Plaintiff appeals from a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board denying her benefits for an alleged back injury received on or about November 16, 1970.
The decision of the appeal board reversed findings of an administrative law judge which granted benefits to plaintiff.
*201This is the kind of close case where the temptation is great to substitute the judgment of an appellate court for that of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board. This is particularly so where, as here, the appeal board voted 3-2 to reverse the administrative law judge. But to substitute our judgment would be contrary to the law.
The 1963 Michigan Constitution provides:
"Findings of fact in workmen’s compensation proceedings shall be conclusive in the absence of fraud unless otherwise provided by law.” Const 1963, art 6, § 28.
This is strong, unequivocal language. This constitutional provision is implemented by § 861 of the workmen’s compensation statute which provides:
"The findings of fact made by the board acting within its powers, in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive. The court of appeals and the supreme court shall have power to review questions of law involved in any final order of the board, if application is made by the aggrieved party within 30 days after such order by any method permissible under the rules of the courts of the laws of this state.” MCLA 418.861; MSA 17.237(861).
In the case at bar, the appeal board found that the claimant did not sustain a work-related injury on November 16, 1970, and, therefore, denied benefits to her. There was substantial conflict in the evidence. The appeal board has recited the testimony they choose to believe and upon which their decision is based. The test is not whether we, sitting as a fact-finder, would find to the contrary; rather, the test is whether the appeal board correctly understood the law and whether there is evidence to support their findings of fact. DeGeer v *202DeGeer Farm Equipment Co, 391 Mich 96, 100; 214 NW2d 794 (1974).
The appeal board interpreted the law correctly; if no work-related injury occurred on or about November 16, 1970, plaintiff was not entitled to benefits. No purpose would be served by our reciting the testimony included in the 43 pages comprising a decision of the majority. We would be doing exactly what we are precluded from doing, namely, evaluating and weighing the facts. The appeal board chose to believe evidence which indicated that a work-related injury did not occur on November 16, 1970. It was a permissible finding on this record.
Affirmed.
J. H. Gillis, J., concurred.