concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority opinion on Issues II and III. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion on Issue IV, “Expert Testimony.” There is no question in my mind that both Marcosky and Peterson are qualified experts who testified about a subject beyond the knowledge of lay persons and whose knowledge would “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Ind.Evidence Rule 702(aj.
The Indiana Evidence Rules provide that “[ejxpert scientific testimony is admissible only if the court is satisfied that the scientific principles upon which the expert testimony rests are reliable.” Evid.R. 702(b). This subsection differs from the Federal Rules of Evidence in its express requirement that expert testimony be based upon reliable scientific principles.
In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court discussed the question of when expert scientific testimony is relevant and reliable. It held, under Fed.Evid.R. 702, that expert scientific testimony is admissible if it is reliable and relevant to the task at hand. 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The focus is *475“solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Id. at 595,113 S.Ct. 2786.
Daubert does not create, however, a special analysis for the admissibility of all expert witnesses. Rather, it provides a method for evaluating the reliability of witnesses who claim scientific expertise. United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir.1996). “[T]he trial court’s role as a gatekeeper is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system: ‘Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.’” United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir.1996) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786).
We need to keep our focus on the difference between scientific and non-scientific expert testimony. A scientific expert is an expert who relies on the application of scientific principles, rather than, on skill- or experience-based observation, for the basis of his or her opinion. See Daubert. The question in this case is whether Marcosky’s testimony is based on his application of scientific principles or theories (which we submit to a Dau-bert analysis) or on his use of personal experience and skill regarding seat belts (which we would usually expect a trial court to allow a jury to evaluate). Marcosky’s opinion is non-scientific and is based on his experience in analyzing the use of seat belts. However, it is not intrinsically “unscientific” for experts to arrive at conclusions by weighing all available scientific evidence. This does not seem to be the “junk science” with which Daubert was concerned. In fact, upon review of the appellee’s experts whose testimony was admitted, I conclude that they used the same “unscientific” approach as Marcosky.
Contrary to the majority opinion, I find that appellants presented sufficient evidence to support Mareosky’s testimony regarding inertial and inadvertent release. Marcosky relied upon his experience in automotive engineering and safety at General Motors, his consulting experience with Gateway Engineering, and his knowledge of the literature, data and information that are routinely used by experts in his field. .He examined the seat belt and vehicle on four occasions, made a microscopic examination of the belt, and consulted with McCrone Labs. Utilizing his experience and the information gleaned from the examinations and consultation, he deduced that the injury was caused by “either an inertial release or a buckle to buckle or inadvertent contact with the buckle.” Any conflicting views bring the issue of credibility into play and only go to the weight of his testimony and not to its admissibility.
Peterson’s opinion that inertial release can occur in real world accidents was also shown to be reliable. Appellants presented evidence that the tests he conducted, including the pendulum test, were performed in a facility designed and equipped to conduct such tests. If the tests are being, challenged as unreliable, the technician’s credibility can be challenged at trial. Peterson’s opinion, and the test protocol he used to conduct the test, is also an issue subject to attack upon cross-examination.
In the Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment the trial court judge stated:
The court has no quarrel with the scientific theory or technique which is demonstrated by the use of that device [pendulum test] and that methodology. The witness Peterson attempts then to relate those forces to the forces involved in the actual crash and rollover experienced by Mrs. Lytle in the instant case. The attempt to make that relationship is not based on any identifiable theory or technique which has been sufficiently identified that it could be empirically tested.
Peterson testified in an Offer of Proof Hearing that based upon his reasonable medical engineering certainty and his experience in sled and crash tests and rollover tests, there was a relationship between the forces that he had found in his pendulum test and the kind of forces exerted in the Lytle rollover. Appendix to Brief of Appellant, Part 3 at p. 57. The trial court obviously concluded that the methodology of the pendulum test was sound and thus the court was “satisfied that the scientific principles upon which the *476expert testimony rests are reliable” which makes the testimony admissible under Evid.R.-702(b). With the help of cross-examination, the jury could recognize any dissimilarities between the accident and the tests. The dissimilarities, then go to the weight, not to the admissibility of the evidence.
Under the facts presented here, recreating the specific conditions under which appellant sustained her injuries is virtually impossible. The intellectual and logical process of deductive reasoning that Peterson employed— which is formally known as differential diagnosis or differential etiology — is frequently used by experts in many fields to determine whether a product that could generally cause a type of injury was the cause in fact of a particular injury and is well recognized as a legitimate and scientifically valid methodology. See Pick v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 958 F.Supp. 1151 (E.D.La., 1997). Quite obviously, if we were to hold that a test or experiment must exactly recreate the conditions present at the time an injury was sustained, a plaintiff would rarely be able to overcome an opponent’s motion for summary judgment.
“In analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony, it is important for trial courts to keep in mind the separate functions of judge and jury, and the intent of Daubert to ... make it easier to present legitimate conflicting views of experts for the jury’s consideration.” Joiner v. Gen.Elec.Co. (11th Cir., 1996), 78 F.3d 524, 530.
While a determination of the admissibility of expert testimony is a matter generally within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion, that discretion is limited. Here, since the opinions met the requirements of Evid.R. 702 and since the out-of-court tests were reliable and admissible, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the expert opinions of Marcosky and Peterson.