specially concurring.
I agree with the result reached by the majority opinion, but I disagree with the legal analysis used in the speedy trial portion. I believe that W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) should *1038be the exclusive framework we use in determining whether a defendant’s right to have a speedy trial has been violated.
Instead of examining whether Yung’s right to have a speedy trial was violated under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b), the majority opinion presents an extensive analysis of the four factors which we utilized to consider claimed violations of the speedy trial right when Rule 204 of the Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming was in effect. When the United States Supreme Court adopted this analysis in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), it stated:
We do not establish procedural rules for the States, except when mandated by the Constitution. We find no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or months. The States, of course, are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with constitutional standards, but our approach must be less precise.
407 U.S. at 523, 92 S.Ct. at 2188 (emphasis added). Consistent with the suggestion in Barker, this Court adopted W.R.Cr.P. 48.
We have held that W.R.Cr.P. 48 is mandatory and that it provides the exclusive framework for our speedy trial analysis. McDermott v. State, 897 P.2d 1295, 1299-1300 (Wyo.1995). In my opinion, we should no longer conduct a Barker analysis since W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) is mandatory. Any constitutional challenge made after the adoption of the rule should be made against the rule itself as the constitutional guarantees addressed in the Barker analysis are included within and superseded by the rule.
In the case at bar, Yung was arraigned on August 21, 1992. His trial was tentatively scheduled for December 14, 1992, but it was continued until January 11, 1993 — 143 days following his arraignment.
W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Speedy trial.
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(4) Continuances not to exceed six months from the date of arraignment may be granted by the trial court as follows:
(A) On motion of defendant supported by affidavit;
(B) On motion of the attorney for the state or the court if:
(i) The defendant expressly consents;
(ii) The state’s evidence is unavailable and the prosecution has exercised due diligence; or
(iii) Required in the due administration of justice and the defendant will not be substantially prejudiced; and
(C) If a continuance is proposed by the state or the court, the defendant shall be notified. If the defendant objects, the defendant must show in writing how the delay may prejudice the defense.
In conducting a W.R.Cr.P. 48 analysis in this case, we must determine the reason for the continuance. During an October 26th hearing on various motions, Yung’s counsel inquired about the trial setting. The State remarked that December or early January were realistic times. Yung’s counsel did not object to the suggested time period, but he mentioned that he hoped the trial would be scheduled for the middle of December. He also stated that he wanted to have at least thirty days to review the results from the crime lab and have his own tests performed.
The trial court heard more motions on November 4th and 5th, at which time the parties discussed Yung’s motion for a date certain. Taking into account that the results were not available from the crime lab and that the scientific evidence should be provided thirty days prior to the trial date, the State suggested that the trial be held in early January. Yung’s counsel requested that the trial be scheduled for December 14,1992, but the State countered that there would not be enough time before December 14th to provide the scientific evidence. Furthermore, the trial court had a three-week trial which had been scheduled to commence in early December. The trial court, therefore, set the case for January 25, 1993. Yung’s counsel did not object at that time to the trial setting.
Yung subsequently filed a demand on December 3, 1992, for a speedy trial. At a December 4th hearing, he objected to the *1039January 25, 1993, trial date, asserting that the 120-day time period provided for in W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(2) would expire on December 21st, and requested that the trial be scheduled for December 14,1992. The State argued that Yung’s right to have a speedy trial was not being violated by the January trial date because W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4) permitted the extra time in this ease. In support of that argument, the State claimed that another case was scheduled to go to trial that week; that Yung’s counsel did not object when the January date was scheduled; that the crime lab had arranged the testing so that it would coincide with the January 25, 1993, trial date and, thus, had not planned to have the tests finished until December 25, 1992; and that the out-of-town witnesses had made plans according to the January 25th trial date. Because the trial court was concerned about a possible speedy trial violation, it agreed that it would allow Yung’s case to begin on December 14, 1992, in the event the ease which was already scheduled for that date did not commence.
On December 7, 1992, the State filed a letter and a motion in which it detailed the unavailability of critical evidence which was necessary for the presentation of its ease. The State reemphasized that, because of the trial court’s prior trial setting of January 25th, the crime lab and out-of-town witnesses had made all their plans accordingly and that much of the State’s evidence would be unavailable if it were required to go to trial on December 14th. The trial court concluded that, “in order to allow a level field for both sides,” the State should be allowed to go beyond the 120 days and ordered that the trial would remain scheduled for January 25, 1993. After more discussion, the trial was rescheduled for January 11th.
I conclude that the continuance of Yung’s trial fell within the specified types of continuances which are permitted by W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4). The parties did not object to the January 25th trial setting, and the State and its witnesses made their plans accordingly. When Yung subsequently claimed that such a delay would violate his right to have a speedy trial and that the trial setting should be moved up, the State’s evidence was not available and would not be available before January 25, 1993.
I also conclude that Yung’s defense was not prejudiced as a result of the continuance. Yung claimed that he was prejudiced because he suffered from pretrial anxiety. He did not, however, show that any witness became unavailable, that evidence was not produced, or that any witness’s memory was impaired by the delay. Nor did Yung show that the prosecutor was using the continuance in order to gain a tactical advantage over him. The trial court decided on the January trial date in an effort to assure that all the evidence and witnesses would be available for the trial and that Yung would have a fair opportunity to thoroughly review the State’s evidence.
The continuance did not exceed six months from the date of the arraignment, it was granted for reasons which are permitted by W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4), and Yung’s defense was not prejudiced by the continuance. Yung’s right to have a speedy trial, therefore, was not violated.