Plaintiff sued for injuries she suffered while attempting to get out of defendant’s car as she was returning from a ride with her. At pretrial, upon the basis of the pleadings, answers to interrogatories and plaintiff’s deposition, defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff was a guest and, there being no allegation of intoxication or wilful misconduct, our Utah guest statute would bar recovery. The District Court denied the motion; ruled as a matter of law (a) that the plaintiff was not a guest; (b) that the defendant was negligent; and (c) that the plaintiff was not negligent; and ordered trial on the question of damages only.
Defendant seeks reversal of the ruling that the plaintiff was not a guest and invokes the protection of our guest statute. It reads in part:
“Any person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle, moving upon any of the public highways of the state of Utah, and while so riding as such guest receives or sustains any injury, shall have no right of recovery against the driver * * * [except for] injuiy or death of such guest proximately resulting from the intoxication or wilful misconduct of such driver * * * ”
The plaintiff, Christine E. Andrus, age 74, and the defendant, Ida Allred, are mothers-in-law in common, the plaintiff’s son having married the defendant’s daughter over 18 years ago. Despite the repute sometimes ascribed to rival mothers-in-law, they have been friends for many years. On February 8, 1964, defendant, Mrs. All-red, called at the plaintiff’s home on Ninth East in Salt Lake City for a visit and invited the plaintiff to go to get something to eat. Afterward they returned to the plaintiff’s home. The critical facts as they appear at this point are these: the defendant stopped her car off the traveled portion on the shoulder of the road in the front of the plaintiff’s home. The parties sat and talked a few minutes. The defendant left the motor of the car running and in drive gear. She pulled on the emergency brake, but apparently not sufficient to hold the car, got out and started around back of the car, intending to assist Mrs. Andrus. Meanwhile the plaintiff was in the process of getting out of the car. She says that she had opened the door; that her one foot was out; and she is not sure whether it had touched the ground or not, when the car started to roll forward, which caused her to fall and suffer the injuries of which she complains.
In support of her position that she was not a guest at the time of her injury the plaintiff relies on the language of the statute “in any vehicle moving upon any of the public highways * * * and while so riding as such guest.” She urges that this does not include, the defendant’s car which *109was stopped on the shoulder of the road at the time of the accident. This view was adopted by the trial court in its findings “that the relationship of guest had ended when the automobile of the defendant stopped in front of the plaintiff’s home, at which time the defendant had alighted from said car.”
It will be noted that there are two facets of the problem thus presented. The first, which we dismiss as being of little consequence, is that the car was not actually on the highway. It can hardly be supposed that the fact that a vehicle swerves off the main portion of the highway would eliminate the effect of the statute. It should be given a sufficiently practical and reasonable application to cover incidents which occur as an integral part of the ride. For example, such as a side-swipe collision where one vehicle runs off the highway into a fence or a building.
In regard to the contention that the vehicle must actually be “moving” on the highway, we take a similar view. If the statutes were given such a narrow and literal interpretation as plaintiff contends for, that would eliminate incidents which might occur while the vehicle was stopped, however briefly, and for any reason. E. g., at a .traffic light, or at a stop sign, or to let other vehicles having the right of way pass, or for any other cause. This impresses us as a hypertechnical interpretation of the statute and one which would not fulfill its plainly intended purpose.
Allowance should be made for the fact that statutes are necessarily stated in general terms, and that often there is neither the prescience to foresee, nor sufficient flexibility of language to cover with exactitude, all of the exigencies of life which may arise. For this reason one of the fundamental rules of statutory construction is that the statute should be looked at as a whole and in the light of the general purpose it was intended to serve; and should be so interpreted and applied as to accomplish that objective.1 In order to give the statute the implementation which will fulfill its purpose, reason and intention sometimes prevail over technically applied literalness.2
The purpose of our guest statute was to afford some protection to a generous person who gives a ride to another from being sued by the guest who accepts the favor.3 It apparently has seemed to the sovereign will (the Legislature) that this turning upon one’s benefactor is an ungrateful thing which is looked upon with disfavor. Accordingly, the statute pro*110tects the host from liability in connection with giving someone a ride for any mere negligence or ordinary fault, yet it preserves protection to the guest if the host is guilty of some aggravated wrong such as being drunk or wilfully committing some wrongful act which results in the guest’s injury.
It is our opinion that a sensible and realistic application of this statute, in conformity with its objective, requires that the protection extend over the entire host-’guest relationship in connection with the giving and talcing of the ride. We can see no logical reason for applying a different rule here than to the relation of carrier and ■passenger for hire in a public conveyance. 'In that case the relationship begins with the attempt of the passenger to enter the car and does not end until he has safely alighted when the ride is over.4 Under this analogy the conclusion seems inescapable that the host-guest relationship here must also include getting into the car at the beginning and getting out of it when the ,ride is completed and any incidents which happen in the course of and arising out of the ride. Insofar as our research has disclosed, this conclusion is supported by a majority of the jurisdictions which have had occasion to pass upon the matter, albeit under somewhat different and variously worded statutes, which hold that such guest statutes were intended to apply until the guest had safely alighted at the completion of the journey.5
Plaintiff makes the contention “that the guest statute is in derogation, not only of the common law, but also of the [Utah] Constitution” and while conceding that “strict construction of a statute contrary to the common law is not warranted in this state,” nevertheless proceeds to argue that this statute must be “carefully applied, and strictly limited to those situations obviously falling within the wording of the act.”
The point of strict construction is made in Prager v. Isreal 6 from our sister state of California, which the plaintiff strongly relies upon and urges us to follow. That decision does hold that under circumstances having some general similarity to-our case, the passenger was not a guest. But there are three significant considerations which make that holding distinguishable from the instant one.
The first is that the rule recognized elsewhere, that a statute in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed, is not the law of this state. It has *111not only been expressly abolished, but the statute which does so includes a mandate that statutory “provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the object of the statutes and to promote justice.”7
The second point essayed is that inasmuch as we adopted our guest statute from California, we should follow their adjudication. We concede the validity of the rule that when a sister state has a statute upon which a judicial determination has been made, the adoption of the statute by another state includes the prior judicial determination, at least as persuasive authority.8 But this rule loses much of its force here because the Prager case had not been decided at the time we adopted our guest statute.9
The third and final point in regard to the Prager case is that the circumstances are so different that, even without the two foregoing reasons, the cases are distinguishable on their facts. In the Prager case the ride had been interrupted in that the parties had stopped for lunch for over an hour, which they had taken in the rear seat of the car and were returning to the front seat when the injury occurred. We do not confront the matter here and are not concerned with whether that cáse could be decided on that issue of fact alone. We recognize the proposition that if the circumstances are such that their having lunch could' be regarded as something quite apart from the ride, which could have been done on a park bench, or at some other convenient place, the car simply being used as a lunchroom, the passenger may well be found not a guest “on the ride” during that diversion. But from the plaintiff’s own statement we cannot see any ’ reasonable basis for such a conclusion under the facts of our case. It is neither shown nor even suggested that the conversation between the parties was other than casual and incidental to the ride; and defendant was going around the car to assist plaintiff in safely alighting at the end of the ride when the injury occurred. It is our opinion that until that was accomplished the plaintiff was still a guest and the trial court’s action to the contrary is vacated. Costs to defendant (appellant).
McDonough and callister; jj., concur.. See Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 5002 (3rd Ed. 1943).
. See Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P.2d 937, 126 A.L.R. 1318, quoting Sutherland on Statutory Construction to this effect.
. Jensen v. Mower, 4 Utah 2d 336, 294 P.2d 683 (1956).
. See 14 Am.Jur.2d § 9S2.
. Randolph v. Webb, 44 Ill.App.2d 118, 194 N.E.2d 379, (1963); Tallios v. Tallios, 350 Ill.App. 299, 112 N.E.2d 723 (1953); Marsh v. Hogeboom, 167 Kan. 349, 205 P.2d 1190 (1949); Adams v. Baker, 317 Mass. 748, 59 N.E.2d 701 (1945).
. 15 Cal.2d 89, 98 P.2d 729 (1940).
. Utah Code Annotated § 68-3-2 (Replacement Volume 1961).
. See Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 5209 (3rd Ed. 1943).
. Though the Prager case was decided in 1940, the incident it dealt with had oc- . eurred in 1935 and the law applied was the then existing California statute which is the same as our own See. 41-9-1 U.C.A.1953, which was enacted by our Legislature in 1935.