specially concurring:
I specially concur in this case because I find that the police obtained appellant’s confession in violation of his right to counsel, but, because of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, I find the error harmless.
To explain the constitutional violation at issue requires a brief review of the facts. When Officer Dale White arrested appellant, he read appellant his Miranda warnings, and asked if he wished to talk. Appellant did not respond, but later asked White what the charges against him were. White said he was charged with robbery. Appellant responded by saying, “This ain’t shit.” White told appellant his response was “pretty cold-blooded” and “the guy was about to die.”
While White and appellant were sitting in White’s patrol car, a number of officers came up to the car and asked, “is that the killer from Tulsa County?” At that point, appellant again asked White what the charges against him were. White told him he was to be charged with armed robbery, shooting, and alluding arrest.
White drove appellant to the police station and escorted him to the intake room. In the intake room, White read appellant his Miranda warnings. Appellant refused to sign the waiver of rights form. Officers Bishop and Officer Ross then entered the room, read appellant his Miranda warnings, and told him they wanted to talk. Ross stated that appellant said he “wanted to see an attorney, did not wish to talk with us.” The interrogation stopped.
At some point shortly after this encounter, Officer Wayne Allen entered the room to recover blood from appellant. White stated that as Allen was finishing up with appellant, White:
stood up, walked over to [appellant] and said, let’s go get you booked in. He wanted to know what he was being *345charged with again. I told him again what he was charged with, for at least the third time.
As we started to walk off I said, isn’t there anybody you want to talk to? I said, you’re facing some pretty heavy charges. And I said, don’t you want to give your side of it? He said, yeah, I’d like to talk to that officer that was just here.
Officer Allen returned to talk with appellant. Allen asked White if he had read appellant his Miranda warnings, and White advised he had. Allen escorted appellant to his office where Allen advised appellant he did not have to talk with him and he had a right to an attorney. Appellant cut Allen off and said “I told you that I would talk to you as long as you’re not with those guys from the county.” Allen did not read appellant’s Miranda warnings prior to questioning him. Appellant then made a number of incriminating statements to Allen, which were later used at appellant’s trial.
Once a defendant invokes his right to counsel, questioning must cease until counsel is provided unless the accused himself initiates further communication with the police and voluntarily waives his rights. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). In Edwards, after the defendant invoked his right to counsel, an officer advised him that two detectives wished to speak to him. When the defendant refused to talk, he was told he “had to” talk to the detectives. The defendant met with the detectives and seemed willing to talk, but first the defendant requested to hear the taped statement of his co-defendant. After hearing that statement, the defendant confessed. The confession was introduced at trial.
In reversing the defendant’s conviction, the Edwards Court noted that the invocation of the right to counsel is a significant event warranting special protection. Id., 451 U.S. at 483-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85. The Court held that the defendant “having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations.” Id. 451 U.S. at 484-485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885.
The Supreme Court addressed what constitutes initiation of communication with police in Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983). In Bradshaw, the defendant invoked his right to counsel. While the defendant was being transferred to county jail, he asked the officer “ ‘Well, what is going to happen to me now?’ ” The officer told the defendant that he did not have to talk to him and that since he had asked for an attorney any statements had to be a product of his free will. Defendant responded that he understood, and he and the officer spoke. During the course of that conversation, the officer advised the defendant that he should take a polygraph test. The defendant agreed, and the next day he submitted to the test. Before the test, the police read defendant his rights and he waived those rights. After the test, the officer told the defendant that he did not believe his story, and the defendant then confessed.
A plurality of the Bradshaw Court found the defendant’s question to the police officer, “ ‘Well, what is going to happen to me now,’ ” constituted initiation of communication with the police. The plurality distinguished the defendant’s question from routine questions such as a request for a drink of water or to use the telephone. Instead, the plurality found that the defendant’s statement, although ambiguous, “evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.” Id. 462 U.S. at 1045-1046, 103 S.Ct. at 2834-2835. The plurality then concluded that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights when he confessed.
Four justices dissented from the plurality opinion in Bradshaw. The dissenters concluded that the question, “ ‘Well, what is going to happen to me now,’ ” was merely a normal reaction to the custodial sur*346roundings and the defendant s loss of freedom. Such a question did not evince a desire to discuss the subject matter of the investigation. One commentator has noted that the dissenters were “much closer to the mark” in analyzing Bradshaw’s question to police. C.H. Whitebread & C. Slobo-gin, Criminal Procedure, An Analysis of Cases and Concepts at 411 (3d ed. 1992).
Here, appellant invoked his right to counsel.1 After Allen had recovered blood from appellant and Officer White told appellant that he was going to book him, appellant asked Officer White for the third time what the charges against him were. Although Appellant’s question to White— what was he being charged with — is quite similar to Bradshaw’s question — what’s going to happen me now — there are distinctions. First, appellant’s question was in direct response to White’s statement that he was going to take appellant and “get him booked in.” Thus, appellant’s question was not simply a spontaneous attempt to initiate conversation, but a response to a statement made by the officer about the next step that was going to be taken against appellant. Second, although appellant had twice before asked White what the charges against him were, White had indicated to appellant that one of the robbery victims was near death and other officers had referred to appellant as a “killer.” Based on these comments, appellant could have legitimate questions as to the charges against him. And third, unlike Bradshaw, Officer White did not caution appellant about his right to counsel, but asked appellant if he wished to speak with someone.
Given the circumstances surrounding appellant’s question, appellant did not initiate the conversation with the police officers. Appellant’s question did not evince an intent to talk about the case. Rather, it was a perfectly understandable response to White’s statement that he was going to book appellant, and appellant’s response seems to be, at least in part, motivated by legitimate concerns raised by the comments of White and other officers implying that appellant was a killer. Because appellant did not initiate communication with the police after he invoked his right to counsel, the confession should not have been admitted at his trial.
Although I find that this confession was obtained in violation of appellant’s right to counsel, after a thorough review of the record and transcripts, I find this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
. Knowledge that a suspect has. invoked his right to counsel is imputed to all officers dealing with the suspect. United States v. Scalf, 708 F.2d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir.1983).