(dissenting). I concur in the conclusion that plaintiff has stated a claim in avoidance of governmental immunity under the public building exception. However, I dissent from the lead opinion’s resolution of the plaintiff’s negligence claim against the defendants city of Detroit and Detroit Police Department. The trial court’s grant of summaiy disposition to the defendants and the Court of Appeals affirmance of that order were clearly premised on the plaintiff’s inability to plead in avoidance of governmental immunity. The separate issue, whether defendants owed plaintiff a duty under these circumstances, was, therefore, not addressed below.1 Nevertheless, the lead opinion, without affording the parties the opportunity to brief the matter, and without meaningful analysis, rules sua sponte that plaintiff’s claim is *719barred because defendant owed the deceased no duty as a matter of law. It bears repeating that
[t]he adversary system disciplines the judicial inquiry and serves to crystallize the difficult choices with which we generally find ourselves confronted. When an issue is not presented in the form of a keenly contested and discrete controversy, a court is denied a valuable resource that contributes both to the legitimacy and wisdom of its judgment. [People v Butler, 413 Mich 377, 393-394; 319 NW2d 540 (1982) (opinion of Levin, J.).]
The scope of the duty owed a citizen by his jailer is complex and of great importance. However, it is not properly before the Court. Accordingly, I would order supplemental briefing or remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings.2
Cavanagh and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Brickley, J.The Court of Appeals discussion of defendants’ duty was limited to the plaintiff’s gross negligence claim against Officer Ralph Heatlie.
The lead opinion’s resolution of the negligence issue arguably would rob the governmental immunity issue of its precedential force because its resolution is no longer necessary to the outcome of the case.