I dissent.
In concluding that the judgment against each of the defendants must be reversed in its entirety, I do not ignore the strong evidence adduced at trial bearing on both guilt and penalty. But the record requires reversal in spite of such evidence.
As to defendant Cummings, there was Wheeler error in the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge to Black prospective juror Leon Passmore on grounds *1344of presumed group bias. (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748].) I recognize that the prosecutor attempted to proffer “neutral” reasons for his strike. The attempt failed. In part, the reasons did not match the facts; in other part, they were little more than pretexts.
As to defendant Gay, the error was not in what the prosecutor did but in what trial counsel did not do. The failings of Gay’s counsel were “pervasive and serious,” and “resulted in a breakdown of the adversarial process at trial; that breakdown establishes a violation of defendant’s federal and state constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel; and that violation mandates reversal of the judgment even in the absence of a showing of specific prejudice.” (People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 84 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgments.
Appellants’ petitions for a rehearing were denied June 23, 1993, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Arabian, J., and George, J., did not participate therein. Mosk, J„ was of the opinion that the petitions should be granted.