(dissenting).
It seems to me the rules which should determine the decision in this case are of statutory origin — -clear, plain and unambiguous. Under the provisions of § 32-706, I.C., alimony for the support of the wife can only be granted for an offense of the husband.
When a divorce is granted for an offense of the wife and the community property has been divided, the wife is not entitled to alimony, there being no statutory provision for such allowance. Platts v. Platts, 37 Idaho 149, 215 P. 464. There is no such thing as a common law power to grant.permanent alimony. Hence an award of alimony cannot be made except where authorized by statute, and such an award, when made and not so authorized, is beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court. Johnson v. Superior Court, 128 Cal.App. 584, 17 P.2d 1055; Ex parte McKenna, 116 Cal.App. 232, 2 P.2d 429; McLaughlin v. Superior Court, 128 Cal.App.2d 62, 274 P.2d 745.
A review of cases adhering to this view would unduly .and unnecessarily prolong this dissent. For collection of cases see, 34 A.L.R.2d 319, § 2, and cases there cited.
The majority opinion can only lead to confusion and unsettle rules established not' only by this court, but by the vast majority of decisions in other jurisdictions. The part of the decree awarding the wife alimony for her support should be stricken.