I respectfully dissent. In my view, neither People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231 [145 Cal.Rptr. 861, 578 P.2d 108] nor People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714 [68 Cal.Rptr. 817, 441 P.2d 625] calls for exclusion of the confessions made by defendant in Nevada on October 3, 1978, and November 8, 1978. I briefly discuss each of the confessions separately.
I
Given the majority’s assumption that the Nevada police officer who conducted the October 3 interrogation violated no provision of Nevada law (p. 92, ante), I see no reasonable basis for excluding the resulting confession. Although—as the majority states—the Nevada officer’s interrogation did result from inquiries by California authorities, there is nothing in the *95present record to suggest that at the time they made those inquiries the California officials were informed that defendant had invoked his Miranda rights when first arrested on September 25 or that the California officials requested the Nevada officer to conduct the interrogation despite such invocation. If the California officers had no reason to know of the defendant’s earlier request for counsel, and if the Nevada officer was acting in conformity with Nevada law in conducting the questioning, I do not see how the majority can conclude that the admission of this confession “would encourage California police to engage in activities outside our borders that violate our own constitutional standards.” (P. 93, ante.) Rather, this appears to be a classic example of a case in which the exclusion of the confession will serve no deterrent value in this state and in which the law of the foreign jurisdiction where the interrogation occurred should apply. (See, e.g., People v. Blair (1979) 25 Cal.3d 640, 656 [159 Cal.Rptr. 818, 602 P.2d 738]; People v. Helfend (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 873, 885-890 [82 Cal.Rptr. 295].)
II
The foregoing reasoning does not, of course, apply to the November 8 interrogation, because the California officer who conducted that questioning was aware that defendant had invoked his Miranda rights at the time of his arrest by requesting an attorney. Nonetheless, the November 8 interrogation still did not violate Pettingill/Fioritto principles.
In People v. Mack (1980) 27 Cal.3d 145, 153-154 [165 Cal.Rptr. 113, 611 P.2d 454], we established that the Pettingill/Fioritto doctrine does not mean that a defendant who once invokes his Miranda rights may never thereafter be found to have voluntarily waived those rights in a subsequent questioning session. In Mack, the defendant—arrested for receiving stolen property—was released from custody after invoking his right to remain silent at an initial questioning session. Five or six days later he was rearrested on new charges and readvised of his Miranda rights. He then confessed to the new charges.
On appeal, Mack contended that since he had invoked his Miranda rights in the first questioning session, his later confession was inadmissible under Pettingill and Fioritto. We rejected the contention, explaining that in the period between the two questioning sessions, while defendant was at liberty, “[h]e was entirely free to consult ‘family, friends, or counsel’ concerning the charges he knew, or should have known, would be brought against him. . . . He knew his rights. He had asserted them when first arrested. In the interim he had an opportunity to carefully consider his predicament and to seek any support he needed—personal or professional—to continue asserting *96his rights, if he so chose. Under the circumstances, his decision to waive his rights must be considered voluntary. ” (27 Cal.3d at p. 154.)
Although in this case, unlike in Mack, defendant had not been released from custody before the November 8 interrogation, an intervening event at least as significant as release did occur: defendant was provided the attorney that he had requested when he first invoked his Miranda rights. After consulting with that counsel, defendant spoke freely with the police on numerous occasions, confessing to a number of crimes. The Nevada officer testified that he saw defendant’s counsel almost daily and that counsel had advised him that he had no objection to the questioning of defendant. Under these circumstances, it serves no discernible purpose to hold that defendant’s initial September 25 request to see an attorney—a request that had been fully satisfied more than a month before the November 8 questioning— had a lingering effect which invalidated his later waiver of rights. (See also People v. Booker (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 654, 660, 664 [138 Cal.Rptr. 347].)1
Accordingly, Pettingill and Fioritto provide no basis for overturning the trial court’s admission of the November 8 confession.
Ill
Since the majority holds that defendant’s convictions must be reversed because of the admission of his confessions, my views on the other guilt, special circumstance and penalty phase issues raised by defendant cannot affect the judgment. Accordingly, I express no opinion on those issues.
Grodin, J., concurred.
Booker also demonstrates that the November 8 questioning did not violate defendant’s rights under Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, 206 [12 L.Ed.2d 246, 250, 84 S.Ct. 1199], (69 Cal.App.3d at pp. 663-665. See also People v. Duck Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 178, 187-188 [133 Cal.Rptr. 511, 555 P.2d 297].)