(Pro Tempore).
The defendant appeals from his conviction of first degree murder of Lynn Michael Wilson. Wilson, the swing-shift attendant at the B & B Texaco station in Portland, had been working alone the evening of October 28, 1965. At 11:30 p.m., the station was found open, but unattended. Two new tires were missing and $173 had been taken from the cash register. The next day Wilson’s body was found beside a road a few miles from the station. He had been shot four times in the back of the head and neck and his hands were tied behind him. There was no money on the body.
In March 1966, the defendant and one Lawrence G. McManis were jointly indicted on a charge of first degree murder of Wilson. The defendant was tried, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. His only assignment of error is the receipt in evidence *487of admissions made by him to police officers. He claims that in connection with the eliciting of these admissions he was denied the right to have his counsel present, was not advised of his constitutional rights and his statements were the product of coercion.
The background facts necessary to understand the defendant’s contentions are complicated and bizarre. The defendant was the father of an infant child born of one Eose Grant. Tom Sipes was the brother of Miss Grant. Through the defendant’s association with Miss Grant, he had known Sipes for several years.
Several weeks before the murder, the defendant, Eose Grant, Tom Sipes and Sandra Williams were arrested by Portland city police and charged with an “after hours” ordinance violation. Some time before, a complaint had been filed against these four charging them with armed robbery, but they had not been previously apprehended. The women had lured two men named Snyder and Young from a Portland night club to a secluded place; there Sipes and Atkins robbed them at gunpoint. At a lineup conducted in the jail the victims of the armed robbery identified the two women; however, they were unable to identify the defendant or Sipes. The defendant was sentenced to ten days in jail on the ordinance violation, Sipes was held in custody on another charge pending against him, and Miss Grant and Miss Williams were detained on the armed robbery charge. This crime will be referred to as the Young-Snyder armed robbery hereafter. By October 28th, the date of the Wilson murder, the defendant had been released from custody; the others remained in jail.
In the early evening of October 28th, the defendant went to the home of Mrs. Laverne Grant, the mother of both Miss Grant and Sipes, and asked her *488to help him “pull a job” that night, because he needed money. Mrs. Grant testified that the defendant expressed bitterness over the lineup identification of Eose Grant, and said that if he committed a crime again he would “blow their brains out.” Shortly after the murder, the defendant, his father, and Lawrence G. McManis drove to Georgia. Before they left, the defendant put two new tires on the car used for the trip. There was other scientific and testimonial evidence tending to prove that Atkins and McManis were the murderers which it is unnecessary to set forth in this opinion.
At the trial Multnomah County detectives Earl Son and Jack Elliott testified that the defendant admitted his presence at the robbery and murder, but claimed that it was the codefendant McManis who forced Wilson into the car and subsequently shot him. They also testified that the defendant made admissions concerning the tires stolen from the service station. It is these admissions which the defendant claims were erroneously received.
The trial court held an in camera hearing to determine the admissibility of the defendant’s statements. The court found that the defendant had been fully advised of his constitutional rights, had waived the right to have his attorney present when he gave the statements, and had made the statements freely and voluntarily.
The evidence is clear that on the two occasions he made admissions he was fully advised of his constitutional rights by the officers questioning him. On the first occasion, he was also advised of his rights by his attorney immediately prior to the questioning. Earlier he had been advised of these rights by another police officer and by a district judge. There can *489be no doubt that he was advised of and fully understood his rights in connection with the making of the incriminating statements.
The essence of the defendant’s other contentions is that the police placed Sipes in the defendant’s cell block with instructions to obtain a confession to the Wilson murder from the defendant; that Sipes struck the defendant and threatened to kill him unless he confessed to that crime, and that because of his fear of Sipes he falsely confessed to participation in the murder; he also contends that he was questioned in the absence of his attorney immediately after the attorney had demanded the right to be present. In addition to the facts recited above the following evidence was produced at the in camera hearing:
On November 10, 1965, the defendant was arrested and arraigned on the Young-Snyder armed robbery charge. He remained in jail at all times thereafter through the month of January 1966. Sipes likewise remained in jail through this period.
On December 21, 1965, the defendant appeared before the judge of a different department of the Multnomah County circuit court on the Young-Snyder armed robbery charge and was permitted to enter a plea of guilty to the included offense of unarmed robbery by putting in fear. On December 22nd, the defendant again appeared in court and asked to be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty. His attorney, George Tamblyn, advised the court that he had mistakenly told his client that he had the right to withdraw his guilty plea if he later changed his mind. On this basis, the court permitted the withdrawal of the guilty plea made the day before. After the withdrawal, the defendant told the court that, in fact, he wished to enter a guilty plea but he feared to do so because *490of the threat of physical retaliation from his codefendant, Sipes, when Sipes learned that he had plead guilty. The judge acknowledged that the chief criminal deputy of the Multnomah County district attorney’s office had previously discussed this problem with him. Sipes’s trial on the armed robbery charge had been set down for January 14, 1966.
After a discussion between the judge, the deputy district attorney in court, and the defendant’s attorney, an understanding was reached that Atkins would orally enter his plea of guilty, but that no journal entry or other public record would be made of the plea until after Sipes had been tried. On this basis, the defendant again entered a plea of guilty and a presentence report was ordered.①
*492Up until this time Sipes and the defendant had shared the same cell block. After the defendant’s second guilty plea, Sipes was placed in what was described as Tank A and the defendant in Tank B.
Despite the efforts of the attorneys and judge to keep Sipes from learning that the defendant had entered a guilty plea in the Young-Snyder robbery case, Sipes became aware of it.
In early January 1966, Detectives Son and Elliott learned from jailhouse informants that the two men had had a “falling out.” Previously, Son and Elliott had heard rumors that the defendant was involved in the Wilson murder. The detectives contacted Sipes and asked him to attempt to find out from the defendant the location of the Wilson murder weapon. He said he would attempt to do so if he were placed in the same cell block with the defendant. This was done. Sipes testified that the officers told him that if he succeeded, the criminal charges against him in Oregon would be dropped and he would be released to the California authorities to answer to criminal charges pending there. Son and Elliott denied making any promises to him.
*493About a week later, on January 14th, Sipes told the detectives that they did not need his help in finding the gun because the defendant wanted to confess to the murder. Arrangements were made for the defendant to be brought from the jail to an interrogation room for questioning. By chance, George Tamblyn was in a corridor of the Multnomah County courthouse on other legal matters and saw the detectives escorting the defendant to the interrogation room. He demanded to know where his client was being taken. Upon being advised that Atkins was going to be questioned, he took him to a private room and advised him of his rights. Mr. Tamblyn testified:
“A * * * We went back to the attorneys’ interviewing room and I asked him what they were going to talk to him about and he said, ‘Weil, they want to talk to me about this service station murder,’ and I said, ‘Are you a suspect in that?’ and he says, ‘Yes.’ I think that’s—and so I told him that my appointment as his attorney for the armed robbery didn’t mean I was his attorney for anything else.
“Q You made this perfectly clear to him that you were only appointed to defend him on that assault with a deadly weapon, armed robbery?
“A The armed robbery, yes.
“Q What was his reaction to this?
“A Well, I don’t know as he reacted to that. I went on to say that if he wanted—if he desired, I would counsel him anyway with respect to at least the interrogation stage of this murder charge, and that if he was subsequently indicted, why, we would take a second look at my commitments and how we felt about each other in respect to this further representation at that time, and he said yes, he would like that, and then I proceeded to tell him that my advice to him as his attorney, therefore, was not to talk to the detectives at all, and I made it *494quite clear that if he really wanted to talk to them, I should be there.
“Q All right. What was his reaction to this, Mr. Tamblyn?
“A He said, ‘All right’-—I mean, ‘I won’t talk.’ ”
At Mr. Tamblyn’s direction, the defendant was returned to his jail cell. Before leaving the building the attorney informed the jailer that the defendant was not to be questioned except with his permission and in his presence. The jailer advised the two detectives of his conversation with Mr. Tamblyn. They asked to be informed when the attorney had left the courthouse.
As soon as they learned that Mr. Tamblyn had left, they again had the defendant brought from the jail and took him to an interrogation room. Sipes was also brought to that room and remained there throughout the questioning that followed. Son and Elliott testified that Sipes was present at the defendant’s request. The defendant denied this. The officers advised the defendant of his rights, and, according to their testimony, he said: “I’ve been informed by my attorney not to speak to anybody, but, I feel that I should tell this and get it off my mind. I want to talk to yon.” The defendant then admitted his participation in the crime.
On January 24,1966, the defendant was again questioned by the same officers and made admissions as to the disposition of the tires stolen from the service station. Sipes was not present.
The officers acknowledged that they were aware of the rumors of hostility between the defendant and Sipes at the time they asked Sipes for his cooperation, but testified that Sipes told them that he and *495Atkins were “back on speaking terms again.” They said that during the first interrogation, the two men appeared to be friendly and that the defendant displayed no sign of being afraid or unwilling to talk. The defendant testified, however, that he made admissions to the officers only because of his fear of Sipes. Both the defendant and Sipes testified that after they had been placed in a common cell block in early January, Sipes had knocked the defendant down and had threatened to kill him if he did not confess to the murder.
The defendant is a small man. Sipes was described as 6' 3" tall and weighing 214 pounds, with a 52-inch chest and 17-inch biceps. He had a reputation for violence and had previously been convicted of felonies involving force. At the time here involved he was being held in custody on the Young-Snyder armed robbery charge, check charges and another armed robbery charge. He was also being detained for California authorities for an armed robbery charge in that state.
Prior to the present trial, Sipes was tried on the Young-Snyder robbery charge, found guilty and sentenced to 20 years in the penitentiary. At the in camera hearing, Sipe’s attorney was called as a witness for the defendant and questioned as to any promises that may have been made to Sipes in order to obtain his cooperation in the murder investigation. He was unwilling to discuss conversations between himself and Sipes on the grounds that they were privileged communications between attorney and client. Sipes, who had been transferred from the penitentiary to the Multnomah County courthouse jail in order to testify at the murder trial, was brought to the courtroom in order to determine if he wished to waive the privilege. Concern was expressed for the physical *496safety of the attorney if he and Sipes were in the courtroom together. Consequently, at the suggestion of the trial court, the attorney was permitted to leave the courtroom by a back door and remain out of the courtroom during the time that Sipes was there.
Sipes waived the attorney-client privilege and was returned to jail. The attorney re-entered the courtroom and testified that before Sipes’s trial on the armed robbery charge he told the attorney that he had “worked a deal with somebody upstairs” and “wasn’t too concerned.”
This attorney also testified to an incident that occurred immediately after Sipes was sentenced to the penitentiary. Sipes became belligerent in the corridor outside the courtroom and refused to return to the jail. The witness described his appearance as that of a cornered animal. It became necessary for a deputy sheriff to unfasten his gun holster cover before Sipes could be returned to his cell.
There was testimony that while at the penitentiary, Sipes became involved in a fight wdth another inmate, causing Sipes to be placed in isolation and the other man hospitalized.
At the conclusion of the in camera hearing the trial court found that the statements of the defendant were freely and voluntarily made, but did not make specific findings of fact. Upon review, this court will not re-examine the historical facts found by the trial court in a hearing to determine the voluntariness of a confession or admission; and where the trial court does not set out its fact findings, we will presume that it found facts consistent with its determination of voluntariness vel non. It is the role of this court to examine the record as thus made and make an independent determination of the ultimate issue *497of voluntariness in accordance with constitutional concepts of due process. Clewis v. Texas, 386 US 707, 87 S Ct 1338, 18 L ed 2d 423 (1967); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 US 737, 86 S Ct 1761, 16 L ed 2d 895 (1966); Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 443 P2d 621 (1968); Jensen v. Gladden, 250 Or 499, 443 P2d 626 (1968).
We will presume the trial court found that: (1) the officers made no promises to Sipes; (2) Sipes did not assault or threaten the defendant; (3) the detectives believed Sipes and the defendant to be friendly toward one another; (4) the defendant made the statement that he wanted to talk in the absence of his attorney.
However, there are also the following uncontroverted facts:
(1) The defendant and Sipes were co-indictees on the Toung-Snyder armed robbery charge.
(2) When the defendant entered a guilty plea to the reduced charge of unarmed robbery, a circuit judge found it necessary in order to protect the defendant from Sipes to follow the unique procedure of making no formal entry of the guilty plea so that Sipes would not hear of it.
(3) After the defendant entered this plea, the jail authorities placed him and Sipes in separate cell blocks.'
(4) Sipes was a very large and powerful man, with a reputation for violence. He had been convicted in the past of felonies involving violence. In addition to the Toung-Snyder robbery charge on which he was jointly indicted with the defendant, he was being held in custody on another armed robbery charge. He was also being detained for California authorities for an alleged armed robbery in that state. *498His own attorney was afraid to be present in a courtroom with him.
(5) Sipes had learned that the defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge on which they were jointly indicted. There were rumors among the jail inmates of ill will and hostility between the two men.
(6) The detectives were aware of these rumors and aware of the nature and background of Sipes. In order to obtain information through Sipes, the detectives placed the two men in the same cell block and within a week the defendant was apparently prepared to confess.
(7) With knowledge that the defendant’s attorney had demanded the right to be present if his client was questioned, the detectives conducted the interrogation in such a manner that the attorney would be unaware of it.
(8) Sipes was present in the interrogation room when the defendant made his admission.
The facts may be stated even more starkly: While officers of the law employed unusual means to protect a prisoner from an instrument of danger, other officers simultaneously exposed him to the same instrument of danger for the purpose of obtaining admissions. This does not measure up to the standards of fair play required of the state in dealing with its citizens.
The totality of the circumstances surrounding the statements present a greater risk of coercion than can be countenanced. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 US 191, 77 S Ct 281, 1 L ed 2d 246 (1957); Clewis v. Texas, supra. The lower court erred in finding the statements voluntary and in admitting them in evidence.
The appellant also contends his Sixth Amendment *499right to counsel was violated. In light of the above disposition of this case we find it unnecessary to decide that question. But see: State v. Atherton, 242 Or 621, 410 P2d 208, cert. den. 384 US 1025 (1966); State v. Sanford, 245 Or 397, 421 P2d 988 (1966); see also Mathis v. United States, 391 US 1, 88 S Ct 1503, 20 L ed 2d 381 (1968), holding that Miranda rights are applicable to one in custody who is questioned as to an offense entirely separate from the one for which he is held in custody.
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
A partial transcript of those proceedings is as follows:
“THE COURT: You did want to get it straightened out— that there was—if there’s a misunderstanding between you and Mr. Tamblyn. You were apparently of the impression that you could withdraw that—enter a plea of not guilty, but nevertheless, you want that straightened out and you still want to enter a plea of guilty, but you have a little problem with the co-defendant?
“MR. ATKINS: Yes.
“THE COURT: Well, now this matter here is a matter in open Court, naturally as all criminal proceedings, but I feel you certainly can go right ahead and tell the Court what your problem is and desire is at this time. I think the matter can be handled judiciously. You go ahead.
“MR. ATKINS: Well, I changed my plea to guilty yesterday and my—I mean because I—that’s what I wanted. I wanted to plead guilty to a lesser charge, and put this thing aside and save, the State—you know—and the Court a lot of time and trouble for something that was done, I mean it was my own act—that I did it, but upon returning to Rocky Butte yesterday, the co-defendant found out I changed the plea to guilty and—well, he said if I didn’t change it back to not guilty, what was going to happen. So—I mean I have to live with them guys. I can’t plead guilty and have him and the rest of them jump on me for it. I mean I’m out there with *491a bunch of guys and where they feel this way, and if I pleaded guilty to this charge against—they said not to plead guilty to it, and in his words, I ain’t going to look very pretty. So, he’s pretty big and I’m pretty small.
“THE COURT: Well, I certainly can appreciate your concern.
“MR. ATKINS: I don’t know what to do, your Honor. I sure—I would like to plead guilty. That’s what I want to do. I want to get it over with, but still I—he knows I changed my plea to guilty and he thinks that I’m messing him around, and I’m not.
“THE COURT: I know. I started to say I can appreciate your concern. I probably would share it were I in your position, but certainly I’m not going to be a party to or—by one way or the other endorse or condone any intimidation by anybody out there as far as I’m concerned. I’m not custodian of the jail—we can’t have a position—if a man has transgressed against our social laws—wants to admit this, wants to enter a plea and have disposition made, I don’t want to have somebody else who is a defendant, guilty or not, intimidate him or injure him for that matter.
“MR. ATKINS: I don’t know what to do, your honor.
“THE COURT: I don’t know either. I’m trying to think a little bit.
“MR. ATKINS: It’s not the fact so much as it could— could from the co-defendant himself—he’ has friends there. If I move to another tank, it still would happen.
“THE COURT: Is he some big operator out there? What’s the co-defendant’s name?
“MR. HAMPTON: Mr. Sipes, your Honor. He has a record and I may say without prejudicing him in the eyes of this Court, he’s also wanted in California for similar robbery pattersn [sic].
“THE COURT: He has a plea of not guilty,? Has he been arraigned?
“MR. HAMPTON: His trial is set for, I believe it’s the 14th or 17th of January.
“THE COURT: Por armed robbery?
“MR. HAMPTON: Yes. He has a charge of obtaining money by false pretenses. One is for the 14th, the other is the 17th of January, 1966.
“THE COURT: The chief criminal deputy was in this morning to talk to the Court about this, Mr. Hampton, and admin*492istratively, why can’t we just continue this matter for the time being?
“THE COURT: * * * I’ll just withhold signing the order, Mr. District Attorney. That will take care of the matter as far as you’re concerned. You realize my position here. I don’t want to be any part of any condoning to any intimidation, but from a practical—I’ll accept your plea of guilty and I’ll not sign the order until such time as Mr. Sipe’s order has been disposed of. Tell your friends out there and—at least that’s the court’s feeling right now. If I decide it should be handled some other way, I’ll let you know. That’s the way I’ll handle it. I’ll accept your plea of guilty and suspend the signing of the order making it official until a further future date * *