concurring.
I concur in the court’s disposition of the claim and in its pronouncement. I write separately to explain why I join today’s opinion.
This claim is for respiratory impairment. According to the employer’s physician, the claimant’s ventilatory function (spirome-tric) test results1 are inconsistent and hence “unacceptable.” The medical expert explained that, in his opinion, the claimant either failed to cooperate or tried to imitate symptoms of lung disease. The American Medical Association’s “Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment” [Guides]2 requires that a doctor confronted with an uncooperative patient test that person’s *704“estimated exercise capacity.” 3 The physician’s failure to administer this test and to include its results makes the evaluation substandard under the Guides and hence saps the medical report of probative value.4 Because this flaw in the employer’s medical proof appears curable, the claim is properly remanded to afford the employer an opportunity to replace the substandard report with one that is defect-free.
Today the court correctly follows the teaching of Gaines v. Sun Refinery and Marketing5 by directing the trial tribunal to reconsider the entire claim upon remand.6
. For an explanation of the method by which "normar ventilatory function values are to be compared with actual test results, see Whitener v. South Cent. Solid Waste Auth., Okl., 773 P.2d 1248, 1251-1252 (1989).
. The Guides’ second (1984) edition applies to this claim.
. The Guides, at p. 97, provide as follows:
"Testing to measure exercise capacity should be done: * * * (4) [when] the individual has not performed maximally or correctly in the spirometry of Deo tests.” (Emphasis added.)
. The probative value of a medical report, unlike its competence or admissibility, denotes the proof's legal efficacy to provide evidentiary support for that which it seeks to establish. Thus, if the report in evidence meets the Guides’ standards for evaluating compensable impairment, it has probative value for that purpose. It can hence be described as "probative of compensa-ble impairment.” In short, evidence which is sufficient in law as proof of a fact is said to be "probative” of that fact. See Whitener v. South Cent. Solid Waste Auth., supra note 1, 773 P.2d at 1249 n. 1; Akin v. Estate of Hill, 201 Kan. 306, 440 P.2d 585, 590 (1968). The extent to which weight is to be accorded admitted probative evidence is an issue for the trier of fact. When it is urged that offered or admitted proof is completely devoid of any probative force, the challenge calls for testing the evidence as effective legal proof for the facts it is tendered to establish. This presents a pure question of law. Peabody Galion Corp. v. Workman, Okl., 643 P.2d 312, 315 n. 7 (1982).
. Okl., 790 P.2d 1073, 1080-1081 (1990). Before Gaines, whenever an appellate court held an employer’s or claimant’s medical evidence to be fatally flawed, the trial tribunal was directed to enter an order based upon the opponent's competent evidence. This technique was known as the Perlinger "jackpot rule.” See LaBarge v. Zebco, Okl., 769 P.2d 125, 130-131 (1989) (Opala, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Its demise came with the teaching of Gaines. See also, Gaines v. Sun Refinery and Marketing, supra at 1082 (Opala, V.C.J., dissenting).
. Contrary to the trial judge’s findings, the claimant’s evidence does establish the basic elements of his claim: (a) he was exposed to harmful airborne particles at work for a period sufficient to cause permanent injury, (b) his respiratory system is impaired and (c) the impairment is causally attributable to the workplace-related exposure.