dissenting.
1. Equity
Appellant acknowledges the appearance of inequity in his claim for sale proceeds traced to home improvement costs paid by respondent. Indeed, if equity has its say, appellant cannot quarrel with the trial court’s decision. In strictly equitable terms, the appeal is both frivolous and mean-spirited.
Respondent spent $7,280.19 on improvements to the home awarded to her in the proceedings concluded in December 1984. According to unchallenged trial court findings, respondent proved the cost of those improvements and those costs were “fair and reasonable.” In addition, the trial court found that these improvements “increased the value and the marketability” of the home, and that the improvements “benefited both parties at the time of sale due to the increased value and marketability of the property.” 1 In fact, we deal ultimately with this undisputed trial court finding: “That it is fair and reasonable that [respon*159dent] be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements made to the homestead.”
Given the settled facts of the case, demonstrated in trial court findings, we are not dealing here with an occupant’s mischievious infliction of charges to the nonoccupant for wasteful expenditures. Moreover, a decision affirming the trial court does not license ransom for frivolous improvement costs. Waste may be precluded by provisions of a decree which squarely deal with home improvement costs. Whether judgments commonly address this topic, we do not know. Absent such provisions, however, payment for unnecessary costs is avoided by a court which finds, unlike the case here, that costs have been incurred unwisely.
A hard and fast rule against recovery of a home improvement investment, absent express license by the decree or the lien holder, might avoid litigation. That is small cause, however, for imposition of a result known to be unreasonable and unfair.
2. Equity’s Place
Equity, which may indeed vary like the chancellor’s foot, sometimes may fail to serve the fundamental interests of those affected by personal and domestic welfare decisions. Nevertheless, even as to the finality of judgments, trial court jurisdiction in a dissolution case “is equitable,” and the trial court may award relief “as the facts in each particular case and the ends of justice may require.” Johnston v. Johnston, 280 Minn. 81, 86, 158 N.W.2d 249, 254 (1968) (court powers upon petition to vacate a divorce decree).
This authority of the trial court is an “inherent power to grant equitable relief.” DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn.1981). In addition, however, under the statute on jurisdiction for reopening a judgment to modify language on a property division, the law of the case is wholly shaped by equity. See Johnston, 280 Minn. at 86, 158 N.W.2d at 254; Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2 (1988).
Articulable considerations of equity guided the trial court in this case. The same considerations compel us to affirm. It is abundantly evident that appellant will be unjustly enriched by the decision to unravel the trial court’s credible handling of the case.
3. Precedent
The equitable result chosen by the trial court is not without precedent. Where the record supported a trial court finding that “improvements added to the overall value of the property and would be reflected in the final sale price,” this court determined in 1986 that the occupant should not be responsible for full payment of improvement costs. Stromberg v. Stromberg, 397 N.W.2d 396, 401 (Minn.Ct.App.1986). Stromberg should not be overruled, expressly or otherwise.
Stromberg, like this case, involved improvements made by a spouse in the course of occupancy for a period of three years. Although a real estate agent had earlier urged that “some changes” be made to the home, there is no suggestion in the case that specific improvements were recommended or that anyone but the occupant initially decided which improvements would add to the value of the home. There are few differences between the facts here and in Stromberg. The importance of any factual distinction is completely eliminated by the trial court’s findings in this case that respondent’s improvements increased the value and the marketability of the homestead such that reimbursement for respondent’s costs was both fair and reasonable.
In addition to our decision in Stromberg, we have on other occasions recognized trial court jurisdiction for altering property decisions to “fairly implement” provisions of an earlier decree. Hanson v. Hanson, 379 N.W.2d 230, 233 (Minn.Ct.App.1985); see also Sullivan v. Sullivan, 374 N.W.2d 517 (Minn.Ct.App.1985). In Hanson and Sullivan, the decree of the court failed to deal with a change of circumstances affecting the mechanics in completing a property award. We recognized there the jurisdiction for a post-decree provision which took account for changed circumstances without altering the interests of the parties deter*160mined in the decree. Respondent asks that we do the same here.
Finally, this case is within the parameters of the more routine task of interpreting ambiguous provisions in a decree. See Stieler v. Stieler, 244 Minn. 312, 319-20, 70 N.W.2d 127, 131-32 (1955) (“full effect must be given to that which is necessarily implied in the judgment, as well as to that actually expressed therein”). The trial court could rightfully clarify a decree provision contemplating a future home sale where the decree called for payment of “costs of sale” but contained no other reference to maintenance or improvement expenses.2 Real estate investments, especially homes, are not static investments which can be neglected by the owner without severe loss of value. The recovery of sale value includes costs other than professional fees and expenses. See Stromberg, 397 N.W.2d at 401 (requiring a sharing of improvement costs where the decree referred to costs of “repairs and maintenance”). Absent a statement of limits on the occupant’s freedom to make improvements, reimbursement for valuable improvements constitutes a fair interpretation of the terms and conditions of a decree contemplating equal division of equity after reimbursements for costs of sale.
I concur in our decision rejecting appellant’s plea for profit from mortgage payments respondent made after the hearing in December 1984. Because our reversal on respondent’s improvement costs conflicts with fundamental notions of equity and law, I respectfully dissent on that issue.
. ■ Although not challenging trial court findings, appellant observes that it is “subject to debate” whether all of appellant's improvements produced an increased market value of the house. He points to a statement of the parties, included in the 1985 trial court findings, that the home had a value of “approximately $89,900." As respondent observes, there is no evidence that this approximation was the fruit of a professional appraisal. Respondent furnished current evidence that a realtor in 1985 projected sale of the home for $69,000, also without any apparent professional appraisal. If the fact issue were raised, we would have no basis to dispute the current trial court findings.
. Paragraph 17 of the 1985 decree states that each party is to hold the other harmless for claims arising from “outstanding” debts the parties incurred after the first temporary hearing. If this provision is germane at all to obligations incurred after the decree, it is only by implication and it is not an unambiguous declaration on home improvement costs incurred before sale proceeds were divided.