(specially concurring).
In joining the majority opinion, I specifically join the Chief Justice’s writing, which holds that the Kotrba standard is inapplicable to the present case. This is simply not an unemployment compensation case such as Kotrba. Rather, this case should be judged on standards for termination of employment, considerably less stringent than those standards pertaining to a denial of unemployment compensation. Kleinsasser *739relies on cases such as Kotrba, Gratzfeld v. Bomgaars Supply, 391 N.W.2d 200 (S.D.1986), and Nelson v. Employment Security Dept., 98 Wash.2d 370, 655 P.2d 242 (1982). Both Nelson and Gratzfeld are unemployment compensation eases. We are here adjudicating upon and reviewing the lower proceedings pertaining to a grievance filed by Kleinsasser for being unlawfully discharged from his employment. Kleinsasser filed a Step One grievance with the city, and later a Step Two grievance. When he lost both of these, he appealed to the Department of Labor under SDCL 3-18-15.2. The Department found for Klein-sasser, presuming that he was unlawfully discharged (terminated) and ordered, based on that determination, that Kleinsasser be reinstated without loss of seniority and that he be paid all back pay, with interest. The Honorable Jeff Davis, Circuit Judge, ruled against the Department’s holding and Kleinsasser. Thereupon, Kleinsasser appealed to this Court.
This so-called “unlawful discharge” is before us. However, it is important to note that Kleinsasser filed for unemployment compensation, and the city did not contest his request. Thus, he was granted unemployment compensation. I repeat: This is not an unemployment compensation case, and the unemployment compensation standards of review are not pertinent. This is absolutely a grievance proceeding under authority of SDCL 3-18-15.2.
If we then logically follow the grievance proceeding thesis, we also consider SDCL 3-18-1.1. This defines a grievance proceeding and expresses the function of the Department. In essence, a complaint filed by a public employee is reviewed to determine if there is a violation of an existing agreement, policy, rule, or regulation. A function of the Department is to hear the evidence and make that determination. The circuit court observed that Department had strayed from its function to administratively review Kleinsasser’s grievance and had mentally wandered into the civil rights and unemployment compensation areas of law.
Lastly, in supporting the Chief Justice’s writing, I wish to mention Exhibit A. Exhibit A was a letter from the City of Rapid City to Kleinsasser, dated September 22, 1986, signed by William Craig, Operations Engineer. It specifies four reasons for Kleinsasser’s discharge:
1. Rule 24 — Immoral, indecent or notoriously disgraceful conduct which reflects unfavorably on the city.
2. Rule 27 — Falsification, misstatement, exaggeration, or concealment of material fact in connection with employment, promotion, any record, investigation or other proper proceeding.
3. Rule 28 — Falsifying attendance record for oneself or another employee.
4. Helping another employee to willfully deceive the city in hours worked.
Existing was an AFSCME Contract (1986). City employees agreed to this contract. The Public Works Rules included a standard schedule of disciplinary offenses and penalties for the City of Rapid City’s employees. It appears that Kleinsasser was terminated because of a violation of rules promulgated pursuant to mutual agreement of the City of Rapid City and its employees. There was, therefore, no meritorious grievance and no unlawful discharge.