(dissenting). I respectfully sug*296gest that if the law is as the majority finds it to be, then it ought to be changed. Why should the law give lip service to favoring settlements and then construct a maze of procedural obstacles effectively prohibiting a defendant from settling his lawsuit and walking away from the courthouse? The Gottschalks (or their insurance carrier) paid $17,-900 for peace. They were discontinued as parties to this proceeding by stipulation and order duly entered in the court below. The instruments of release were skillfully worded to preclude any further potential enforcement of liability against appellants by way of "any further liability for the * * * accident or any consequences resulting therefrom, by way of contribution or otherwise”.
Let us be clear at the outset. The Gottschalks (or their carrier) are not going to pay one dollar more, over and above their negotiated release, either to the plaintiff or to the road commission. The road commission’s purpose in keeping them in the lawsuit need not be the subject of speculation here, but it must be tactical and not substantive. The majority and I read Witucke v Presque Isle Bank, 68 Mich App 599; 243 NW2d 907 (1976), lv den, 397 Mich 842 (1976), differently. Apparently we agree that under no circumstances would the road commission be entitled to indemnification from the Gottschalks. The majority however reads Witucke to mean that contribution is an issue here. I do not see how.
The road commission has no possible right to contribution against the Gottschalks.1 Krevsky v Naccarato, 56 Mich App 704; 224 NW2d 731 *297(1974), lv den, 394 Mich 772 (1975), holds that where a plaintiff and defendant enter a settlement, by its terms, limiting the defendant’s liability, the plaintiff cannot indirectly recover more from that defendant by recovering from a non-settling defendant more than the latter’s pro rata share, and forcing him or her to sue the defendant for contribution. What is proposed is a charade. The road commission would have the ordinary and normal right of subpoena to secure the presence and testimony of the Gottschalks. Keeping them in as parties defendant presents a distorted picture. I cannot see how the jury could be instructed to assess or compute damages against the Gottsch-alks in favor of the plaintiffs or the commission.
In order for a pro rata share to be found there must be at least two culpable parties. A settlement is not evidence of culpability unless its terms so state. Therefore, where in the present case, unlike that in Naccarato, the settlement occurred before judgment and the settling party was dismissed as a party, no pro rata share can be determined.
The remaining defendant (road commission) will therefore be liable for any judgment against it less a pro tanto reduction for the amount that the settling party paid. A pro tanto reduction does not require a finding that the settling party was in fact a tortfeasor.
GCR 1963, 204 requires that a third-party plaintiff have a substantive right against a third-party defendant, see, 1 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), p 508. Since the road commission has no right to indemnification or contribution, and no other substantive right is alleged, there are no grounds for a third-party complaint.2
The appellant has met the requirements of GCR *2981963, 116 for accelerated judgment. The trial court’s decision denying the third-party defendants’ motion for accelerated judgment should be reversed.
The current MCLA 600.2925a-d; MSA 27A.2925(1M4) apply only to torts committed on or after January 1, 1975 (1974 PA 318, § 3). Therefore, the applicable law is MCLA 600.2925; MSA 27A.2925, which was repealed by 1974 PA 318. This opinion makes no comment on the effect of the new law had it been in force.
Moyses v Spartan Asphalt Paving Co, 383 Mich 314, 334; 174 *298NW2d 797 (1970), which overruled what was "left of Michigan’s common law bar of contribution between or among 'wrongdoers,’ wilful or intentional wrongdoers excepted” has no applicability here. The controlling issue here is the settlement and its attendant provisions. This Court has indicated that when one defendant settles, another defendant’s liability is reduced by the pro tanto share. Sobotta v Vogel, 37 Mich App 59; 194 NW2d 564 (1971).