In this original proceeding, William T. Porter, as a resident and taxpayer of the City of Oklahoma City, asks this court to assume original jurisdiction and to enjoin the City of Oklahoma City and the individuals composing its governing body from issuing (a) “Series ‘A’ General Purpose Bonds of 1968” of said city, dated as of October 1, 1968, in the aggregate principal amount of $32,625,000, and (b) “Series ‘A’ Limited Access Facility Bonds of 1968” of said city dated as of October 1, 1968, in the aggregate principal amount of $2,670,000, and (c) “Series ‘A’ Fire Station and Fire Equipment Bonds of 1968” of said city, dated October 1, 1968, in the aggregate principal amount of $365,000.
62 O.S.1961, § 11, adopted in 1910, made the Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma ex officio Bond Commissioner of the State of Oklahoma; 62 O.S.1961, § 13, provides that:
“It shall be the duty of the Bond Commissioner to prepare uniform forms and prescribe a method of procedure under the laws of the State in all cases where it is desired to issue public securities or bonds, in any county, township, municipality or political or other sub-divisions thereof of the State of Oklahoma; and it shall be the further duty of said Bond Commissioner to examine into and pass upon any security so issued, and such security, when declared by the certificate of said Bond Commissioner to be issued in accordance with the forms of procedure so provided shall be incontestable in any court in the State of Oklahoma unless suit thereon be brought in a court having jurisdiction of the same within thirty days from the date of the approval thereof by the Bond Commissioner; ”
and 62 O.S.1961, § 14, also adopted in 1910, provides that “No bond hereafter issued by any political or municipal sub-division of this State shall be valid without the certificate of said Bond Commissioner.”
This proceeding, contesting the validity of these three issues of bonds because of alleged fatal defects in the election held in the City of Oklahoma City on July 16, 1968, authorizing the issuance of the bonds, was commenced in this court within the 30-day period prescribed in 62 O.S.1961, § 13. It was commenced on September 10, 1968, subsequent to the issuance, on the same date, by the Attorney General, as ex-officio Bond Commissioner of the State of Oklahoma, of his separate certificates approving each of the three issues of bonds as being issued in accordance with the Constitution and laws of this State and the forms and method of procedure prescribed by the Bond Commissioner for the issuance of such bonds. Copies of the transcripts of the proceedings with respect to the bonds, examined by the Bond Commissioner, are a part of the record before this court.
*387Those transcripts disclose that the governing body of the City of Oklahoma City, on August 13, 1968, received written bids for the three issues of bonds, and, on August 15, 1968, accepted the bid of Harris Trust and Savings Bank, Chicago, Illinois (and associates) for the “Series ‘A’ General Purpose Bonds of 1968,” and sold that issue of bonds to those bidders, and accepted the bid of The First National Bank and Trust Company, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the other two issues of bonds and sold them to that bidder; that the successful bid for the “Series ‘A’ General Purpose Bonds of 1968” is conditioned, among other things, upon delivery of the bonds to the bidders at a named bank in the City of New York, New York, “within seventy-five days from the date of sale,” accompanied by a certificate of non-litigation as of the date of delivery of the bonds; and that the successful bids for the other two issues of bonds is conditioned, among other things, upon delivery of the bonds to the bidder, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, “on or before October 28, 1968,” accompanied by a similar certificate of no litigation.
The record before us also discloses that on August 1, 1968, an action, numbered 183,721, was commenced in the District Court of Oklahoma County by S. Dale Rorem, an individual, and Oklahoma Taxpayer’s Association, Inc., a corporation, as plaintiffs against the City of Oklahoma City, a municipal corporation, and the Oklahoma County Election Board, as defendants, alleging that, after the voting at the bond election of July 16, 1968, had been completed and the polls closed and the results of the voting at each polling place in the city certified to the County Election Boards involved, an error was discovered in the printing of the official “ballots” used at the polling places in Oklahoma County, which error caused an incorrect tally of the votes cast at said election on Proposition No. 1 (which involved the Limited Access Facility bonds mentioned above); “that, upon the discovery of the printing error and the incorrect tally of votes as hereinbefore described, persons whose names are unknown to these plaintiffs, but who were within the employment, supervision and direction of the defendant, Oklahoma County Election Board, agent of the defendant, The City of Oklahoma City, made corrections upon the face of the official ballot, thereby altering, defacing and mutilating the official ballot as marked by the voters in said election;” and, based thereon, those plaintiffs prayed that the district court decree said election and the results thereof to be a nullity and a void election, and prohibit the defendant, City of Oklahoma City, from acting upon any alleged authority granted to it as a result of said election.
The record before us also discloses that on August 23, 1968, after considering the stipulations of the parties, the evidence adduced at a hearing held on that date, and the briefs of the parties, the district court found that the issues were “(1) that the election of July 16, 1968, is illegal because ballots used at such election were mutilated, (2) that the election of July 16, 1968, is illegal because it was conducted through the use of voting machines, and (3) that the election of July 16, 1968, is illegal because the certificates posted outside each precinct polling place did not correctly reflect the votes cast in such precinct,” and held that the evidence before the court was not sufficient to constitute a cause of action or entitle the plaintiffs to any judgment against the defendants in the action. It also appears, that those plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial was overruled on September 3, 1968, and they gave notice in open court of their intention to appeal to this court. However, as of the date of this opinion, such an appeal to this court has not been perfected.
The respondents in the present proceeding deny the applicant’s contentions concerning the invalidity of the bond election and of the bonds, and join with the applicant in asking this court to assume jurisdiction and to determine the questions of law raised by the applicant. They also ask that this court, in this proceeding, issue a writ of certiorari to the district judge who tried *388the above-mentioned case No. 183,721 in the District Court of Oklahoma County, commanding him to certify to this court all of the records in that case and all things pertaining thereto, for review by this court, and that this court consolidate the two causes and determine, immediately, all of the questions of law presented, so that, if the bonds are not invalid for any of the reasons asserted by the plaintiffs in the two causes, they may be delivered to the successful bidders within the time specified in their respective bids.
In this connection, the respondents allege that the trend of the municipal bond market has been, and is, such that, if it becomes necessary for the city to readver-tise for bids for the bonds authorized at the election of July 16, 1968, because such litigation has not been finally determined prior to the specified dates for delivery of these bonds and the bonds cannot be delivered with the required certificates that there is no litigation pending concerning the bonds, the total interest cost to the city, provided for under the new bids, would undoubtedly be from three and one-half million to four million dollars more than under the successful bids for the bonds in question herein; and that, therefore, it is of extreme public importance and of urgent necessity that the questions of law presented in this proceeding and in the above-mentioned district court case be finally determined, by this court, as quickly as possible. It appears that obtaining such a final determination of all of those questions, and, at the same time, obviating the additional interest cost to the city (which would, of course, adversely affect this applicant and all owners of property in the City of Oklahoma City which is not exempt from sinking fund levies), is the reason that this applicant commenced his action in this court rather than in the District Court of Oklahoma County.
This applicant contends, among other things that, because voting machines, rather than the usual printed, separate ballots for each voter, were used at the election of July 16, 1968, in all polling places within that part of the City of Oklahoma City that are within Oklahoma County, the election is void because held in conflict with that part of Section 6 of Article III of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma which provides that “In all elections by the people the vote shall be by ballot.”
Although, as we understand it, voting machines are being used only in Oklahoma County and' Tulsa County at the present time, the statutes authorizing their use (26 O.S.1961, § 271 and following) provide for their use in all of the counties of the state (26 O.S.1961, § 271).
The question of the constitutionality of the statutes authorizing the use of voting machines, and of their use thereunder, is of statewide concern and of great public importance to all of the people of the state. The other questions presented by the applicant herein arise out of the use of voting machines at the bond election at which the issuance of the bonds in question herein was authorized. Time is of the essence in finally determining these questions. On authority of Sublett v. The City of Tulsa et al. (1965), Okl., 405 P.2d 185, we have determined to assume jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the questions of law presented by the original applicant herein.
However, neither the District Court of Oklahoma County nor the judge thereof who tried case No. 183,721 therein is, or has been made, a party to this original proceeding, and in State ex rel. Simpson, County Attorney, et al. v. Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. (1915), 45 Okl. 472, 146 P. 433, this court held in the first paragraph of its syllabus:
“The officer or tribunal whose action is to be reviewed, and in whose possession the record of such action remains, is the proper legal authority to make return to a writ of certiorari to review such proceedings, and are therefore proper and necessary parties defendant thereto.”
Without considering the question of whether the successful party to a proceeding is *389a proper party to seek a writ of certiorari to review such proceedings, we decline to assume jurisdiction with respect to the application of the respondents herein for a writ of certiorari.
Section 6 of Article III of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, involved in the plaintiff’s first proposition, provides in pertinent part that:
“In all elections by the people the- vote shall be by ballot and the Legislature shall provide the kind of ticket or ballot to be used and make all such other regulations as may be necessary to detect and punish fraud, and preserve the purity of the ballot; * * *.”
We first note that, unlike the provision of the Massachusetts Constitution that was involved in the only case relied upon by the plaintiff herein (Nichols v. Board of Election Commissioners, 1907, 196 Mass. 410, 82 N.E. 50, 12 L.R.A.,N.S., 280), the Oklahoma Constitution does not provide that the voting shall be by “written votes.” In the annotations to the case of State of Ohio ex rel. Automatic Registering Machine Co. v. Green, Director of Finance (1929), 121 Ohio St. 301, 168 N.E. 131, as reported in 66 A.L.R. 849, the annotator states that, in all of the jurisdictions in which the question had arisen (citing cases from Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Washington), the courts have concluded that statutes authorizing the use of voting machines are not in contravention of constitutional provisions requiring that all votes shall be by “ballot,” on the theory that the word “ballot” was not used in its literal sense, but only for the purpose of designating a method of conducting elections which will insure secrecy and the integrity of the ballot.
In the cited Ohio case, the Ohio Supreme Court, in arriving at the conclusion that the constitutional provision requiring that the voting be by “ballot,” was meant merely to relate to the essential secrecy of the indication of the voter’s choice, said:
“In Opinion of the Judges, 7 Me. 492, 495, the court stated that the ‘word “ballot” may be considered as opposed to a vote by word or by signs,’ * * *. The same distinction is pointed out in Temple v. Mead, 4 Vt. 535, at page 541.
“In the case of Williams v. Stein, 38 Ind. 89, 10 Am.Rep. 97, the court points out the same distinction, holding that the essential of ballot voting is secrecy, in order that the elector may exercise the franchise as he pleases, uncontrolled and unquestioned by any person or power.
“The same doctrine has been announced in Ritchie v. Richards, 14 Utah, 345, 47 P. 670; Brisbin v. Cleary, 26 Minn. 107, 1 N.W. 825; People ex rel. Williams v. Cicott, 16 Mich. 283, 97 Am.Dec. 141; State ex rel. Smith v. Anderson, 26 Fla. 240, 8 So. 1; Ex Parte Arnold, Recorder of Voters, 128 Mo. 256, 260, 30 S.W. 768, 1036, 33 L.R.A. 386, 49 Am.St.Rep. 557.
“In the exhaustive brief filed on behalf of the relator an interesting discussion is given of the ballot in the English Parliament, the ballot in literature, and the history of the ballot both in other countries and also in colonial times in America, which shows that, while the ballot originally was a ball which was kept concealed in the hand and used without it being known how the voter voted, the derivative and practically universal meaning of the term now is the method of secret voting, or, as stated in part 2 of volume 1 of Cassell & Co.’s Encyclopedic Dictionary (1884), page 404, ‘secret as opposed to open voting.’
“It was manifestly impossible for the framers of the Ohio Constitution to foresee all of the mechanical developments of our modern age. * * * so the framers of the Ohio Constitution could not well foresee the time when a voter, by manipulating a lever, could mark either a straight ticket or a split ticket with exactly the same definiteness of individual expression as when he marks the ballot in his hand. * *
*390We perceive nothing in Section 6 of Article III of the Oklahoma Constitution which would limit voting to some method or methods under which each voter indicates his choice or choices on a separate piece of paper issued to him for that purpose. We hold that it contemplates that the Legislature shall provide a method, or methods, of voting at elections in such a way that not even those who count or tabulate the votes will know how any particular voter voted.
We have examined the Oklahoma statutes authorizing the use of voting machines (26 O.S.1961, § 271 and following) and hold that they are not violative of, but are in harmony with, the above-quoted provisions of Section 6 of Article III of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma.
The plaintiff’s second proposition, that the entire bond election is void because all of the ballots used in the portion of the City of Oklahoma City which lies within Oklahoma County were mutilated, arises out of (a) an admitted error in the printing of the large, columnar-ruled tally sheets (sometimes hereafter referred to as “certificate-tally sheets”) that are placed inside each voting machine of the type used in Oklahoma County for the bond election in question, before any voter votes at any particular election, and upon which the total number of votes cast for, and the total number of votes cast against, each and every proposition being voted on at such an election is imprinted, as the result of pushing a certain button, after the polls have been closed and the last voter has voted on that machine, and (b) the⅛ admitted action of an employee or employees of the County Election Board of Oklahoma County in correcting such error, on each of the copies of the tally sheets which had been returned to the county election board by the officials of the various polling places in Oklahoma County.
Twelve separate bond propositions (numbered 1 through 12) were submitted to the voters of Oklahoma City at the election held on July 16, 1968. All qualified electors of the city were eligible to vote on Proposition No. 1, which related to the issuance of the limited access facility bonds involved herein, but only qualified property-tax-paying electors were eligible to vote on the other eleven propositions. On the front face of each voting machine (seen by the voters) appeared printed “ballot labels,” as they are referred to in the voting machine statutes, with two voting levers for each proposition, oné 'for voting for the proposition and one for voting against the proposition. Immediately below one of the voting levers accompanying a statement of Proposition No. 1 appeared the identifying number “2A” and, immediately below that number, appeared the word “For;” and, immediately below the other voting lever, appeared the identifying number “3A” and, immediately below that number appeared the word “Against.” Each of the two voting levers accompanying the statement of each of the other eleven propositions was similarly identified but each voting lever had a different identifying number below it. Inside the machine, there was a separate digital counter for each voting lever which, if the related voting lever had been turned down by a voter, would advance one digit when that voter had finished voting and moved a large lever that opened the curtains, which, with the front face of the voting machine, formed a voting booth. The printed forms of tally sheets inside the voting machine, which the voter could not see, corresponded with the ballot labels on the front of the machine, with the proper identifying number, and were so arranged and set in the machine that, when the polls had been closed and the imprinting apparatus activated by the precinct officials, the total number of votes registered on each counter would be imprinted in the proper space on the tally sheets, and it is admitted that, with respect to each voting machine, the total number of votes registered on the counter for the voting lever numbered “2A” was imprinted in the “2A” space on the tally sheets and the total number of votes registered on the counter for the voting lever numbered *391“3A” was imprinted in the “3A” space on the tally sheets. However, after the tally sheets from the voting machines, certified by the proper precinct officials as the results of the election in their precinct, had been returned to the County Election Board of Oklahoma County, it was discovered that the word “Against,” instead of the word “For,” appeared with the identifying number “2A” on the certificate-tally sheets and the word “For,” instead of the word “Against,” appeared with the identifying number “3A” on the certificate-tally sheets.
It is admitted that some one or more of the employees of the county election board, using a felt-tipped marking pen, made a line through the word “Against” that appeared in the “2A” space on each of the certificate-tally sheets and printed the word “For” in that space, and drew a line through the word “For” that appeared in the “3A” space on each of the tally sheets and printed the word “Against” in that space; and it is admitted by the plaintiff that, as so corrected, the certificate-tally sheets disclosed the correct number of votes for, and the correct number of votes against, each of the twelve propositions voted on at that election.
The plaintiff’s argument is, in substance, that in the circumstances, the “ballot” consists of (a) the ballot labels on the front face of the voting machines and (b) the tally sheets in the machines with the respective total votes imprinted thereon; and that the printing error on the tally sheets combined with the correction thereof by the employee or employees of the county election board mutilated all of such “ballots” and invalidated the entire election.
We cannot agree with the plaintiff that the tally sheets used in voting machines of the type used at the election in question herein is a part of the “ballot.” Under the principles upon which we decided the plaintiff’s first proposition, a “ballot” is a means, or instrumentality, by which a voter secretly indicates his will or choice so that it may be recorded as being in favor of a certain candidate, or for or against a certain proposition or measure. Also, see Board of Education of Oklahoma City et al. v. Woodworth et al. (1923), 89 Okl. 192, 214 P. 1077. As we see it, the portions of the voting machine which count the number of votes as indicated by all of the voters and imprint the various totals on a tally sheet simply take the place of the human counters used under the general statutes relating to elections when voting machines are not used at an election. We hold that a mark placed on the tally sheet or certificate-tally sheet is not a “distinguishing mark” on a “ballot” within the intent of such terms as used in 26 O.S.1961, § 371. Plaintiff’s second proposition must be denied.
The' plaintiff’s third proposition is, to some extent, related to his second proposition. He contends that the election should be declared invalid because the copy of the tally sheet from each voting machine, bearing the certificate of the precinct officials, posted outside the polling place where that machine was used, as required by 26 O.S.1961, § 368, had not been corrected in the manner that the certificate-tally sheets returned to the county election board were corrected, and, therefore, did not show the correct results with respect to Proposition No. 1.
This proposition must be denied. The right of a qualified elector to vote and to have his vote counted is basic and fundamental. When an election has been conducted in good faith, no elector has been misled, and a true and fair return of the entire election has been canvassed and made, as in the present case, the will of the people, as indicated by their votes at such election, cannot be defeated by irregularities (particularly those resulting from some act or acts on the part of the election officials) which are not sufficient to change the ultimate results of the election. See: State ex rel. Edwards v. Millar, Mayor, et al. (1908), 21 Okl. 448, 96 P. 747; Lamb v. Palmer, County Treasurer (1920), 79 Okl. 68, 191 P. 184; Mayberry et al. v. Gaddis et al. (1923), 88 Okl. 286, 213 P. 316; Gardner v. Scott (1951), 205 *392Okl. 333, 237 P.2d 863; and Sparks v. State Election Board (1964), Okl., 392 P.2d 711.
This same principle would he applicable to the plaintiff’s first proposition, above, and also disposes of his fourth proposition that the bond election was tainted by the election of the precinct officials in one polling place allowing four electors to return to the voting machine, after having pulled the large lever that advances the digital counters inside the voting machine, for the purpose of voting on Proposition No. 1, which they stated they had forgotten to vote on while in the voting booth the first time. Even if it could be assumed that each of those four electors voted in favor of one, or more, or all, of the bond propositions, their votes were not sufficient to have affected the ultimate results of the election, for each of the propositions concerning the bond issues involved herein would have the required majority with four less votes for the proposition.
The plaintiff does not question the correctness of the certificates of the Bond Commissioner concerning the bonds involved herein, issued under date of September 10, 1968, except to the extent that the questions raised by him in this proceeding might be said to constitute an attack upon such approval. Consequently, it has not been necessary for us to consider all of the bond proceedings or the correctness of the Bond Commissioner’s declaration with respect thereto, and we have not done so.
It is the judgment of this court that the injunction prayed for by the plaintiff herein should be, and hereby is, denied.
JACKSON, C. J., IRWIN, V. C. J., and DAVISON, WILLIAMS, BERRY and McINERNEY, JJ., concur.