dissenting:
The majority affirms the trial court’s order suppressing evidence on the grounds that the officers did not possess sufficient specific and articulable facts to support reasonable suspicion that criminal activity had occurred, was occurring, or was about to occur. In my opinion, the record supports reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop. Therefore, I dissent.
I.
On December 17, 1994, at approximately 11:45 p.m., Officers Lisk and Archambo of the Castle Rock Police Department received a dispatch call informing them that there was a possible altercation between the occupants of a van and another vehicle in the parking lot of Willie Wilson’s tire store in Castle Rock. The dispatcher informed the officers that one vehicle had pulled into the parking lot, the other had followed, and that an altercation was occurring or was about to occur. One of the officers testified at the suppression hearing that she was unaware who provided the information regarding the altercation.
The officers then proceeded in their patrol car from the Castle Rock Police Station to the parking lot of Willie Wilson’s tire store. The parking lot is approximately one-half block away from the police station, and Officer Lisk estimated that it took the officers between thirty seconds and one minute to reach the parking lot. As the officers approached the lot, they saw a van in the parking lot traveling towards their patrol car. At that time, Officer Lisk observed that the van was the only occupied vehicle in the parking lot.
As the patrol car approached the van, the van stopped, and Officer Lisk activated the patrol car’s overhead lights. The officers then exited the patrol car and approached the van. Officer Lisk informed the passenger of the van that the officers received a report of an altercation involving the van. The passenger responded that he had argued with some friends, who had already left the scene.
While Officer Lisk was questioning the passenger, Officer Archambo spoke with the driver of the van, the defendant, who identified herself as Lisa L’Heureux.1 While speaking with the defendant, Officer Ar-chambo detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage on her breath and noticed that her eyes were bloodshot and watery. Officer Archambo then asked the defendant to step out of the van and perform certain roadside *374tests designed to determine whether the defendant was intoxicated. As the result of the defendant’s performance on these tests, as well as the officers’ observations that the defendant was intoxicated, the officers placed the defendant under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol.
Officer Lisk then returned to the van to look for the vehicle registration. As Officer Lisk approached the van, another officer on the scene notified her that there was a small envelope lying on a step on the driver’s side of the van. Upon opening the envelope, Officer Lisk discovered a white powdery substance inside which later proved to be methamphetamine. The officers then transported the defendant to the Douglas County Detention Facility.
The People charged the defendant with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, driving under the influence of alcohol, and resisting arrest. The defendant then moved the trial court to suppress all statements and evidence obtained as a result of the investigatory stop of her van, alleging that the stop ran afoul of the United States and Colorado Constitutions. The trial court ruled for the defendant, and entered the requested suppression order.
II.
The majority holds that the trial court correctly concluded that Officers Lisk and Archambo lacked reasonable suspicion to justify their investigatory stop of the defendant’s van. Maj. op. at 369. I disagree.
A police officer, without probable cause to effect an arrest, may conduct an investigatory stop provided the following requirements are satisfied: (1) the officer must have an articulable and specific basis in fact for suspecting that criminal activity has occurred, is taking place, or is about to take place; (2) the purpose of the intrusion must be reasonable; and (3) the scope and character of the intrusion must be reasonably related to its purpose. People v. Weston, 869 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Colo.1994); Stone v. People, 174 Colo. 504, 509, 485 P.2d 495, 497 (1971) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).
In this case, we are concerned with the first of these requirements. We have restated this element as requiring that the officer have a reasonable suspicion that an individual is engaged in, has engaged in, or is about to engage in criminal conduct. People v. Garcia, 789 P.2d 190, 192 (Colo.1990). We have further elaborated:
The question is “whether there were specific and articulable facts known to the officer which taken together with rational inferences from these facts, created a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the intrusion into the defendant’s personal security.”
Id. at 192 (citing People v. Thomas, 660 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Colo.1983)).
The United States Supreme Court has clarified that the quantum of proof required to effect an investigatory stop is “obviously less demanding than that for probable cause,” stating that the Fourth Amendment requires only “ ‘some minimal level of objective justification’ for making the stop.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (citing INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1763, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984)). The Sokolow Court further stated that the “level of suspicion [required] is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. Additionally, in determining the validity of the stop, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); People v. Sosbe, 789 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Colo.1990).
Information provided by an anonymous informant may give rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion if that information, together with corroborating observations made by the officer, provides a specific and articulable basis in fact to suspect that an individual is involved in criminal activity. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); Garcia, 789 P.2d at 192. In determining whether an anonymous tip gave rise to reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigatory stop, the White court stated:
*375Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.
White, 496 U.S. at 330, 110 S.Ct. at 2416.
Moreover, under the proper circumstances, the verification of seemingly innocent details provided by an anonymous informant may be sufficient to provide the necessary corroboration. Garcia, 789 P.2d at 192. It is not necessary that the police corroborate details which, by themselves, raise the suspicion of illegal activity. People v. Turcotte-Schaeffer, 843 P.2d 658, 661 (Colo.1993).
In the instant case, the police officers had the necessary reasonable suspicion to support the investigatory stop of the defendant’s van. The officers received a report that there was a possible altercation or disturbance involving the occupants of a van in the parking lot of Willie Wilson’s tire store. They arrived at the parking lot almost immediately to find that the only occupied vehicle in the parking lot was a van which was proceeding directly towards their patrol car. This provided the officers the requisite reasonable suspicion to engage in an investigatory stop of the van.
Although the information providing the reasonable suspicion was furnished to the officers by an anonymous informant, the officer’s sighting of the van in the location reported by the informant verified a “seemingly innocent detail” supplied by the informant, and thus afforded the essential corroboration to support the officer’s reasonable suspicion of potential criminal activity. See Garcia, 789 P.2d at 192.
The police were informed that a van was involved in an altercation at a specific location near midnight in Castle Rock. The police immediately proceeded to that location and arrived there within one minute of the dispatch report. Upon arriving at that location, the parking lot of a tire store, the police observed that a van was the only occupied vehicle in the parking lot. Viewed under the totality of the circumstances, these details provide the necessary corroboration to support a finding of reasonable suspicion as required by Garcia and White.2 Because the officers had a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was taking place, was about to take place, or had already taken place, the investigatory stop of the defendant’s van was valid under both the Colorado and United States Constitutions.
*376This holding is supported by our decision in People v. Melgosa, 753 P.2d 221 (Colo.1988), where we reached the same conclusion on similar facts.3 In Melgosa, a police officer received a report from his dispatcher that “a blue van was possibly involved in a break-in.” Id. at 223. The report was unclear as to the details of the possible break-in. The officer proceeded to the location indicated by the dispatcher, where he observed a parked blue automobile containing two occupants. As the officer approached the automobile, the automobile pulled away from the curb. Acting on his belief that this automobile may have been the “blue van” reported by the dispatcher, the officer turned on his overhead lights and pulled the vehicle over. The officer then searched the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle, discovered burglary tools and goods the officer believed to be stolen, and arrested the driver.
In evaluating the propriety of the officer’s stop of the vehicle, we held that “there is no question that the investigatory stop and temporary detention of the defendants were constitutionally justified.” Id. at 226. In so holding, we stated:
Within a minute after hearing the 2:31 a.m. police dispatch broadcasting a possible break-in involving a blue van ..., Officer Taylor observed a blue automobile pull away from the area where the alleged crime was reported to have been committed. The officer thus had an articulable and specific basis in fact for suspecting that the defendants had been involved in the reported break-in.
Id.
Our decision in Melgosa mandates the conclusion that the investigatory stop in the instant case was valid. As in Melgosa, the officer in the instant ease had immediately responded to a dispatch call reporting a potential crime possessing only the knowledge that the perpetrators were driving a van. Also as in Melgosa, the officer in the case before us stopped the defendant although he actually witnessed no criminal activity. Our conclusion in Melgosa, that such circumstances provide an articulable and specific basis to support an investigatory stop, is thus applicable to the case at bar. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s suppression order and remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I am authorized to say that Justice MULLARKEY and Justice KOURLIS join in this dissent.
. The defendant later informed Officer Lisk that her legal name is currently Lisa George.
. The holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Cox, 942 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir.1991), supports my view that the anonymous tip in the instant case was sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop. In Cox, an anonymous citizen informed the police that an armed individual was brandishing a weapon. The only other information given by the citizen was that the individual was at the corner of 36th and Walnut in a maroon Lincoln Continental with the license plate number LLN 135. The police proceeded to that location, where they found the defendant standing next to a red Ford LTD bearing the above license plate number. The police then engaged in an investigatory stop of the defendant which led to his search and arrest.
The court of appeals upheld the stop, holding that the officers' corroboration of the anonymous tip, albeit partially inaccurate, provided the tip with sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to support the investigatory stop. In so holding, the court stated:
In this case, a citizen eyewitness reported an armed person driving a certain vehicle in a certain location. The police found a vehicle matching the caller's description at the specified location.... [Ujnder the circumstances, we think the police were justified in approaching [the defendant] to further investigate the. complaint.
Id. at 1285.
Thus, in Cox, the court of appeals upheld the stop despite the fact that the detailed information provided by the anonymous caller was largely incorrect. In fact, the dispositive fact for the court in that case was that "[t]he police found a vehicle matching the callers description at the specified location.” Id. This mirrors the situation in the instant case. Immediately after the police received the report that a van was involved in an altercation in the parking lot down the street from the police station, the police arrived at the specified location to find a vehicle matching the caller’s description. The ruling in Cox therefore supports upholding the investigatory stop in the case at bar.
. The majority correctly notes that in Melgosa, we did not address the issue of corroboration of an anonymous tip. Maj. op. at 371. The majority then attempts to distinguish Melgosa from the instant case by pointing out that in Melgosa there was no indication that the informant was anonymous. Id. A careful comparison of the facts of Melgosa to the record in the instant case reveals striking similarities.
In Melgosa, the facts state that "a dispatcher for the Colorado Springs Police Department aired over a police radio channel the report of a possible 'burglary' of a motor vehicle in progress.” Melgosa, 753 P.2d at 223. In the instant case, Officer Lisle testified at the suppression hearing that "Officer Archambo and I were dispatched to the parking lot of Willie Wilson’s tire store.... We got a report of some type of altercation between the two vehicles.” Thus, in both cases, the officers were provided information from a dispatcher with no elaboration as to the identity of the person who initially provided the information.
While there is no indication in Melgosa that the informant was anonymous, there is also no indication of the informant’s identity, and certainly no indication that the transmission from the dispatcher informed the officers of the informant's identity. The court in Melgosa may have simply assumed that the officers’ subsequent corroboration of the information provided to them by the dispatcher was sufficient to lend the requisite indicia of reliability to that information and thus give rise to reasonable suspicion. The holding in Melgosa therefore supports my conclusion that the officers in the case at bar possessed sufficient reasonable suspicion to support their investigatory stop of the defendant's van.