I concur in the result. However, I would rest the holding on somewhat different grounds.
The majority attempt to finesse Nash’s personal liberty claim by concluding that the ordinance is essentially an economic regulation which affects Nash’s ability to use his private property as he wishes, not his right to cease performing the duties of a landlord. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 99, 103-104.) In my view, this line of reasoning elevates formal logic over practical reality.
Prior to the enactment of demolition controls, Nash could have razed his building and used the property for something other than residential leasing. Now, he is reduced to the single option of selling the property. Clearly, the ordinance has made it more difficult to cease being a landlord.
In effect, the majority employ the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” burdens on constitutional rights as a means of avoiding Nash’s personal liberty claim. This distinction obscures the actual impact of the challenged enactment. If the city had fined Nash one dollar for ceasing to be a *110landlord, the majority would have had no difficulty finding that the asserted personal liberty interest had been burdened. Practically, the ordinance imposes a far greater burden than a small fine. Nevertheless, since that burden is “indirect and minimal” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 104), the majority conclude that it does not warrant strict scrutiny. (See generally Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 252, 288-290 [172 Cal.Rptr. 866, 625 P.2d 779] (conc. opn. of Bird, C. J.).)
I would acknowledge that Nash’s practical ability to cease being a landlord has been burdened. Further, inasmuch as the duties of a landlord necessarily involve the rendering of personal services, I agree with Justice Mosk that the right to cease being a landlord is constitutionally protected. (See dis. opn., post, at p. 114.) The freedom to withhold personal services is a corollary of the basic liberty to pursue and obtain happiness by engaging in the common occupations of the community. (See Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 17 [95 Cal.Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529, 46 A.L.R.3d 351].)1
Ftowever, applying strict judicial scrutiny, I have no difficulty finding that the ordinance was necessary to serve a compelling governmental objective. Housing is a basic necessity of life. The provision of housing for every California family is, in the words of the Legislature, “a priority of the highest order.” (Gov. Code, § 65580, subd. (a).)
The demolition controls were enacted in response to a demonstrated propensity on the part of Santa Monica landlords to destroy rental housing units. During the so-called “Demolition Derby,” landlords razed over 1,300 rental units in a 15-month period. The dissent’s assertion that the city could have halted this march of destruction by less restrictive means is mere conjecture.
Further, the ordinance imposes only a minimal constraint on Nash’s freedom. As the majority point out, he can escape from the landlord business by the simple expedient of selling his property or withholding rental units from the market as they become vacant. Nash does not contend that this particular piece of property is especially important to him or that a sale would harm his ability to provide for himself or his dependents. In short, *111the ordinance burdens Nash’s right to withhold personal services only by limiting his ability to maximize the profits from his property. Though this is a burden, it is not an unduly harsh one in view of the city’s compelling interest in providing housing for its residents.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.
For purposes of this discussion, I assume that Nash would, as a practical matter, have no alternative but to perform substantial personal services were he to continue in the apartment rental business. The record is not entirely clear on this point. Nash might have been able to avoid performing the services that were distasteful to him by, for example, placing his rental units in trust. However, in view of my conclusion that the ordinance passes constitutional muster under the standard of strict scrutiny, I find it unnecessary to delve further into this question.