It is quite unlikely that any Nebraska stockgrower views a cattle brand as a meaningless mark rather than an indelible indicator for ownership of the animal bearing its owner’s brand. Since today’s decision is the first for this court’s construction of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 54-109 (Reissue 1988), it is also equally improbable that anyone would have imagined the legislative distortion and subversion of the patent purpose of livestock brands.
Until today, some may have believed that only Frankenstein created a monster, at least those who had never examined § 54-109 (Reissue 1988) concerning a brand in relation to ownership of cattle. This court, like a loyal laboratory lackey, has assisted in loosing the monster in cattle country.
Before enactment of 1971 Neb. Laws, L.B. 323, § 54-109 explicitly provided that a cattle brand “shall be prima facie evidence of the ownership of such [branded] animal by the person whose brand or mark it may be.” § 54-109 (Reissue 1968). Thus, before 1971, Nebraska had a sensible statute pertaining to ownership evidenced by a brand, a statute similar to those in other cattle-producing states; for example, the Wyoming statute which states:
A certified copy of any brand or mark recorded in the office of the board is prima facie evidence of ownership of animals branded or marked therewith for that species of livestock recorded by the board. The brand shall be received as evidence of ownership in all legal proceedings *363involving title to the animal.
Wyo. Stat. § 11-20-108 (1977). See, also, Mont. Code Ann. § 81-3-105 (1987) (registered cattle brand is “prima facie evidence that the person, firm, or corporation entitled to use the mark or brand is the owner of animals on which it appears ..
In a review of the legislative history for the 1971 amendment of § 54-109, nothing reveals the anticipated improvement to be accomplished through amendment of the statute pertinent to ownership and brands, and, therefore, legislative intent regarding proof of ownership by brand is shrouded in Solonian silence. However, during a hearing before the Agriculture Committee of the Nebraska Legislature in 1971 concerning amendment of § 54-109, a representative of the Nebraska Brand Committee commented: “Over the years, as we enforced and detected violations of these [brand] laws, we’ve been forced to back off from any prosecution because some wording of the law makes this man technically innocent, while he has actually stolen or misappropriated someone’s livestock.” Agriculture Committee Hearing, L.B. 323, 82d Leg. 10 (Feb. 4, 1971). How unwittingly prophetic, for § 54-109, as amended in 1971, now provides that a cattle brand “shall be prima facie evidence of the ownership of such [branded] animals by the person possessing such animals,” thereby reducing the statute to the absolute absurdity that possession is paramount proof of ownership for cattle. The Legislature’s enactment of a statute bereft of rationality does not condone this court’s collaboration and participation in such a legislative misadventure. Under the present § 54-109, some sidewindin’ owlhoot could rustle someone’s branded cattle and wind up as the owner by being caught with the critters — a result which is bad law, east or west of the Pecos, and which violates not only the Code of the Hills but common sense as well. Somebody better fetch the marshal.
Notwithstanding the nonsensical nature of § 54-109, the majority of this panel refuses to acknowledge the fundamental distinction between a presumption and prima facie proof. McGowan v. McGowan, 197 Neb. 596, 250 N.W.2d 234 (1977), contains this court’s elaboration of some problems involving a presumption utilized in a trial:
*364A presumption is a standardized practice under which certain facts are held to call for uniform treatment with respect to their effect as proof of other facts. McCormick on Evidence (2d Ed.), § 342, p. 802. The same authority suggests that “presumption” is the slipperiest member of the family of legal terms, except its first cousin, “burden of proof.” Reasons for the creation of presumptions are numerous and the treatment of presumptions also differs widely. There are at least eight senses in which the term has been used by courts. The former Nebraska approach to presumptions is ordinarily referred to as the “bursting bubble” theory. Under that approach when evidence was introduced to rebut the presumption, the presumption disappeared and the burden of proof or persuasion did not shift. Under such a rule whether a particular set of basic facts gave rise to the dignity of a presumption was ordinarily not critical in the matter of instructing a jury after trial. What was many times referred to as a “presumption” was often merely a permissible or probable inference, or was a method of indicating that the evidence was sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed verdict or to constitute a prima facie case.
197 Neb. at 603, 250 N.W.2d at 238.
Thus, a presumption is an assumption of fact required to be made from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in an action. For that reason, a presumption is procedurally and evidentially distinct from prima facie proof inasmuch as prima facie proof is evidence sufficient to submit an issue to the fact finder and precludes a directed verdict on the issue. See State v. Copple, 224 Neb. 672, 401 N.W.2d 141 (1987).
The prima facie case is used by the trier of law to decide whether a case is directed out of court at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence or, instead, is suitable for the trier of fact. The presumption, on the other hand, is used by the trier of fact. When the trier of law finds that a presumption applies, it is passed along to the trier of fact.
Fenner, About Presumptions in Civil Actions, 17 Creighton L. Rev. 307, 312 (1984). The all-too-obvious point is that § 54-109 *365expressly relates to prima facie proof and does not mention or effect a presumption concerning ownership of cattle. Nevertheless, the majority of this court fails to discern the distinction between a presumption and prima facie proof.
The majority of the judicial panel reviewing this case attempts to support its position by underlining and emphasizing the peculiar language in § 54-109, namely, “the person possessing such animals.” All the judicial underlining or underscoring cannot infuse intelligibility into an incomprehensible statute or absolve a statute of its profound absurdity.
If we accede to reason, as a court should, and put aside the legislative fiasco found in § 54-109, the evidence adduced in this case is sufficient to sustain the verdict for Broken Bow Production Credit Association. Without objection or restrictive purpose, exhibit 22, a copy of the “Brand Inspectors Local Inspection Certificate 38727 A16,” was received in evidence, establishing that the Anderson Ranch at Milburn, Nebraska, was the inspection point for the cattle in question and designating “Trico Live Stock/Anderson Ranch” as the seller of the 30 heifers later sold by Mactier. As expressed in the brand inspector’s certificate, the 30 heifers sold by Mactier bore the “fZ” brand on their left shoulders. Additionally, again without objection or restriction, exhibit 21, a copy of the “Inspectors Tally and Local Certificate,” identified the cattle sold by Mactier as follows:
[[Image here]]
The brand inspection certificates must be read in the light of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 54-101(2) (Reissue 1988), which in pertinent part provides: “A certificate of inspection shall be construed and intended to be documentary evidence of ownership on all cattle covered by such document.” Undeniably and unfortunately, the majority of this court has overlooked, or elected to disregard, the presence of “Anderson Ranch” as a *366seller and owner of the cattle designated in the brand inspectors’ certificates. Also, Broken Bow PCA called James Pearman, a brand inspector for the Nebraska Brand Committee, who testified that “Waynard B. and Maxine Anderson” were the owners of “spear bar Z brand” on the cattle sold by Mactier and acknowledged that “the cattle were owned by Waynard and Maxine Anderson.”
Consequently, there were exhibits and testimony that Andersons owned the cattle sold by Mactier. Such evidence required the district court to submit the Anderson ownership issue to the jury. By judicial alchemy in reverse or gone awry, the majority of this panel has transformed evidential gold into a base substance worthless for the jury’s consideration. Whatever the ultimate weight of evidence placed before the jury, that evidence convinced a jury of 12 at the trial level, but, on appeal, the jury has increased to 16, resulting in an oligarchic verdict through the appellate process. The evidence supports the jury’s finding that Andersons owned the cattle in question and necessitates affirmance of the verdict for Broken Bow PCA.