Defendant was convicted by a jury of felonious driving. MCLA 752.191; MSA 28.661. His sentence consisted of two years probation and 20 weekends in jail plus $360 costs, a $250 fine and license revocation.
The testimony at trial established that on November 10-11, 1974 defendant had worked the afternoon shift at Fisher Body in Lansing. He left work at about 4:30 a.m. after working about 11-1/2 hours. Defendant then went to a fellow worker’s home where he and two co-workers chatted and shared some whiskey amounting to two drinks apiece. Defendant and one of the men left at about 6:30 a.m. to go out for breakfast. Defendant followed his co-worker to the restaurant. They were traveling northbound on a five-lane highway. The co-worker’s car turned left from the center lane into the parking lot of the restaurant. Subsequently, defendant turned left whereupon the victim, driving a motorcycle, collided with defendant’s car. The victim was thrown off of his motorcycle and landed near the parking area of a bank. He was severly injured.
The victim stated that he was traveling southbound and from 2-1/2 blocks away he saw the first car turn into the restaurant parking lot. He continued traveling southbound to a point in front of the restaurant where the second car (defendant’s car) turned in front of him and the collision occurred.
Defendant testified that he turned immediately after his co-worker turned and that he did not see *526the motorcycle. The co-worker stated that he heard the crash after he had parked his car.
Much of the trial testimony centered around defendant’s behavior after the accident. The prosecution produced witnesses who testified that defendant appeared intoxicated and that he did not pass the balance tests administered by the police at the scene. Defendant stated that the two drinks had no effect upon his driving.
Defendant contends that evidence of his intoxication was irrelevant as it concerned events subsequent to the driving in question and also that the people failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support a conviction of felonious driving. The two issues presented overlap considerably for once it is established what constitutes felonious driving, i.e., what evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, then it becomes clear as to which evidence is relevant.
We define felonious driving as the reckless or negligent driving of a vehicle upon a highway resulting in crippling injury.1 The statute provides:
*527"Every person who drives any vehicle upon a highway carelessly and heedlessly in wilful and wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others, or without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property and thereby injuring so as to cripple any person, but not causing death, shall be guilty of the offense of felonious driving and upon conviction thereof shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding one thousand [1,000] dollars or to imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding two [2] years or by both fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.” MCLA 752.191; MSA 28.661.
The statute focuses on the result of the defendant’s actions rather than on the nature of the actions. In other words, it is possible that two individuals could engage in identical conduct but yet receive different penalties by virtue of the fact that the results differed. Injury oriented penalties are not infant to our law. To illustrate, we reiterate a well-known and perhaps overused law school example. If A hits B in the nose and B suffers no physical injury, A could be charged with battery. Yet, if C hit D, a hemophiliac, in the nose and D bled to death as a result, C could be charged with involuntary manslaughter.
We find that in the instant case the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain a conviction of felonious driving. The injury is not disputed. It is therefore only necessary that the evidence support either negligent or reckless driving.
The evidence supports a finding that defendant failed to yield a right of way to the oncoming motorist. The jury could find that this occurred for *528a variety of reasons. For example, the possible effect of alcohol on defendant’s driving or the failure to keep a proper lookout. The jury could also find that defendant, by driving under the influence, made a conscious choice that was in disregard of the safety of others. Whatever the reason, the evidence supports the jury’s verdict.
Defendant contends that evidence of intoxication is irrelevant to the charged offense in this case. He directs us to cases in other jurisdictions that hold intoxication alone is insufficient to support a finding of reckless driving. These cases do not however stand for the proposition that evidence of intoxication is inadmissible. Aside from the well established rule that relevancy determinations are discretionary with the trial judge and additionally that in the instant case intoxication was part of the res gestae, People v Campbell, 30 Mich App 43; 186 NW2d 49 (1971), there are additional reasons for its admissibility. Such evidence is properly considered in making a determination of whether one has driven recklessly or carelessly. In this case we have an accident which resulted in severe injury. Alcohol possibly had a large effect on defendant’s perception and additionally is relevant in determining whether defendant proceeded in the face of a known danger.
Affirmed.
D. E. Holbrook, Jr., J., concurred.Defendant contends that felonious driving is reckless driving plus crippling injury.
The reckless driving statute as amended reads:
"(a) Any person who drives any vehicle upon a highway or a frozen public lake, stream or pond or other place open to the general public, including any area designated for the parking of motor vehicles, within this state, in wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.
"(b) Every person convicted of reckless driving shall be punished by imprisonment in the county or municipal jail for a period of not more than 90 days or by a fine of not more than $100.00, or by both.” MCLA 257.626; MSA 9.2326.
Felonious driving contains the additional phrase "without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or likely to endanger any person or property * * * .” We interpret this to mean ordinary negligence. Ex parte Chernosky, 153 Tex Crim 52; 217 SW2d 673 (1949). We reject the interpretation that ordinary negligence cannot support criminal liability. Negligent driving resulting in death supports criminal liability, MCLA 750.324; MSA 28.556, and the same has been held constitutional, People v *527McMurchy, 249 Mich 147; 228 NW 723 (1930). We are troubled by the fact that negligent homicide is a high misdemeanor while felonious driving is a felony. However, the penalties are not inconsistent and we presently invite the Legislature to review these provisions.