Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Jones:I am still of the opinion that if there is a statutorily provided remedy, such remedy must be pursued, but if there is simply another available remedy not statutorily provided, the existence of such remedy should be only one factor, not the only factor, to be weighed by the court in determining whether declaratory judgment will lie. See: dissenting opinion in McWilliams v. Mc-*524Cabe, 406 Pa. 644, at pp. 658-661. To the extent the majority opinion rests the disposition of this appeal on the rule enunciated by the majority opinion in McWilliams v. McCabe, supra, I must register my dissent.
Moreover, the majority opinion takes the flat position that declaratory judgment will not lie where there is a dispute of facts. This position seems to overlook the fact that the Declaratory Judgments Act (Act of June 18, 1923, P. L. 840, §1 et seq., 12 P.S. §831) was supplemented by the Act of May 22, 1935, P. L. 228, §6, 12 P.S. §852, which provides for the trial, by jury or the court without a jury, of issues of fact in a declaratory judgment proceeding. I would take the position that ordinarily the existence of a dispute of facts should be a factor to be weighed heavily in the exercise of a court’s discretion as to whether to entertain declaratory judgment. See: Ladner v. Siegel, 294 Pa. 368, 144 A. 274; Keystone Ins. Co. v. W. & E. Cory., 402 Pa. 318, 322, 165 A. 2d 608. To the extent that the majority opinion states that the existence of a dispute of fact always and solely proscribes declaratory judgment I must register my dissent.
However, since all the parties in the issue sought to be determined by this proceeding are not parties hereto, I agree with the result reached in the majority opinion.