(dissenting). I dissent.
At the joint arraignment of defendant and his wife, the trial judge was informed by the prosecutor of the nature of the plea bargain. The judge then proceeded with the taking of defendant’s guilty plea; voluntariness of the plea was specifically treated during that proceeding. After taking the plea under advisement, the judge accepted it and sentenced defendant. A review of the record discloses that all aspects of the bargain were kept.
Defendant now seeks, in effect, a change in the procedure for taking guilty pleas. Anytime a plea bargain involved special consideration for a family member or relative, defendant would require that the trial judge make two findings of voluntariness, one at a special hearing and one at the plea taking as is already required by court rule. GCR 1963, 785.7(1), (2) and (5). Such a change is not supported *555by either the referenced court rule or the most recent exhaustive interpretation of it. See, Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96; 235 NW2d 132 (1975).
Nor would I institute such a change based upon People v James, 393 Mich 807; 225 NW2d 520 (1975), and People v Freddie Harris, 394 Mich 841 (1975). The abbreviated disposition of these cases makes deduction of any general rule difficult at best.
Special facts may arise requiring special treatment. However, such facts are not alleged in this case. Therefore, I see no reason either to disturb defendant’s conviction or to institute a mandatory rule which would preclude the acceptance of such pleas or radically change the manner in which they are taken.
I would affirm.