concurring specially.
I perceive an additional reason that the summary judgment in this case should be affirmed. As the majority opinion notes:
The issues in this case evolve from the failure of a police officer to arrest a driver whom the officer had stopped for a traffic violation and whom the officer realized had consumed alcoholic beverages. Op. at-.
I believe there is a significant legal question relating to the application of the doctrine of qualified immunity to the facts in this case. I am satisfied the doctrine of qualified immunity should be invoked to shield the officer and his employer from liability as a matter of law, in the absence of bad faith or outrageous conduct.
In' Keehn, we did not address any rule of law relating to immunity. I would now extend the concepts articulated in Keehn, and hold a police officer’s decision with respect to an arrest of a driver, who has consumed alcoholic beverages, and the officer’s assessment of the person’s ability to operate a vehicle safely are discretionary functions. When a police officer performs such discretionary functions reasonably and in good faith, the rule of qualified immunity shields him from liability.
In Kimbley v. City of Green River, 663 P.2d 871 (Wyo.1983), we invoked the concept of qualified immunity in connection with activities of police officers. In that case, qualified immunity was extended to officers who reasonably and in good faith made an arrest under a facially valid warrant. Relying upon Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096 (Wyo.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1208, 103 S.Ct. 1199, 75 L.Ed.2d 442 (1983), we articulated this general rule:
[A] qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.
Kimbley, 663 P.2d at 878 (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)).
Our definition of good faith is that it encompasses an honest, lawful intent, and actions taken without knowledge of fraud and without any intent to assist in any fraudulent or otherwise unlawful scheme. Kimbley. We have defined what is reasonable as that “having the faculty of reason; rational; governed by reason; being under the influence of reason; thinking, speaking, or acting rationally, or according to the dictates of reason; agreeable to reason; just; rational.” Kimbley, 663 P.2d at 879 (citing Claussen v. State, 21 Wyo. 505, 516, 133 P. 1055, 1056 (1913)). We do not unfairly invoke hindsight in assessing official actions challenged in litigation, and the conduct of an officer must be outrageous to justify loss of the qualified immunity otherwise bestowed. Kimbley.
We considered the concept of qualified immunity in DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo.1986), and we there declined to extend it to the conduct of police officers who negligently perform operational duties such as driving a patrol car. Our holding was that qualified immunity is available only with respect to discretionary or policy-making functions and does not extend to those activities identified as operational duties. DeWald. The categorization of the situation in DeWald as involving operational duties serves to distinguish that case from this case.
We have not yet considered the question of whether a determination by a police officer of a person’s fitness to drive and his *618decision with respect to the arrest of a person who is driving after consuming intoxicating beverages are discretionary or operational functions. Other courts, where this issue has been considered, have ruled these activities are discretionary functions. Hildenbrand v. Cox, 369 N.W.2d 411 (Iowa 1985); Shore v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 444 A.2d 1379 (Conn.1982); Everton v. Willard, 468 So.2d 936 (Fla.1985); Rubinow v. County of San Bernardino, 169 Cal.App.2d 67, 336 P.2d 968 (1959).
In Hildenbrand, the Supreme Court of Iowa recognized that, in investigating accidents and determining the manner in which they will enforce the laws, police officers necessarily exercise broad discretion. That was not the only ground upon which the court based its decision, however; it also analyzed the arrest and driving while under the influence of intoxicating beverages statutes adopted in Iowa and found the use of the term “may” in the statute rather than “shall” conferred discretion on the officers with respect to a decision as to whether an arrest should be made. Hil-denbrand. Invoking similar reasoning, the Supreme Court of California, in Rubinow, denied the relief sought citing the failure of the plaintiff to demonstrate that the state statute created a mandatory duty the officer was obliged to perform.
My review of the applicable Wyoming statutes persuades me a police officer’s evaluation of the fitness of a person to operate a motor vehicle and his decision as to whether an arrest should be made are discretionary activities. Like the Iowa statutes, the Wyoming statutes invoke the term “may” rather than the word “shall” in describing the officer’s duty to arrest, both in general and in relation to motor vehicle violations.1 “Generally, the verb ‘may’ when used in a statute makes that statute directory instead of mandatory.” In Interest of MKM, 792 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Wyo.1990) (citing Mayor v. Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 64 Wyo. 409, 192 P.2d 403, reh’g denied, 64 Wyo. 430, 195 P.2d 752 (Wyo.1948)). I find it significant that the legislature, when referring to typically ministerial duties of police officers, has invoked and used the mandatory term “shall.”2
After reviewing the facts of this case in the light of our rule of qualified immunity and our usual standard of review, I conclude the district court’s grant of the summary judgment also is sustainable under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Brown failed to allege any facts sufficient to over*619come the qualified immunity extended to the police officer. There is nothing in the record to demonstrate the officer behaved unreasonably, without good faith or in an outrageous manner.
The record discloses the officer detected alcohol on Mendoza’s breath, but after observing Mendoza closely, he exercised his judgment and concluded that Mendoza was not impaired. As we noted in Keehn, a person can legally drink and drive in Wyoming, and the odor of alcohol on a driver’s breath by itself is not a ground for arrest of that driver. Keehn. Furthermore, I do not perceive it is within our judicial prerogatives to require that a police officer administer a field sobriety test in every instance in which he stops a vehicle and detects the odor of alcohol on the driver’s breath.
Brown alleged nothing more to establish bad faith than the claimed existence of a relationship of friendship between the police officer and Mendoza’s family. Brown contends the officer knew Mendoza and his family and asserts this is evidence of his bad faith in failing to carry out his duties by arresting Mendoza. Without more, this assertion is insufficient to serve as a basis for a charge of bad faith. I find nothing else in the facts of this case, even read in the light most favorable to Brown, that would serve to take away the qualified immunity of the officer.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut has described quite aptly the policy reasons for limiting the exposure of a police officer to liability:
The adoption of a rule of liability where some kind of harm may happen to someone would cramp the exercise of official discretion beyond the limits desirable in our society. Should the officer try to avoid liability by removing from the road all persons who pose any potential hazard, he may find himself liable in many instances for false arrest. We do not think that the public interest is served by allowing a jury of laymen with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight to second-guess the exercise of a policeman’s discretionary professional duty. Such discretion is no discretion at all.
Shore, 444 A.2d at 1384.
In Keehn, we expressed similar concerns. We noted “[pjeace officers are encouraged, if not constitutionally obliged, to employ ‘the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.’ ” Keehn, 834 P.2d at 116 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325-26, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality)). We went on to comment:
As to the factual realities, governments simply do not have the resources to protect all citizens at all times from the con sequences of all illegal or tortious activity. Consequently, law enforcement agencies and personnel must be afforded some discretion as to how to marshal their time, talents, and assets to achieve the greatest overall good.
Keehn, 834 P.2d at 116.
This language captures a recognition that the proper planning and implementation of a viable system of law enforcement for any governmental entity must involve the exercise of discretionary powers at several levels, including those exercised by judges, prosecutors, arresting officers, and other officials in the justice system. Everton, 468 So.2d 936. It is indeed appropriate to strike a balance between detrimental interference with the provision of this essential public service and the natural desire to compensate victims of officials’ wrongdoing. Cynthia Zellner MacKinnon, Note, Negligence of Municipal Employees: Redefining the Scope of Police Liability, 35 U.Fla.L.Rev. 720 (Fall 1983) (recognizing the qualified immunity from liability extended to a police officer in performing discretionary functions achieves this balance). The officer may not perform those discretionary functions in an outrageous manner or in bad faith but, when he invokes his professional judgment and acts on it in good faith, he will not be subjected to liability.
I do not disagree with, nor in any way denigrate, the decisional basis of the trial court. The trial judge concluded that, on *620the basis of this record, even if one assumed negligence on the part of the police officer, his conduct was not the proximate cause of this accident. The court was aware of the time elapsed between the contact by the officer and the accident, and also noted the continued consumption by Mendoza of alcoholic beverages. I agree the record is insufficient, as a matter of law, to justify a finding of a causal relationship between the police officer’s contact followed by his decision not to arrest Mendoza and the accident. I would adopt the qualified immunity doctrine, however, because it is broader than the rule of causal connection encompassed in the trial court’s decision. In Keehn, for example, there was no evidence of a continued consumption of alcoholic beverages, and the absence of a causal connection in that case had to depend only upon the lapse of time. It follows there will be instances in which a trial will be required with respect to causation, in which the trial would not be necessary if the doctrine of qualified immunity were invoked. I prefer a legal rule to address such situations rather than the potential of ad hoc resolutions of a causal connection, which, after all, ordinarily is a question of fact. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo.1983).
. Wyo.Stat. § 7-2-102 (1987) reads:
(a) A peace officer may arrest a person when:
(i) He has a warrant commanding that the person be arrested; or
(ii) He has reasonable grounds for believing that a warrant for the person’s arrest has been issued in this state or in another jurisdiction. (Emphasis added.)
Wyo.Stat. § 7-2-103 (1987) reads, in part:
(a) A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant and detain that person until a legal warrant can be obtained when:
(i) Any criminal offense is being committed in his presence by the person to be arrested;
(ii) He has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and that the person to be arrested has committed it; or
(iii) He has probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor has been committed, that the person to be arrested has committed it and that the person, unless immediately arrested:
(A) Will not be apprehended;
(B) May cause injury to himself or others or damage to property; or
(C) May destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the misdemeanor.
(b) A peace officer may issue a citation to a person in lieu of arrest for a misdemeanor if:
(i) The misdemeanor is committed by the person in the officer's presence; or
(ii) The peace officer has probable cause to believe a misdemeanor has been committed and that the person to be issued a citation has committed the misdemeanor. (Emphasis added.)
Wyo.Stat. § 31-5-1204 (1989) reads, in part:
(a) The authority of a police officer to make an arrest is the same as upon an arrest for a felony when the officer has reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the person arrested has committed any of the following offenses and the manner of making arrests shall be as in misdemeanor cases:
******
(ii) Driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any substance as prohibited by W.S. 31-5-233; * * *.
. See, e.g., Wyo.Stat. § 31-5-1211 (1989) which reads, in part:
(a) Every traffic enforcement officer * * * shall deposit the original or a copy of the traffic citation with a court having jurisdiction over the alleged offense or with its traffic violations bureau. (Emphasis added.)