Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Bell :I very strongly disagree with the majority, the concurring and the dissenting Opinions. With respect to the concurring Opinion, the law is contrary thereto: Lawler v. Commonwealth, 347 Pa. 568, 33 A. 2d 432; Crawford’s Estate, 313 Pa. 127, 169 A. 438. The dissenting Opinion by Mr. Justice Musmanno merely restates the views and contentions which, as the sole dissenting Judge in the two prior decisions of this Court, he had previously expressed in those decisions. The majority Opinion states that it would be highly inappropriate for this Court to entertain a petition for clarification whenever a District Court’s decision, which negatives or, in effect, overrules a decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is currently on appeal before a United States Court of Appeals. Nothing so greatly diminishes or destroys the respect of all the people of the United States for our Courts and for Law alike as when a Federal District Court Judge unwisely exercises jurisdiction of a matter which has frequently and more properly been before a State Court, and thereafter ignores or nullifies decisions of the Supreme Court of this or any other State.
We turn now to a consideration of Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548,127 A. 2d 287, and Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A. 2d 844.
This Court, twice within the last few years, has interpreted Girard’s will, and has held that Negro boys did not come within the will’s provisions and could not be admitted to Girard College: Girard Will Case, 386 *301Pa., supra,* and Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa., supra. Certiorari in this last case was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States in 357 U.S. 570. In each of these cases, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania heard and considered and decided all of the contentions which the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the City of Philadelphia and counsel for Negro boys are now making to the District Court of the United, States.
In Girard College Trusteeship, this Court considered inter alia and rejected the contention that the Public Accommodations Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, §654, 18 P.S. §4654, applied to Girard College, which this Court has said twice is primarily and principally an Orphanage Establishment for poor male white orphans.** Since the application of the Public Accommodations Act, which was cited by counsel for the Negro boys in a footnote in their brief and was not specifically referred to in the body of this Court’s Opinion in Girard College Trusteeship, I believe that clarification of our Opinion (after oral argument on this point) is, under all the circumstances, wise.
Each and all the parties in interest had two appropriate remedies: (1) clarification. See Lawler v. Commonwealth, 347 Pa., supra; Crawford’s Estate, 313 Pa., supra; and (2) a petition to the Orphans’ Court of Philadelphia County for a reconsideration of Girard’s will in the light of (a) changed circumstances, and (b) recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and of the Supreme Court of the United States.
It is well established that the meaning and interpretation of a State statute is a matter for the State Courts and not for a Federal Court. Erie Railroad *302Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64; Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726.
Every Judge knows, and nearly every attorney knows, that a Court frequently does not specifically discuss and answer in its Opinion in every case, every contention made by either or both of the parties. Since the Public Accommodations Act of 1939 was not specifically discussed and specifically rejected (as inapplicable to Girard College) in this Court’s Opinion in the Girard College Trusteeship case, and since Federal District Court Judge Joseph S. Lord, III, in Commonwealth v. Brown, Trustees of the Estate of Stephen Girard, Civil Action No. 39404, 260 F. Supp. 323, based his Opinion on his interpretation of the Public Accommodations Act,* I favor (I repeat) oral reargument in order to clarify our decision on this point.
It is important to note what Judge Joseph S. Lord overlooked was that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa., supra, pertinently said (page 445) : “The private character of the trust and the privacy of the Orphanage which the trust was established to maintain and administer were aptly described in Girard Will Case, supra, as follows: ‘All provisions of the will show that it was not intended to be a public school; indeed, it is not merely a school at all but what Girard himself called in a codicil to his will, an “Orphan Establishment,” a home where the fatherless boys eat, sleep, study and live together, enjoying the testator’s bounty which provides for them not only an education but also lodging, board, clothing and all the necessities of life. . . . [Girard College] is erected on land owned by Girard and the buildings *303were constructed with his own funds. . . . The college has been supported and maintained for now over a century by Girard’s estate; not a penny of State or city money has ever gone into it; no taxpayer has ever been called upon to contribute to it; . . .’ ”
The second alternative appropriate action in which the question of the admission of Negro boys and the applicability of the Public Accommodations Act and other related questions concerning Girard’s will could have been raised, was in the Orphans’ Court of Philadelphia, which is and for nearly one hundred years has been an outstandingly able Court in this field of law— certainly far more experienced than a lower Federal Court District Judge. The rights of everyone, including the rights of Negro boys to be admitted to Girard, would be thus completely protected by experts. The losing party in such a case would have an absolute and unqualified right of appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania with its experience and expertise in this field of law, and if the losing party therein desires, he, it or they can appeal for a certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.
This is a brief statement of the reasons for my very strong dissent to the failure of this Court to clarify beyond any possible doubt the prior decisions of this Court on the subject, and its interpretation of the Public Accommodations Act.
This Opinion by Chief Justice Steen spoke for five members of this Court, with only Justice Mtjsmanno dissenting.
The admission age for these orphan boys is between 6 and 10 years.
Section 654(d) of The Penal Code of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, 18 P.S. §4654, provides: “(d) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to include any institution, club or place or places of public accommodation, resort or amusement, which is or are in its or their nature distinctly private, . . .”