of California Constitution, article VI, section 18, indicates that no such departure was intended. This court’s power to censure or remove judges for misconduct, after a recommendation by the Commission, was added to the Constitution in 1960. (Cal. Const., art. VI, former §§ lb, 10b, adopted at Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1960) as Sen. Const. Amend. No. 14, Stats. 1959 (Reg. Sess.), res. ch. 254, pp. 5822-5825.) The original scheme empowered the Commission, “after such investigation as [it] deem[ed] necessary,” to “order a hearing” on charges of misconduct, or to request this court to appoint special masters for that purpose. No time limit was placed on the misconduct which could be considered. (Cal. Const., art. VI, former § 10b.)
Subsequently, the Constitutional Revision Commission (CRC) undertook a comprehensive proposed modernization of the Constitution. An article VI committee was appointed to address judicial issues. The article VI committee’s third working draft retained much of the form and substance of the *1821960 provision for judicial discipline. However, a limitations period was included to the effect that “[t]he Commission on Judicial Qualifications [now the Commission on Judicial Performance] may order a hearing ... or request the appointment of special masters . . . with respect to . . . cases [of misconduct] which occur in the term of office of the judge current at the time of the hearing or request or which occur in the term ... of the judge immediately preceding such current term and the Supreme Court may make an order of removal ... on the basis of any cause occurring during such terms of office.” (Cal. Const. Revision Com., art. VI committee, third working draft (July 15, 1965) pp. 41-42, italics added.) The third working draft thus expressly stated that the period of limitations for exercise of this court’s disciplinary power was to be measured backward from the time the Commission formally called for a hearing on the charges.
The third working draft was considered by the full CRC at its meeting of July 29, 1965. Judge Charles J. McGoldrick, speaking for the California Judges Association (CJA), commented upon the draft’s provisions for judicial discipline. His only observation on the proposed limitations period was that “some [CJA] members feel . . . [the discipline provision] should be amended so that action could not be taken against a judge for his conduct prior to his current term of office or within four years of the date of the conduct charged against him.” (Minutes, Cal. Const. Revision Com. meeting of July 29, 1965, p. 20.) The CRC referred the issue back to the article VI committee, which was to report directly to the drafting committee. (Id., at p. 24.)
At its meeting of November 18, 1965, the CRC took up the drafting committee’s final proposal, which tracked the current form of article VI, section 18, former subdivision (c), and included the current prohibition against censure or removal for conduct occurring more than six years before the judge’s “current term.” The final revised version was approved without discussion. (Minutes, Cal. Const. Revision Com. meeting of Nov. 18, 1965, pp. 12-13.)
The CRC’s proposed constitutional revision was introduced in the Legislature as Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 13 (1966 First Ex. Sess.) (A.C.A. No. 13). No changes were made to the limitations provision as A.C.A. No. 13 progressed through the two houses, and that provision (Stats. *1831966 (First Ex. Sess.) res. ch. 139, par. Eighty-Second, p. 978) was adopted unaltered by the voters at the General Election of November 8, 1966.3
From this chronology of events the following principles emerge: the disciplinary limitations period proposed by the article VI committee clearly was to be measured by the term which the judge was “current[ly]” serving at the time the Commission set the formal hearing process in motion. That concept was never discussed or criticized, and no departure from it was ever suggested. While Judge McGoldrick proposed a shorter limitations period (current term or four years, whichever is less), he never intimated that the period should be measured from any later point in the disciplinary process, such as the imposition of final discipline by this court. Subsequent efforts by the article VI and drafting committees produced a briefer, semantically recast version of the discipline section. Most references to the Commission’s detailed procedures were dropped, and the current limitations language was adopted. But there is no indication of an intent to alter the measurement of the limitations period as originally expressed in the third working draft.
It therefore seems quite clear that no such intent arose, and that the final language implicitly incorporates the original proposal in this respect. The modernization of the final language, with the consequent loss of procedural detail, simply eliminated the opportunity to include an express statement to that effect.
To overlook this clear history, and instead to adopt the majority’s simplistic and unusual construction, has a distorting effect on the entire disciplinary process. An accused judge facing older but still timely charges has the incentive to delay the imposition of final discipline until after he commences a new term. By the same token, and with equally unjust implications, the Commission’s examiner faces pressure to rush the matter to final discipline in order to avoid the intervening loss of valid and relevant charges.
The majority suggest the constitutional provision “combines the functions of a [classic] statute of limitations [measured by the time proceedings commence] and a rule limiting the time proceedings may remain pending.” *184(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 177-178.) By allowing commencement of a new term to shorten the total elapsed time between misconduct and final discipline, the majority assert, the constitutional provision “gives due deference to the will of the electorate in reelecting a judge . . . .” (Id. at p. 178.) But this “voters’ will” analysis begs the fundamental question. There is no dispute that the Constitution immunizes a judge for certain past misconduct when the voters have more recently elected him to a new term. The issue is whether such immunity merely affects the charges the Commission may hear, or whether it may also prevent final discipline upon charges the Commission did properly hear. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, language, history, logic, and policy all indicate that the former construction is appropriate.4
As might therefore be expected, the majority’s novel interpretation appears out of step with the rule in other jurisdictions. Of those few states that impose limitations on discipline for misconduct which precedes the judge’s “current term,” most appear to measure the limitations period backward from receipt of a complaint by the disciplinary agency. (See Rosenbaum, Practices and Procedures of State Judicial Conduct Organizations (1990) ch. 2, p. 17.)
Accordingly, I cannot endorse the majority’s restrictive limitations period, under which petitioner may only be disciplined for judicial misconduct which took place within six years before the term he is serving at the moment we file this decision. Because the 1987 incident occurred within six years before the term petitioner was serving when the Commission’s formal hearing process began, the Constitution does not prevent us from considering that incident.5 Having done so, I nonetheless join the majority’s *185determination that the discipline recommended by the Commission is not warranted.6
George, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied February 15, 1996.
Hearings before the special masters began on August 17, 1994, and continued through September 2, 1994.
As amended by Proposition 190, operative March 1,1995, the Constitution transfers from this court to the Commission the powers of removal or censure and creates a new Commission power of “[public] admonish[ment]” short of censure. These Commission actions, like that of private admonishment, are now subject only to our review jurisdiction. As before, however, removal or censure may occur only for “action occurring not more than 6 years prior to the commencement of the judge’s current term.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18, subd. (d).)
The ballot pamphlet materials for A.C.A. No. 13, submitted to the voters as Proposition 1-a, made no reference to the limitations period for judicial discipline. The argument in favor of the measure noted that a principal purpose of the constitutional revision effort was to reduce the length of the frequently amended Constitution of 1879, and to “put[] the Constitution into modem, concise, and easily understandable language.” The argument also noted that judges would be under “stronger disciplinary procedures.” (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends, to Cal. Const, with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1966) p. 2.)
One might argue that a judge is unlikely to “pull the wool over the voters’ eyes” and win a new term when formal charges of misconduct are already pending against him. The facts of the instant case belie any such claim. Moreover, although Proposition 190 opens to the public all formal Commission proceedings begun after February 28,1995 (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18, subd. (j)), the Commission previously retained broad discretion to conduct a closed and confidential inquiry, even where charges of moral turpitude were involved. (Id., former subds. (f), (g); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rules 902, 907.2; cf. Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1994) 8 Cal.4th 630, 638 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 641, 882 P.2d 358].) Thus, there has been no guarantee that the voters would become aware of pending charges which might affect their support for the judge.
As previously noted, Proposition 190, operative March 1, 1995, provides that the Commission, subject to our discretionary review, “may . . . censure ... or remove a judge for action occurring not more than 6 years prior to the commencement of the judge’s current term . . . .” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18, subd. (d).) I assume the majority would conclude, by reasoning parallel to its analysis here, that this limitations period must be measured from the time the Commission takes its final disciplinary action, so that charges properly heard by the Commission might nonetheless be obliterated if the judge commenced a new term before the *185Commission’s proceedings were final there. Thus, I cannot be confident that the mischief wrought by the majority’s holding is ameliorated in future cases.
By rejecting the Commission’s recommendation of public censure, we leave the case at large for a determination by the Commission whether it should exercise its own power of private admonishment. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18, former subd. (c).) The Commission’s constitutional power of private admonishment derives from a discrete, self-contained sentence which, unlike the provisions for censure and removal, specifies no time limitation on the conduct which may be considered. (Ibid.) It appears the Commission may therefore take the 1987 incident into account for admonishment purposes, and I do not read the majority’s opinion as holding otherwise.