(concurring in part and dissenting in parí). I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiff cannot assert a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment because the handbook specifically disclaims any intent to create contractual or *186binding obligations to employees. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that even when an employer demonstrates a bona fide reduction in force, a plaintiff may survive a motion for summary disposition by presenting sufficient evidence that the RIF was a mere pretext and that discriminatory animus was a true motivation behind the discharge. I further agree that the plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to survive summary disposition of her age discrimination claim. Consequently, I am in agreement with parts i, n, m(A), and m(B) of the majority opinion.
However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that summary disposition of the plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim was proper. For the reasons expressed in part n(c) of Justice Cavanagh’s dissent, I believe that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable person could find that the plaintiff’s demotion was motivated by gender discrimination.