dissenting:
The majority “[assumes] that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the decedent’s death on January 23, 1988.” I fully agree with this assumption. Nonetheless, the majority concludes that “the amended complaint changed the party [from the District of Columbia General Hospital to the District of Columbia] and did not merely correct a misnomer.” Moreover, the majority states that the District of Columbia did not receive “the notice required by [Super.Ct.Civ.R.] 15(c) within the time specified therein,” and hence Ms. Arrington’s appeal is “time-barred.” I am constrained to disagree because I believe that the majority not only disregards important facts which distinguish this case from Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 91 L.Ed.2d 18 (1986), but also ignores the purpose and rationale behind Super.Ct.Civ.R. 15(c).
CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS
Mrs. Annie Arrington was readmitted to D.C. General Hospital on November 19, 1987, after being treated there from October 23, 1987, to November 10, 1987, following a stroke which left her incapacitated. She was discharged on December 2, 1987, even though she suffered from a very serious de-cubitus ulcer. Subsequently, she was admit*683ted to Greater Southeast Community Hospital for surgical treatment of the ulcer. However, she developed a bacterial infection and died of septicemia on January 23, 1988.
On May 17, 1988, her daughter, Ms. Betty Arrington, sent a letter to the Mayor of the District of Columbia regarding “Notice of Claim Pursuant to D.C.Code § 12-309.” The letter detailed Ms. Arrington’s complaints about her mother’s treatment at D.C. General Hospital, and informed the Mayor of her claim against the City of Washington. On June 2, 1988, the Acting Secretary of the District of Columbia acknowledged Ms. Ar-rington’s notice of claim, asked for certain information, and indicated that an investigator would contact her. Ms. Arrington’s complaint, filed against the District of Columbia General Hospital on January 22, 1991, specified that a § 12-309 letter also had been sent to the Mayor on July 21, 1989, and was received on July 24,1989.
The January 1991, complaint and discovery requests were mailed and certified to: District of Columbia General Hospital, 19th & Massachusetts Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003.1 A clerk of the court dismissed the complaint in April 1991, without prejudice, because Ms. Arrington had not filed an affidavit of service.
On April 16, 1991, Ms. Arrington filed a motion to reinstate her complaint. A copy of the complaint was hand delivered to the Office of the Corporation Counsel on April 18, 1991. On May 28,1991, an Assistant Corporation Counsel filed a Praecipe stating that “the District of Columbia General Hospital does not oppose plaintiffs Motion to Reinstate the [January 22, 1991] Complaint.” The trial court reinstated the complaint in an order docketed on August 7, 1991. The order noted that the summons and complaint, as well as discovery requests, were mailed to D.C. General Hospital on January 22, 1991, and required the District of Columbia, not the District of Columbia General Hospital, to file an answer within thirty days. On August 13, 1991, the District filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.
Ms. Arrington filed a motion to amend her complaint under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 15(c) on September 17, 1991. The amended complaint was filed on January 20, 1992. The trial court docketed an order on January 28, 1992, denying the District’s motion to dismiss the complaint, granting Ms. Arrington’s motion to file an amended complaint, and ordering the District of Columbia to answer the complaint within twenty days. The District filed its answer on February 5,1992.
Superior Court Civil Rule 15(c)
Superior Court Civil Rule 15(c) mirrors Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and permits a party to amend a pleading after the statute of limitations has expired. It “seeks to ensure that litigation be decided upon the merits rather than upon technical pleading rules.” Strother v. District of Columbia, 372 A.2d 1291, 1297 (D.C.1977) (citing generally MooRe’s FEDERAL PRACTICE, ¶ 15.02[1]).
The rationale behind the rule is that if, within the statute of limitations, the defendant was put on notice that the plaintiff was attempting to enforce a claim against him because of a certain occurrence or event, then there is no cognizable prejudice to the defendant when, after the running of the limitations period, plaintiff is allowed to amend the complaint to reassert the claim that was deficiently stated the first time.
Strother, supra, 372 A.2d at 1297-98.
In Pritchett v. Stillwell, 604 A.2d 886, 888 (D.C.1992), we recognized that there are two key inquiries regarding Rule 15(c). The first question is: “did the amendment ‘change the party”’? and the second is: “if so, did the amending party satisfy the notice requirements of 15(c)(1) and (2)”? If the amendment merely corrects “the name of the party being sued [and] does not ‘chang[e] a party against whom a complaint is asserted’,” the second inquiry need not be made. Id.
THE RELATIONSHIP AND IDENTITY BETWEEN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GENERAL HOSPITAL AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
The majority states that:
*684D.C. General Hospital is a single health care facility located in southeast Washington, D.C. The District of Columbia, on the other hand, is a municipal corporation which employs tens of thousands of persons and operates numerous offices and facilities which are scattered over a wide area.
This statement prompts the majority to conclude that the amended complaint changed the party being sued, rather than merely correcting the name of that party. I respectfully disagree. The amended complaint corrected the technical name of the party being sued by dropping the words “General Hospital” and leaving the words “District of Columbia.”
The majority’s description of D.C. General Hospital is misleading in that it fails to recognize the historic and intimate relationship and identity between D.C. General Hospital and the District of Columbia.2 In 1920, the Congress of the United States appropriated money to construct a municipal hospital in the District of Columbia, known first as Gal-linger Municipal Hospital.3 Eventually the Hospital’s name was changed to the District of Columbia General Hospital, undoubtedly to reflect its direct management and operational relationship with, and funding by, the District of Columbia government. In Calomeris v. District of Columbia, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 364, 365, 226 F.2d 266, 267 (1955), the court stated: “Care for the indigent sick is clearly a governmental function. The purpose of the General Hospital is to care for the indigent sick.”
Since its inception, D.C. General Hospital has consistently performed a governmental function, with governmental funds, in caring for the economically poorer population of the District of Columbia, and responsibility for the management and operation of the Hospital has remained with the District of Columbia. Even the creation of the D.C. General Hospital Commission in 1977 did not alter the fundamental and historic relationship and identity between the Hospital and the District of Columbia. See D.C.Law 1-134, May 13, 1977, D.C.Code §§ 32-201 et seq.
Although the D.C. General Hospital Commission was designed as an independent agency of the District of Columbia, the District government continued to play a direct and significant role in its management, budgetary and fiscal operations. Under D.C.Code § 32-212, the Mayor appointed members of the Commission, with the consent of the Council of the District of Columbia, and under D.C.Code § 32-218 the Mayor was assigned the power to remove a Commissioner for misconduct or malfeasance. Commissioners bore no personal liability for their official actions. Id. § 32-223. Moreover, the Commission had to submit its budget to the Mayor, and the Mayor could modify that budget before transmitting it to the Council. Id. § 32-241. The management relationship of the District to the Hospital was tightened in 1993, when (1) “all the duties, powers and functions of the Commission” were transferred to the Commission’s Executive Director, the chief administrator of the Hospital, and (2) the Executive Director was placed under “the direct supervision and control of the Mayor.” Id. § 32-211.1.
In short, it has been abundantly clear since at least the 1920’s that the District’s municipal hospital, now D.C. General Hospital, and the District of Columbia have a clear identity of interest. D.C. General Hospital is not an isolated health care facility located in southeast Washington, D.C. It is a historic and intimate part of the District of Columbia. It carries out a governmental function under the supervision and control of the District of Columbia government. Its debt is the District of Columbia’s debt. Therefore, it is rare when one does not think of the District of Columbia in discussing D.C. General Hospital. To file a suit against D.C. General *685Hospital is to file it against the District of Columbia.
To make a distinction between the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia General Hospital is a “technical nicety” on which Rule 15 frowns. See Spann v. Commissioners of D.C., 148 U.S.App.D.C. 300, 443 F.2d 715 (1970); Keith v. Washington, 401 A.2d 468 (D.C.1979). Accordingly, as the trial judge concluded, the amended complaint should not be dismissed as time-barred.
RULE 15(c) AND SCHIAVONE V. FORTUNE
“The four-pronged test [set forth in Schia-vone v. Fortune, supra ], is utterly irrelevant unless the amendment is one ‘changing the party against whom a claim is asserted.’” 477 U.S. at 35, 106 S.Ct. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Even assuming that the change in the name of the party is not a mere correction, however, the requirements of Rule 15(c)(1) have been met in this case. Specifically, (1) Ms. Arrington’s claim arose “out of the conduct set forth in [her] original” complaint; (2) the District of Columbia “received such notice that it [was] not prejudiced in maintaining [its] defense on the merits”; (3) the District of Columbia “must or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning identity, the action would have been brought against it”; and (4) “the second and third requirements have been fulfilled within the prescribed limitations period.” Schiavone, supra, 477 U.S. at 29, 106 S.Ct. at 2384.
This case differs remarkably from Schia-vone. There “[t]he caption of each complaint named ‘Fortune,’ without embellishment, as the defendant.” Id. at 22-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2381. A paragraph in the complaint described “Fortune” only as “a foreign corporation having its principal offices at Time and Life Building, Sixth Avenue and 50th Street, New York, New York.” Id. at 23,106 S.Ct. at 2381. There was no mention of Time, Inc. in the original complaint. The fact that Fortune had an office at the Time and Life Building did not signal its corporate relationship to Time, Inc. In contrast, Ms. Arring-ton’s original complaint contained the words “District of Columbia” directly in the caption. Furthermore, in Schiavone, the complaint was not mailed until May 20, 1983, even though suit was filed on May 9, 1983; the defendant refused to accept the complaint. Here the complaint was mailed prior to the expiration of the limitation period, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the defendant refused to accept the mailed complaint. In addition, the defendant in Schia-vone did not receive any notice of the complaint that is comparable to the § 12-309 notice of claim provided to the District by Ms. Arrington.
Ms. Arrington’s amended complaint “arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth ... in the original pleading_” Rule 15(c). The amended complaint was virtually the same as the original complaint. In addition, the District “received such notice of the institution of the action that it [was] not prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits” and “knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.” Id. Ms. Arrington’s suit could not have been a surprise to the District of Columbia. On May 17, 1988, Ms. Arrington sent a notice of claim letter to the Mayor pursuant to D.C.Code § 12-309, advising him of her claim against the city due to her mother’s treatment at D.C. General Hospital. The District acknowledged receipt of the letter on June 2, 1988. In addition, Ms. Arrington’s January 22, 1991 complaint specified that a § 12-309 notice letter had been sent to the Mayor on July 21, 1989, and was received on July 24, 1989.
The attorney for the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia General Hospital is the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia. Undoubtedly, the Office of the Corporation Counsel was notified of the original complaint. Even if the Hospital had not informed the Office of the Corporation Counsel about the original complaint, the statute of limitations was tolled with the filing of the original complaint. Varela v. Hi-Lo Powered Stirrups, Inc., 424 A.2d 61, 70 (D.C.1980). Moreover, in filing its praecipe on May 28, 1991, the Office of the Corporation Counsel raised absolutely no objection to re*686instatement of the complaint against the District of Columbia General Hospital, and no concern about the Hospital not being sui juris. The District could not have been prejudiced in its defense by the amended complaint. The Office of the Corporation Counsel was served with a copy of the original complaint by hand on April 18,1991, at 13th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., now the John Wilson Building, and then the seat of the District of Columbia government. No significant action took place with respect to Ms. Arrington’s lawsuit until after the District filed its answer on February 5, 1992. Since the District was formally notified of the claim at least by May 1988, it had a substantial amount of time to investigate the circumstances of the claim prior to the formal litigation process, and could not have been caught by surprise.
In summary, for the reasons set forth above, I believe that Ms. Arrington’s amended complaint is not time-barred because it merely corrected the name of the party being sued. Even assuming that the change did not constitute a correction, however, the requirements for relating the amended complaint back to the original complaint have been met. As the Supreme Court reminded us in Schiavone, “Rule 8(f) says: ‘All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.’ ” 477 U.S. at 27, 106 S.Ct. at 2383.4 This reminder is consistent with our own interpretation of Rule 15(c) in Pritchett, where we reiterated the fundamental proposition that “Rule 15(c) is to be applied liberally ... in order to further the rule’s purpose: ‘to ensure that litigation be decided upon the merits rather than upon technical pleading rules.’ ” 604 A.2d at 890 (quoting Strother, supra, 372 A.2d at 1297; see also Keith, supra, 401 A.2d at 470). Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
. This is the official mailing address of D.C. General Hospital. See Inside the Courts. Government and Law Libraries of the District of Columbia 387 (1st ed„ 1993).
. Information regarding the early history of public hospitals in Washington, D.C., including the Washington Asylum and Gallinger Municipal Hospital, may be found in Proctor, II Washington Past and Present, A History, 1930, ch. XLIX, at 568-71, ch. LXI, at 669-70, 682-83.
. The Washington Asylum, and later the Washington Asylum and Jail, functioned as the District’s hospital, and later combined hospital and jail in the early 1900’s.
. Rule 8(f) of the FedR.Civ.Pro. is identical to Super.Ct.Civ.R. 8(f).