dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Accepting the Majority’s definition of standing as requiring a direct, immediate, pecuniary, and substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation, I would find that foster parents meet this standard. The issue before the court in a custody case requires a determination of *287the best interests of the child. See Priester v. Fayette County Children and Youth Services, 354 Pa.Super. 562, 512 A.2d 683 (1986). Putting aside the obvious pecuniary interests of a foster parent in such proceedings, I would suggest that foster parents who wish to assert that the best interests of the child are met by their retention of physical custody have a direct and substantial interest in the matter at issue. This does not create in them a greater right than the natural parents or CYS. Rather, the court is free to prioritize the interests of foster parents as it sees fit.
Unlike the Majority, I can find no legislative preclusion for a finding of foster parent standing in cases involving custody. In that respect, custody cases are distinguishable from cases concerning adoption or involuntary termination of parental rights. Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2531(a), which concerns adoption, “[ejvery person now having or hereafter receiving or retaining custody or physical care of any child for the purpose or with the intention of adopting a child under the age of 18 years shall report to the court in which the petition for adoption will be filed.” Courts of this Commonwealth have interpreted this language to exclude foster parents from the class of persons entitled to file such reports, unless they are able to obtain the approval of CYS. Chester County Children and Youth Services v. Cunningham, 540 Pa. 258, 656 A.2d 1346 (1995) (3-3 decision); In re Adoption of S.C.P., 364 Pa.Super. 257, 527 A.2d 1052 (1987); In re Adoption of Crystal D.R., 331 Pa.Super. 501, 480 A.2d 1146 (1984). Similarly, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512 limits those persons entitled to file a petition for involuntary termination of parental rights to a parent, an agency, or an individual who has custody of or stands in loco parentis to a child and has filed a report of intention to adopt. Foster parents have been refused standing under this statute because they have only physical custody of their foster children, while CYS retains legal custody. In re Adoption of J.M.E., 416 Pa.Super. 110, 610 A.2d 995, appeal denied, 533 Pa. 612, 618 A.2d 402 (1992). Importantly, no such statutory preclusion exists for purposes of determining the issue in the present case, namely, whether foster parents *288have standing to file a petition to retain custody of their foster children. Nevertheless, the Majority concludes that “overwhelming authority supports the conclusion that [foster parents] lack standing [in such cases.]” Majority slip op. at 263. I cannot agree.
The Majority relies primarily on Priester, supra, for its determination that foster parents lack standing in custody cases. Initially, I note that Priester is the only case in which a court has held that foster parents do not have standing in a custody dispute. Because we are sitting in en banc review, I am prepared to revisit the wisdom of this decision. In Priester, the court discussed In re Adoption of Crystal D.R., supra, in which the court determined that foster parents had no standing to adopt their foster child without the consent of CYS. That case set forth a policy determination that “[b]y its very nature, the foster parent/foster child relationship ‘ “implies a warning against any deep emotional involvement with the child since under the given insecure circumstances this would be judged as excessive.” ’ ” Priester at 565, 512 A.2d at 684, quoting In re Adoption of Crystal D.R., supra, at 510, 480 A.2d at 1151, quoting J. Goldstein, A. Freud, and A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 24 (1973). The Priester court appeared to base its conclusion that foster parents lack standing in custody matters on this policy rationale. However, the court failed to cite any case law or statute concerning the issue of foster parents’ standing in custody cases, stating that “[t]here is an absence of controlling authority specifically on point.” Id. at 566, 512 A.2d at 684. In so stating, the court failed to acknowledge the case of Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Service, 228 Pa.Super. 371, 324 A.2d 562 (1974), which addressed this precise issue.
In Stapleton, this court considered whether foster parents had standing to file a petition to retain custody of their foster child. In concluding that the foster parents did have standing to file such a petition, we looked to certain provisions of the Juvenile Act, 11 P.S. §§ 50-302, 50-314. Although that Act has since been repealed, the language of the relevant sections presently in effect has not been changed in any material *289respect. In considering the language of what is now 42 Pa.C.S. § 6334, which states that “[a] petition ... may be brought by any person including a law enforcement officer,” the Stapleton court reasoned:
It is difficult to see how standing could have been defined any more broadly. [The foster child] was within the jurisdiction of the court below. The [foster parents] are ‘any persons.’ They therefore had standing to file a petition raising the issue of who should have custody of [the foster child].
Stapleton, at 380, 324 A.2d at 567. While it might be argued that Stapleton’s interpretation of § 6334 is too broad in that the filing of the petition to initiate proceedings is limited to the initiation of dependency proceedings,1 we can still look to its rationale, generally, regarding the standing issue because we can find no statutory authority to the contrary that precludes such standing. Rather, we are left with a situation in which there is no legislative dictate either way. See Kellogg v. Kellogg, 435 Pa.Super. 581, 646 A.2d 1246 (1994) (there is no statute directly addressing the standing of a third party seeking custody as against another third party). Further, I am persuaded by the following observation of the Stapleton Court:
What appears to have caused the confusion in this case is that the distinction between a party’s standing and the court’s standard of review has been overlooked. The fact that a stranger to the child ... has standing to file a petition -with respect to the child implies nothing about the *290standard that the court will apply in deciding what action to take on the petition. It may well be that upon examination of the petition and of the evidence, if any, the court will conclude that the petition should be dismissed as of no merit.
Id. at 380, 324 A.2d at 567. This observation was echoed by Justice Montemuro in his' Opinion in Support of Reversal in Chester County Children and Youth Services v. Cunningham, supra. In that Opinion, Justice Montemuro stated:
‘[T]he grant of standing does nothing more than allow an interested party to be heard in court; it surely does not amount to an award of custody nor does it change at all the standards by which the court decides the issue. Indeed, the “best interests” of the child remain the paramount concern in these matters.’
Id. at 273, 656 A.2d at 1354, quoting Chester County Children and Youth Services v. Cunningham, 431 Pa.Super. 421, 428, 636 A.2d 1157, 1161 (1994) (Beck J., dissenting).
The Majority recognizes the direct conflict between Priester and Stapleton. However, it holds that Priester “more accurately reflects the role of foster parents intended by the Legislature.” Majority at 272. Thus, the Majority overrules Stapleton “to the extent [that it] conflicts with Pennsylvania law, as enunciated in this Opinion----” Id.
I cannot find, as the Majority does, that the relationship between foster parents and foster children deprives the foster parent of standing to appear before the court and be heard in the proceedings. Rather, one’s status before the court governs rights, burdens, and presumptions to which one is entitled. Further, I cannot agree with the Majority’s determination that foster parents should not have standing in custody cases on the theory that foster care, due to its temporary nature, implies a warning against any emotional involvement between the foster parents and the child. See Majority at 267-68, 272-73. If this is true, it is a sad commentary on our foster care system indeed. One of the purposes of foster care should not be to create an emotional limbo for a child. *291Fortunately, most foster parents do not approach their responsibilities with such sterility. Rather, in providing a caring and supportive environment for children, they realize that there may be emotional involvement. That involvement has risks, and one of those risks is that the children will leave and go on to something better such as returning to a parent, reunification with a sibling, or adoption. Most foster parents are prepared for those risks if they are in the best interests of the child. In today’s world, can we ever have too many people concerned with the best interests of a child? To deny standing per se to foster parents under circumstances such as those presented in this case is to subordinate the children’s best interests to the will of human service agencies.
Finally, I harken to the expression of Justice Montemuro in the Opinion in Support of Reversal in the Cunningham case when I say that our Majority opinion today “slams the courthouse door at the behest of a human service agency which has, without the necessity of justifying its action to anyone, determined unilaterally where the best interests of the child lie.” Id. at 267, 656 A.2d at 1351.
I recognize that Cunningham is factually different from the instant case. In Cunningham, the foster parents filed a report of intent to adopt without agency consent, and, here, the foster parents merely seek to participate in the custody/placement proceedings. However, the analysis offered by Justice Montemuro is both cogent and instructive:
Thus, the Opinion in Support of Affirmance creates a rule which grants foster parents ‘standing’ when the agency approves, yet refuses them ‘standing’ when the agency disapproves. Under the general principles of standing, there is no logical reason to distinguish between the two situations on this basis. Admittedly, the concept of standing is an amorphous one. Usually, standing is a requirement that parties have sufficient interest or injury in a lawsuit to ensure that there is a legitimate controversy before the court. See 59 Am.Jur.2d § 30 Parties (1987). Here, the Opinion in Support of Affirmance is not using the concept of standing in its generally accepted sense. Rather, *292it is being used as a policy tool to prevent foster parents from adopting their children absent the consent of the agency on a per se basis. In effect, foster parents’ legal status, and thus their ability to appear before the court, is being determined not by the nature of their relationship to the controversy, but by another party to the controversy. As a matter of jurisprudence such a rule as the Opinion in Support of Affirmance sets forth is ill-conceived and contrary to the Act.
... For example, foster parents who obtain the consent of the agency can file a ‘Report of Intent to Adopt’ and gain review of the court to complete the adoption. However, those who fail to obtain the consent of the agency can go no further as they have no ‘standing.’ This scheme is contrary to both the letter and spirit of the Act. Our law clearly places the responsibility with the court to make the final determination of what is in the best interests of the child. Nowhere does it grant family service agencies an unreviewable power to determine who can and cannot adopt a child in this Commonwealth. The Opinion in Support of Affirmance erroneously gives these agencies absolute and unreviewable discretion in situations such as the one presented here. However, foster parents should be able to appeal the agency’s decision to the court for a determination of whether adoption would be in the best interests of the child. It can be anticipated that in most cases, the court would defer to the considerable expertise of the agency and affirm its decision to withhold consent. However, such a scheme would insure that the courts, not social service agencies, make the final decision as to whether adoption is in the best interests of the child in any given case. This is mandated by the plain language of the Act.
Id. at 271-72, 656 A.2d at 1353-1354.
It has long been recognized that a child “ ‘becomes strongly attached to those who stand in a parental relationship to it and who have tenderly cared for it.’ ” Commonwealth ex rel. Bankert v. Children’s Services, 224 Pa.Super. 556, 561, 307 A.2d 411, 414 (1973), quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Chil *293dren’s Aid Society v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 96, 66 A.2d 300, 306 (1949). In fact, in Gard, at 97, 66 A.2d at 306, our supreme court stated that “[n]othing could be more cruel than forcible separation of a, child from either its real or foster parents by whom it has been lovingly cared for and to whom it is bound by strong ties of affection....” (emphasis added). Based upon this policy, and because the grant of standing does nothing more than allow an interested party to be heard in court, I cannot agree that foster parents should not have standing in custody cases. Hence, this dissent.
. Section 6303(a) defines the scope of the Juvenile Act as follows:
(a) General Rule. — This chapter shall apply exclusively to the following:
(1) Proceedings in which a child is alleged to be delinquent or dependent.
(2) Transfers under section 6322 (relating to transfer from criminal proceedings).
(3) Proceedings arising under Subchapter E (relating to dispositions affecting other jurisdictions).
(4) Proceedings under the Interstate Compact on Juveniles, as set forth in section 731 of the act of June 13, 1967 ... known as the 'Public Welfare Code.’ [Emphasis added.]