I respectfully dissent. The majority’s efforts to distinguish this case from Lawhorn v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1357 [240 Cal.Rptr. 848, 743 P.2d 908], are unavailing. Petitioner’s misconduct was serious and willful; indeed, the majority brush aside facts which might justify greater discipline than that imposed on Lawhorn. At a time when consistency in discipline has assumed obvious importance, the majority’s refusal to follow applicable precedent is insupportable. As in Lawhorn, I would order that petitioner be placed on probation for five years and suffer an actual suspension of two years.
The majority emphasize that Lawhorn avoided his client’s calls, stalled further with a false story that his estranged wife had placed a “freeze” on his trust account, and repaid the misappropriated funds only after he was threatened with a State Bar complaint. In addition, the majority speculate that Lawhorn probably lied at his hearing when he claimed the funds improperly withdrawn from his trust account remained in a “stash box” in his refrigerator and were not used for his personal needs. (Ante, at p. 627.) By contrast, the majority observes, petitioner in this case made no false excuses to his client, spontaneously offered to repay in installments, and was candid in the disciplinary proceedings.
But our Lawhorn opinion belies any notion that the cited distinctions suggest more lenient discipline here. In Lawhorn, we affirmed that misappropriation is so serious as to warrant disbarment absent substantial mitigation. (43 Cal.3d at p. 1366 [citing Tarver v. State Bar (1984) 37 Cal.3d 122, 133 (207 Cal.Rptr. 302, 688 P.2d 911), and Rules Proc. of State Bar, div. V, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 2.2(a)].) However, we gave Lawhorn’s repayment full mitigating credit because it occurred before an actual complaint was filed with the State Bar. We emphasized that Lawhorn’s “stash box” testimony was “not implausible” on the evidence, and we found contextual excuses for his other possible lapses of candor before the State Bar. We made only a brief and oblique reference to Law-horn’s “account freeze” lie to his client, and we minimized its seriousness in light of Lawhorn’s inexperience and life difficulties. We concluded that Lawhorn had been “foolish,” “wrong,” and negligent, but that he was not “venal.” After viewing the case in this strong mitigating light, and after *630discounting potentially aggravating dishonesty, we nonetheless imposed a two-year actual suspension. (43 Cal.3d at pp. 1366-1369.)
The starting point in any disciplinary case must be the seriousness of the underlying breach. Here petitioner, faced with financial difficulties, appropriated $2,000 of his client’s money to his own use in the age-old hope that funds would materialize from another source to repay the client. The State Bar Court found that petitioner’s conduct in this regard was “willful” and involved moral turpitude. The purpose of the strict trust account requirements is to protect client funds from just such maneuverings, however motivated. We have deemed willful misappropriation of trust funds a “gross” violation of professional ethics which undermines public confidence in the profession. (E.g., Ambrose v. State Bar (1982) 31 Cal.3d 184, 192-193 [181 Cal.Rptr. 903, 643 P.2d 486]; see also Finch v. State Bar (1981) 28 Cal.3d 659, 665 [170 Cal.Rptr. 629, 621 P.2d 253].)
Petitioner’s demonstration of life difficulty, remorse, and atonement is not significantly greater than that we found in Lawhorn. Lawhorn and petitioner were of approximately equal experience, both faced financial and marital problems, and both repaid as promptly as they believed their financial circumstances permitted. Petitioner’s hiring of a management firm to tighten his office practices is largely beside the point. His rob-Peter-to-pay-Paul financial misdealings arose not from lax oversight, but from a conscious, fundamental disregard of his professional obligations.
In any event, petitioner, unlike Lawhorn, has a second, separate instance of misconduct—his abandonment of client Castaneda. The majority dismiss this fact with the comment that “[t]he abandonment appears to have resulted from the same forces leading to the misappropriation, namely, petitioner’s poor management skills. [Citation.]” (Ante, at p. 627, fn. 3.) I reject both the premise (“poor management skills” explain petitioner’s problems) and the implied conclusion (the abandonment is irrelevant for purposes of discipline). On the contrary, a single incident of abandonment may warrant suspension (std. 2.4(b)), and a “pattern of misconduct” is an aggravating circumstance in any case (std. 1.2(b)(iii)).
Finally, while the State Bar’s new disciplinary standards are not binding on us, they promote a healthy consistency in the sanctions imposed for various forms of attorney misconduct. Hence, we said in Lawhorn that “we will not reject a recommendation arising from application of the [standards unless we have grave doubts as the propriety of the recommended discipline. . . .” (43 Cal.3d at p. 1366.) The State Bar Court’s proposal that petitioner suffer a two-year actual suspension was based on application of *631the standards. The majority fail to raise the “grave doubts” which would justify overturning the recommendation.
I see no reasoned basis for the majority’s departure from the discipline imposed in Lawhorn, which involved similar and no more serious misconduct. I would adopt the State Bar Court’s recommendation that petitioner be placed on probation for five years, with an actual suspension of two years.
Puglia (Robert K.), J.,* concurred.
Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.