delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This certiorari1 proceeding presents the question whether the Colorado State Patrol’s brief stop of the defendant, Teddy Ralph Rister, while it was operating a sobriety checkpoint on a county highway violates the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and article II, section 7, of the Colorado Constitution. The Jackson County District Court affirmed the county court’s ruling that the sobriety checkpoint was unconstitutional, and suppressed the evidence obtained as a result of the stop. We reverse.
I
In September 1985, Colonel John Dempsey, Chief of the Colorado State Patrol, issued an “Operational Procedures Bulletin” authorizing the use of sobriety checkpoints “to reduce the number of motor vehicle accidents in which alcohol is a contributing factor” and “to aid in the detection, apprehension and/or deterrence of drivers who are intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol.” The bulletin set forth numerous procedures to be followed in establishing and operating a sobriety checkpoint, including providing the criteria for selecting a sobriety-checkpoint site, and the physical requirements of a checkpoint site. The bulletin provided that:
As each vehicle is contacted the trooper will approach the motorist and state “This is a Colorado State Patrol Sobriety Checkpoint set up to determine the sobriety of drivers.” The trooper will then normally ask for the driver’s license only. If during this brief encounter the trooper perceives no evidence of alcohol impairment, the motorist should be allowed to proceed immediately, being assisted back into traffic by an officer. Constitutional rights of motorists must be foremost in the minds of our officers. The purpose of a sobriety checkpoint is deterrence/apprehension of DUI. If other types of violations or articulable suspicions of other violations are immediately discernible, those may also be investigated; however, as a general rule, the encounter involving checking the driver’s license should be adequate to determine any evidence of alcohol impairment.
During the stop, the trooper will be alert for any articulable conditions normally associated with persons driving under the influence. These conditions would include, but not be limited to, odor of alcoholic beverage about the driver, slurred speech, flushed appearance, disorderly or unusual conduct, visual disorders and/or lack of muscular coordination. In the event any condition or combination of conditions exist which give the trooper probable cause to believe the driver may be under the influence of alcohol, the driver may then be requested to perform certain psychomotor coordination tests and/or submit to a chemical test of either his blood or breath. If *485sufficient evidence of intoxication is then developed, the driver will be arrested.
The bulletin provided that state patrol officers would take no action against motorists who make “an apparent attempt to avoid the checkpoint” by turning around or turning off the highway before reaching the checkpoint, unless “a specific action other than merely turning around would justify pursuit.” Moreover, the checkpoints would be maintained for a predetermined period of time, but would be canceled if “significant traffic congestion at the site or other circumstances arise ... as determined by the on-scene officer-in-charge.” Under the procedures outlined in the bulletin, the state patrol would publicize the use of sobriety checkpoints and the dates of their use to deter alcohol-impaired driving, but “the exact location and times of scheduled checkpoints will be kept confidential.” Written instructions corresponding to the bulletin’s specified procedures would be provided to all officers operating the checkpoint.
Lieutenant Ralph Martin of the Colorado State Patrol authorized a sobriety checkpoint in Jackson County to be implemented on July 5, 1986, a Saturday during the Fourth of July weekend. The checkpoint was to be located at the three-way intersection of Highway 14 and County Road 12. On July 5, six state patrol officers, who had been given specific instructions on how to conduct the checkpoint screening of vehicle operators, set up traffic cones in the intersection demarcating two adjacent, off-road areas in which vehicles would be directed to stop. One “stop area” was located on the northwest corner of the intersection, and vehicles southbound on Highway 14 were directed to stop in that area. Another stop area was located on the east side of the intersection where a dirt parking area was located, and vehicles northbound on Highway 14 and eastbound on County Road 12 were directed to stop there. Signs stating “Be Prepared to Stop” and “sobriety checkpoint” were placed two-tenths and one-tenth of a mile before the checkpoint.
The state patrol operated the checkpoint for two and one-half hours, from 4:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m., and stopped 233 vehicles that entered the Highway 14-County Road 12 intersection. All vehicles were stopped; however, officers diverted all traffic past the checkpoint on a few occasions when volume would not allow additional vehicles without creating safety hazards or imposing unreasonable delay to motorists. The average stop lasted three minutes. Several vehicles turned around or turned off before reaching the intersection, and the state patrol did not attempt to stop them.
The defendant, who was eastbound on County Road 12, was asked to drive into the checkpoint stop area when he came to a stop sign at the intersection. The defendant requested permission to turn right at the intersection and proceed south on Highway 14. The officer denied the request and directed the defendant into the parking area. After the defendant parked his car, two state patrol officers saw the defendant and the passenger in his car leave the car and switch places so that the passenger was sitting in the driver’s seat. An officer subsequently checked the defendant’s driver’s license on a computer and found that his license had been denied. The officer then issued the defendant a summons and complaint charging him with driving a motor vehicle while license denied in violation of section 42-2-130, 17 C.R.S. (1984 & Supp.1990).
The defendant moved to suppress “any statements or observations made by law enforcement officers surrounding the seizure and arrest of the defendant” on the ground that there was no probable cause to seize and detain him. Following a suppression hearing, the county court ruled that since the stop was not based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion it was unconstitutional under the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and article II, section 7, of the Colorado Constitution, and suppressed the prosecution’s evidence against the defendant. The district court affirmed, holding that “seizures must stem from probable cause or at least an articula-ble suspicion, the use of warrants or at least legislative authority.”
*486II
The fourth amendment, which is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment,2 provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
Because we are bound by the United States Supreme Court’s decisions concerning the fourth amendment, People v. Quintana, 785 P.2d 934, 938 (Colo.1990), we look to that Court’s decisions to determine whether the state patrol’s sobriety-checkpoint stop of the defendant violated his fourth amendment right against unreasonable seizures.
Although the state patrol’s stop of the defendant’s vehicle was brief, the stop was a “seizure” under the fourth amendment. Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2485, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990); see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3082, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). Accordingly, we must decide whether the state patrol’s seizure of the defendant was “reasonable” under the fourth amendment.
Recently the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of highway sobriety checkpoints in a case similar to the one now before us. In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990), the Michigan State Police established a sobriety-checkpoint pilot program that set forth numerous guidelines governing checkpoint operations, site selection, and publicity.
Under the guidelines, checkpoints would be set up at selected sites along state roads. All vehicles passing through a checkpoint would be stopped and their drivers briefly examined for signs of intoxication. In cases where a checkpoint officer detected signs of intoxication, the motorist would be directed to a location out of the traffic flow, where an officer would check the motorist’s driver’s license and car registration and, if warranted, conduct further sobriety tests. Should the field tests and the officer’s observations suggest that the driver was intoxicated, an arrest would be made. All other drivers would be permitted to resume their journey immediately.
Id. 110 S.Ct. at 2484. During the only checkpoint set up by the Michigan State Police prior to the Court’s decision in Sitz, 126 vehicles were stopped. The average delay for each vehicle was about 25 seconds. During the 1 hour and 15 minute duration of the checkpoint’s operation, two drivers were detained for field sobriety testing, and one of the two was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. A third driver who drove through the checkpoint without stopping was pulled over and arrested for driving under the influence.
“[A]ddress[ing] only the initial stop of each motorist passing through a checkpoint and the associated preliminary questioning and observation by checkpoint officers,”3 the Court reaffirmed that a “balancing analysis” derived from Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), and applied in cases concerning highway checkpoints for detecting illegal aliens was the appropriate test for determining whether the checkpoint stops violated the fourth amendment. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2485. The analysis in the context of checkpoint seizures balances “the State’s interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which [the checkpoint] system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped.” Id. at 2488. The Court found that the state’s interest in eradicating *487drunken driving is substantial,4 while the “intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints[ ] is slight.” Id. at 2486. Moreover, the Court found that the temporary checkpoint, which resulted in the arrest for driving while intoxicated of about 1.5% of those stopped, “reasonably advanced” the state’s interest in eliminating drunken driving. Id. at 2487-88.
Applying the balancing test for checkpoint stops as enunciated in Sitz,5 we conclude that the checkpoint stop of the defendant was not an “unreasonable” seizure under the fourth amendment. It is beyond debate that drunken driving is a serious problem, and that the state has a substantial interest in preventing the loss of life and damage to property caused by drunk drivers. See, e.g., Noe v. Dolan, 197 Colo. 32, 37, 589 P.2d 483, 486 (1979). The burden on the fourth amendment rights of the motorists who were stopped at the checkpoint was relatively minor. Motorists were directed to pull off the road, and state patrol officers would request that each produce a driver’s license. The duration of the average “stop” in this case was 3 minutes, in contrast to the 25-second average “stop” in Sitz. We cannot conclude that this fact alone renders the checkpoint unconstitutional under the fourth amendment, in view of the limited discretion afforded state patrol officers at the checkpoint and amount of time reasonably necessary to stop vehicles and check for driver licenses and signs of intoxication.
The Highway 14 checkpoint stops suffer from none of the defects the United States Supreme Court found to contribute to the unreasonableness of police searches and seizures of vehicles on the open road. The primary evil the Court sought to prevent in random stops of vehicles was “the ‘kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion’ ” present in those kinds of stops. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2487 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1400, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)); see Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662, 99 S.Ct. at 1400; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-83, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2581, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). Other defects in police seizures of vehicles which the Court has identified as “subjective” factors weighing against permitting the seizures include the “ ‘generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers,’ ” Prouse, 440 U.S. at 656, 99 S.Ct. at 1397 (quoting Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558, 96 S.Ct. at 3083); and interfering with motorists’ freedom of movement, causing inconvenience, consuming time, and creating substantial anxiety in motorists, see id. at 656, 99 S.Ct. at 1397. The state patrol officers in this case had limited discretion over which vehicles could be stopped. The checkpoint-operating guidelines required that the officers stop all cars entering the intersection, with the only exception being that officers could permit all cars, or a fixed number of cars, to proceed through the intersection if traffic began backing up. The location of the *488checkpoint was authorized by supervisory personnel and the checkpoint was operated in a nondiscriminatory manner. The stop of each vehicle by state patrol officers was limited to a request to see the driver’s license and briefly determining whether the driver exhibited signs of intoxication. Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court noted, checkpoint stops differ markedly from roving-patrol stops because:
“[T]he subjective intrusion — the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers — is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop. In [United, States v.] Ortiz, [422 U.S. 891, 95 S.Ct. 2585, 45 L.Ed.2d 623 (1975),] we noted:
“ ‘[T]he circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers’ authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.’ 422 U.S., at 894-895 [95 S.Ct. at 2587-2488].”
Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2486-87 (quoting Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558, 96 S.Ct. at 3083) (brackets in Sitz). The defendant does not identify, and we do not find in the record, that the “subjective” concerns present in roving-patrol stops were present in the Highway 14 checkpoint stops. Cf. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559, 96 S.Ct. at 3083 (routine checkpoint stops do not intrude on motorists in the same manner as roving-patrol stops: interference with legitimate traffic is minimal; checkpoint stops appear to and actually do involve less discretionary enforcement activity; and any claim that “particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial review”). In view of the limited scope of the checkpoint stop, in which state patrol officers were not permitted to stop vehicles that turned around before entering the checkpoint, to engage in prolonged questioning, or to search vehicles, cf. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558, 566-67, 96 S.Ct. at 3083, 3086-87; People v. Andrews, 173 Colo. 510, 514, 484 P.2d 1207, 1209 (1971), we find that the intrusion on motorists’ fourth-amendment rights was reasonable.6
The final factor to consider in the Sitz balancing test is whether the Highway 14 checkpoint reasonably advanced the state’s interest in combatting drunken driving. The question this factor presents is whether in the furtherance of the state’s legitimate goal of combatting drunken driving the checkpoint stop “is a sufficiently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests which such stops entail,” Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659, 99 S.Ct. at 1399. The Court in Sitz explained that this factor did not “transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger.” 110 S.Ct. at 2487. However, the requirement that the method chosen by police must reasonably advance the state’s interest in dealing with a serious public danger serves an important role in preventing blanket police detention of motorists where there is only a “marginal contribution to roadway safety,” Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661, 99 S.Ct. at 1400.
The state patrol set up the checkpoint site on Highway 14 on the basis of information that drunk drivers had been arrested or had been involved in accidents on roads, such as Highway 14, that provided access to nearby recreational sites.7 Notwith*489standing the lack of any driving-under-the-influence arrests at the Highway 14 checkpoint, we conclude that the checkpoint reasonably advanced the state’s interest in combatting drunken driving. The Sitz Court approved a sobriety checkpoint even though only 1.5% of the drivers passing through the checkpoint were arrested for alcohol impairment. 110 S.Ct. at 2487; cf. id. at 2488 (noting that in Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 554, 96 S.Ct. at 3081, illegal aliens were found in only .12% of cars passing through immigration checkpoint, and that the ratio of illegal aliens detected to vehicles stopped- — considering that sometimes more than one illegal alien was found in a single vehicle — was about .5%). Moreover, in this case, the location of the checkpoint was established on a reasonable basis- — information available to the State Patrol indicated that roads in the area of recreational sites near the city of Walden had been used by drunken drivers. Finally, the announcement and establishment of a sobriety checkpoint undoubtedly had some effect on advancing the state’s interest in preventing drunken driving.
As we view the balance of the competing interests involved in the sobriety-checkpoint stops conducted by the State Patrol in this case, the relatively minor intrusion on the motorists’ fourth amendment rights to accomplish the state’s objective of reducing drunken driving was not unreasonable.
Ill
Article II, section 7, of the Colorado Constitution provides in relevant part that “[t]he people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Although article II, section 7, is almost identical to the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, we have held that the Colorado Constitution’s search and seizure provision provides greater protection than does the fourth amendment.8 E.g., People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815 (Colo.1985); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 140 (Colo.1983); Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 200 Colo. 94, 98-99, 612 P.2d 1117, 1120 (1980).
As the amicus curiae Colorado Criminal Defense Bar has pointed out, we have previously noted that “[sjeveral times we have determined that the Colorado proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures protects a greater range of privacy interests than does its federal counterpart,” Oates, 698 P.2d at 815. See, e.g., People v. *490Corr, 682 P.2d 20 (Colo.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855, 105 S.Ct. 181, 83 L.Ed.2d 115 (1984); Sporleder, 666 P.2d at 139-43; Chames v. DiGiacomo, 200 Colo, at 98-99, 612 P.2d at 1120-21. However, our approach in determining what kinds of seizures are “reasonable” under article II, section 7, of the Colorado Constitution is similar to the approach taken by the United States Supreme Court. We have implicitly recognized that to assess the reasonableness of police conduct as a general proposition “there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails,’ ” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1733-34, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967)) (brackets in Terry). See Stone v. People, 174 Colo. 504, 510, 485 P.2d 495, 498 (1971).
Accordingly, when we have been confronted with the question of the reasonableness of seizures that are substantially less intrusive than arrests, we have, as the United States Supreme Court has, balanced the competing interests of the state in accomplishing its legitimate goals and of the individual in the inviolateness of his or her person. See, e.g., People v. Savage, 698 P.2d 1330, 1334 (Colo.1985) (before a person may be subjected to investigatory stop and limited search, articulable and specific basis in fact must exist for suspecting that criminal activity has taken place, is in progress, or is about to occur; purpose of intrusion must be reasonable; and scope and character of intrusion must be reasonably related to its purpose) (applying Stone v. People test to determine whether seizure based on less than probable cause is reasonable); State v. Kabayama, 94 N.J.Super. 78, 82-83, 226 A.2d 760, 763 (1967) (in checkpoint-stop case, balancing inconvenience to motorists with “necessity to protect the general public"), cited with approval in Andrews, 173 Colo, at 514, 484 P.2d at 1209.
Neither the defendant nor amici curiae have suggested any means other than by balancing the interests of the state and motorists by which we are to determine the reasonableness of the checkpoint stops. In Exotic Coins, Inc. v. Beacom, 699 P.2d 930 (Colo.), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892, 106 S.Ct. 214, 88 L.Ed.2d 214 (1985), we considered an argument similar to the defendant’s in this case that the “reasonableness” standard of article II, section 7, of the Colorado Constitution should be construed differently from the fourth amendment’s “reasonableness” requirement, and concluded, “We see no reason to reach a different result here under the Colorado Constitution than that reached under the United States Constitution.”
We can find no basis in checkpoint-stop cases for concluding that “reasonableness” under article II, section 7, should be determined by a procedure other than balancing the interests of the state and the motorists, and determining whether the checkpoint stop in question reasonably advances the state’s interests.9 We hold that *491under the facts presented in this case the balance under article II, section 7, should be struck in favor of the reasonableness of the Highway 14 checkpoint stops.10
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and this case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
QUINN, J., dissents. LOHR and KIRSHBAUM, JJ., join in the dissent.. The People petitioned for certiorari pursuant to § 13-6-310, 6A C.R.S. (1987), and we granted certiorari pursuant to C.A.R. 49.
. E.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2254, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979).
. The Court noted that detention of particular motorists for field sobriety testing may require satisfaction of an "individualized suspicion standard." 110 S.Ct. at 2485.
. No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States’ interest in eradicating it. Media reports of alcohol-related death and mutilation on the Nation’s roads are legion. The anecdotal is confirmed by the statistical. "Drunk drivers cause an annual death toll of over 25,000 and in the same time span cause nearly one million personal injuries and more than five billion dollars in property damage." .... For decades, this Court has “repeatedly lamented the tragedy.”
110 S.Ct. at 2486 (citations omitted).
. We recognize that in Sitz the Court was concerned with the question whether Michigan’s checkpoint system was generally valid under the fourth amendment whereas in this case we are confronted with a narrower issue — whether the defendant’s fourth amendment rights were violated. However, it is neither practical nor likely to be profitable to attempt to distinguish between the validity of the state patrol’s checkpoint system generally and the state patrol’s seizure of the defendant specifically. The remedy the defendant sought, and obtained, from the trial court was the suppression of evidence obtained against him as a result of the checkpoint seizure. Because the exclusionary rule is designed primarily to deter unlawful police conduct, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48, 94 S.Ct. 613, 619-20, 38 L.Ed.2d 561; People v. Schoondermark, 759 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo.1988), the defendant’s suppression motion necessarily called into question the validity of the checkpoint system generally, which in operation resulted in the seizure of the defendant. Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Sitz is equally applicable in this case.
. As in Sitz, no allegation has been raised that any state patrol officer subjected any person to unreasonable treatment, which may be subjected to post-stop judicial review. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2485 (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559, 96 S.Ct. at 3083). Nor are we concerned today with the reasonableness of any search or seizure occurring after a police officer at a sobriety checkpoint stop suspects that a driver is intoxicated and further detains the driver for roadside sobriety testing. Cf. People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310 (Colo.1984).
. Although the sobriety checkpoint was ultimately located at the intersection of Highway 14 and County Road 12, a state patrol sergeant had *489originally proposed that the checkpoint be located at the intersection of Jackson County Roads 12 and 18, which is about 5 miles from the Highway 14-County Road 12 intersection. In a memorandum proposing the checkpoint, the sergeant stated that he had
attempted to research and establish D.U.I. arrests and D.U.I. involved data for Jackson [County Road] 12 and [County Road] 18 in order to hold a sobriety checkpoint on these roads the weekend of July 4, 1986.
The data is extremely limited due to the small amount of time a trooper has been stationed in the area. I have had to rely on Jackson County Sheriff's Office for a limited amount of information on D.U.I arrests they have made and mostly cold accident reports they have taken.
Jackson County Sheriff's Office records indicate D.U.I. arrests on [County Road] 12 on June 13, 1984 at [3:45 p.m.] and July 28, 1984 at [2:50 p.m.]. Accidents involving drinking drivers reveal one on June 13, 1984 at [3:45 p.m.]. On [County Road] 18, one accident involving a drinking driver occurred on August 11, 1984 at [7:30 p.m.] and one on August 5, 1984 at [3:00 p.m.].
The most important statistic is that on May 4, 1986 at [6:00 a.m.] and on May 17, 1986 at [12:10 a.m.], there were drinking driver accidents on [County Road] 18. On May 24, 1986 at [7:15 p.m.] there was one D.U.I. accident on [County Road] 12.
Although there is limited data for the location, common sense and experience of Sheriff's deputies and Grand County troopers confirm numerous drinking drivers commuting on this road between Walden and recreational sites at Lake John and Delanney Buttes Lakes on holiday weekends.
. The parlies dispute whether our decisions in People v. Benner, 187 Colo. 309, 530 P.2d 964 (1975), and People v. Andrews, 173 Colo. 510, 484 P.2d 1207 (1971), stand for the proposition that checkpoint stops are permissible under article II, section 7, of the Colorado Constitution. As we read Benner and Andrews, neither case has any bearing on the validity of checkpoint stops under article II, section 7. Each case concerns a federal constitutional challenge to a checkpoint stop, see Benner, 187 Colo, at 311-12, 530 P.2d at 965; Andrews, 173 Colo, at 512-14, 484 P.2d at 1208-10, and we made no reference in those cases to the Colorado Constitution.
. Numerous courts in other states have similarly upheld the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints by similarly balancing the competing interests of the state and individual under their state constitutions, see, e.g., Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1329, 241 Cal.Rptr. 42, 48, 743 P.2d 1299, 1304-05, 1311-13 (1987) ("As we have explained, both the majority and concurring minority in [a previous California search-and-seizure case], and ultimately, all other pertinent authorities determine the constitutional reasonableness of searches and seizures by a balancing test...."); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 530-531, 532-535, 673 P.2d 1174, 1177, 1178-81 (1983); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 505-506, 479 A.2d 903, 913 (1984); Opinion of the Justices, 128 N.H. 14, 16, 509 A.2d 744, 745 (1986); State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J.Super. 575, 583, 427 A.2d 131, 135 (1980); People v. Torres, 125 Misc.2d 78, 79, 81-82, 478 N.Y.S.2d 771, 772, 774 (1984); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 337 S.E.2d 273, 275 n. 1, 276 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084, 106 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed.2d 720 (1986), and the federal Constitution, see, e.g., Illinois v. Bartley, 109 Ill.2d 273, 284-285, 93 Ill.Dec. 347, 352, 486 N.E.2d 880, 885 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068, 106 S.Ct. 1384, 89 L.Ed.2d 608 (1986); State v. Riley, 377 N.W.2d 242, 243 (Iowa App.1985); State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143, 147 (Me. 1985); City of Las Cruces v. Betancourt, 105 N.M. 655, 658, 660, 735 P.2d 1161, 1164, 1166 (Ct.App.1987); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 524-528, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 651-653, 473 N.E.2d 1, 3-6 (1984); State v. Goines, 16 Ohio App.3d 168, 170, 474 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (1984).
. We find no merit in the defendant’s arguments that the state patrol conducted a “search” violative of article II, section 7, of the Colorado Constitution. As we stated in People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310, 316 (Colo.1984), "a driver of a motor vehicle has no legitimate expectation of privacy in his physical traits and demeanor that are in the plain sight of an officer during a valid traffic stop.” Under the facts presented in this case, the state patrol’s Highway 14 checkpoint stops were not unreasonable and constituted valid traffic stops.