In Re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. J9610436 & J9711031

Dissenting Opinion by

HARRELL, J.

in which RAKER and WILNER, JJ., join.

I respectfully dissent. Some time ago it was observed that “hard cases make bad law.” 1 This is such a case. Giving proof to that aphorism, the Majority opinion in this case engages in appellate fact-finding in an effort to justify its desired result, heedless of the need for disciplined appellate review of the record in this extraordinarily difficult termination of parental rights case.

Mr. F is a compelling petitioner. No party, no attorney, no witness, and least of all not the trial judge, expressed any doubt that Mr. F is other than “a hard-working, sincere man who loves his children and seeks to promote their well-being.” 2 This same cast of characters essentially agrees, however, that Mr. F is intellectually impaired. Although the extent of his impairment was not quantified neatly in a numerical expression, I think it must be conceded on this *705record (Mr. F’s own opinion notwithstanding), that it was proven, and the trial judge so found, that Mr. F was not a fit custodial parent at the time of the hearings below. The evidence supporting that conclusion was more than anecdotal or speculative, as dismissed by the Majority opinion. The real dispute was whether his impairment was of such a degree that, in order to maximize his potential to become a fit parent to Tristynn and Eddie (and giving due regard to Eddie’s extraordinary medical needs) in the foreseeable future, Mr. F required only “drop-in” external support3 or virtually full-time support. Mr. F’s witnesses expressed confidence that he could become, within 6-12 months, a fit custodial parent with only drop-in types of services. The trial judge did not credit that testimony, however, and, on the evidence that was before him, concluded instead that there was little likelihood that Mr. F’s shortcomings as a custodial parent would be remedied in the near future. The trial judge terminated Mr. F’s parental rights, as opposed to continuing the children in foster care limbo, in the face of the unlikelihood of reunification in the foreseeable future and the presence of two sets of ready, willing, and able adoptive “parents.”

The Majority opinion’s analysis, as invited to do so by Petitioner and Amicus, fixates on two essentially evidentiary issues: (1) the quality of, and weight to be given, Dr. Blum-berg’s opinion as to Mr. F’s parental fitness; and (2) asserted shortcomings in the services offered by the Carroll County Department of Social Services (DSS) to Mr. F to facilitate reunion of the children with him. The Majority glosses-over the evidence as to Mr. F’s condition and how it would affect his ability to rear his children if they were returned to his care and custody, now or in the foreseeable future. To the extent the trial judge considered and gave weight to Dr. Blumberg’s opinion (occupying but a paragraph of the judge’s 12 page Memorandum and Order of 23 August 2000), it was as to the *706required factor of FL § 5-318(d)(1)(i)4 (“whether ... the following continuing or serious condition[ ] ... exist[s]: (i) the natural parent has a disability that renders the natural parent consistently unable to care for the immediate and ongoing physical or psychological needs of the child[ren] for long periods of time”), and confined to “mental retardation” as further defined in § 7-101(Z) of the Md.Code (2000 Repl.Vol.), Health-Gen. Art. (“a developmental disability that is evidenced by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning and impairment in the adaptive behavior of an individual.”). The judge’s conclusion that Mr. F suffered from such a disability, however, was not dependent on Dr. Blumberg’s opinion alone. The judge noted that he considered the other witnesses called by DSS, as well as those called by Mr. F, each of whom also acknowledged, in various ways, Mr. F’s intellectual limitations.

The issue in this case is not whether Mr. F was and is disabled. More precisely, it was how much support it would take to determine if that disability could be mitigated to the degree that a fact-finder could conclude that there was a reasonable probability that Mr. F, in the foreseeable future, could become a fit parent for two small children, one of whom has extraordinary medical needs. Mr. F claims it was DSS’s job to supply, or direct him to, services tailored to overcome his disability, to the degree possible, insofar as it made him less than a fit parent. DSS asserts it had no such obligation or, alternatively, that it would take around-the-clock supervision of Mr. F and the children and other assistance which it does not (nor can) offer and, on this record, no other governmental agency or organization has been shown adequately to be able to offer to Mr. F in these circumstances, i.e., a specific mentally-disabled, single parent seeking to raise and care for these two small children.5 An examination of the record *707before the trial judge reveals that his fact-finding was not clearly erroneous and his conclusions were supported, to a clear and convincing standard, by the facts in evidence.

Dr. Blumberg performed a forensic psychiatric evaluation of Mr. F in October 1997 in order to determine his parental fitness.6 In preparation to meet with Mr. F, Dr. Blumberg reviewed the extensive written case file provided by DSS. His clinical examination of Mr. F took place at meetings of two hours duration on 15 October 1997 and one hour on 21 October 1997.7

Dr. Blumberg concluded that Mr. F, “although well-meaning and well-intentioned, has significant intellectual limitations, and it’s those limitations that, I think, seriously handicap!. 1 his ability to take care of children ... especially so with his youngest child having a number of medical problems and complications.” Mr. F, according to Dr. Blumberg, was “in complete denial of any difficulties, and, apparently, [even with] *708supervised visits [with the children] needed considerable assistance.”

Dr. Blumberg equated Mr. F’s intellectual impairment with a disability that compromised his parenting ability. As examples of how this disability would manifest itself, the witness explained that, because Mr. F’s judgment range was “very limited,” he likely would: (a) fail to anticipate or recognize the signs of impending medical problems; and, (b) be unable to set limits for the children, help with school work, or address their emotional problems as they grew older. It was not, for Dr. Blumberg, a question of Mr. F being abusive or deliberately harmful, but that he would be unintentionally neglectful or unable to respond appropriately to the children’s needs because he did not appreciate what those needs were or might be. Mr. F’s response to Dr. Blumberg presenting such issues to him during the examination was essentially that all the children needed was love and that would be enough.

Factored into his opinion, Dr. Blumberg acknowledged that Mr. F probably could improve his reading skills to achieve a very basic, primary level of comprehension, but that it would be difficult for him ever to learn to read, for example, a newspaper. Although he believed Mr. F could learn some additional, fundamental parenting skills, Dr. Blumberg did not think he would be able to learn the number of skills necessary to parent properly these two children, one of whom has special needs himself.

After receiving Dr. Blumberg’s written report into evidence,8 the trial judge asked Dr. Blumberg if he saw any probability that there would be an improvement in Mr. F’s ability to be a fit parent for these children in the future. Dr. Blumberg responded in the negative, explaining that Mr. F’s intellectual impairment was a permanent condition with which he was born and would continue throughout his life.

*709Deborah Ramelmeier, a former employee of the DSS who had been the caseworker assigned to Mr. F’s children’s cases from their inception until November 1997, testified about the children’s physical conditions. Both children were developmentally delayed.9 Eddie had a brain cyst which, together with related fluid build-up, required daily monitoring to identify and ward-off serious health implications. Eddie also suffered from persistent pulmonary hypertension and serious reactions to environmental allergies.10

Ms. Ramelmeier next explained the general course of DSS’s efforts to work with Mr. F. Although one service agreement was executed, on 3 July 1996,11 Mr. F rejected two subsequent proposed agreements, one offered on 13 December 1996 and another on 23 April 1997.12 It is unclear whether Mr. F *710rejected the proposed agreements on his own volition or on the advice of counsel. It was after the last proposed agreement was rejected by Mr. F on 6 May 1997 that DSS notified him on 13 May 1997 that it was changing its plans for the children from attempts at reunification with Mr. F to a permanency plan of termination of his parental rights and possible adoption. She summarized the Department’s thinking regarding the change in the permanency plan:

The struggle that we’ve been dealing with is that, although Mr. F desperately wants to care for his children and he loves his children, we feel very strongly that he doesn’t have the ability, regardless of what services we could provide for him. We are never going to be able to provide services enough to make him able to care for his children, (emphasis added).

Although cataloguing some logistical and veracity problems with Mr. F during the time she worked with him (such as missing appointments to visit the children due to his erratic work schedule, forgetting to call and re-schedule, not telling her the truth about whether and how he had electricity at his dwelling, and other matters relative to his status), Ms. Ramel-meier noted that the main and continuing problem over the eighteen months she worked with Mr. F and observed his numerous supervised visitations with his children was the high degree of supervision he needed in order to identify and remember the most fundamental parenting skills, such as feeding, changing diapers, playing with the children, and teaching them to talk. Although Mr. F improved his parenting skills somewhat over this period of time, he nonetheless required constant reminders and supervision, lest a child be choked by inattentive feeding, overwhelmed by the number of toys offered, or failing to receive proper teaching (exemplified by Mr. F’s desire to teach the alphabet to a 10 month old, before teaching him how even to utter intelligible sounds). *711Ms. Ramelmeier also noted that Mr. F had unrealistic notions of what activities were appropriate for children of such tender ages, such as his desire, expressed shortly after Eddie was born, to take both children to Hershey Park and to go swimming at a public pool.

The caseworker who replaced Ms. Ramelmeier, Ms. Helga Anderson, testified next. She supervised the children’s cases until March 1998. She narrated a series of examples, gleaned from her interactions with Mr. F and monitoring of his visitations with the boys, how Mr. F continued to have difficulties dividing his time appropriately between the two children, his inappropriate notions of field trips he proposed to take the children on (such as an Orioles night game), and other problems. Of potential greatest consequence, and representative of Mr. F’s lack of reading skills combined with an unrealistic, simplistic approach to looking out for the best interests of the children, Ms. Anderson recounted how Mr. F brought a gift in May 1998 to Eddie, age two at the time, that bore a warning on the box that, due to a potential choking hazard, it was inappropriate for children under the age of three. When asked whether he had checked the box to see if the toy was appropriate for children under three, Mr. F responded he had checked the box and that it was an appropriate toy for Eddie.

Asked certain ultimate questions, Ms. Anderson responded thusly:

Q. Based on your observation, would Mr. F be able to have unsupervised visitation with the boys at this time?
A. 1 really don’t believe so. I have concern for the safety of the children. If he’s unable to determine when a toy is inappropriate because of choking hazard, he — I—I have concerns if he would be able to give medication appropriately, if he would recognize warning signs if the boys become ill. And, again, he — he does not seem willing to turn to the Agency for help, and I would have concerns as to whether or not the boys would get adequate supervision.
Q. Are there any other services that the Department could provide to Mr. F at this time?
*712 A. Not to my knoivledge.
Q. Since you’ve been involved in the case, has Mr. F made efforts to adjust his circumstances?
A. I think Mr. F has tried very hard. It’s very obvious that he loves his children, that he would like to have his children with him, that he would like to have a chance to be a father to his children. I think he has done everything within his capability. I don’t believe, unfortunately, that that’s enough to provide for the safety of the children.

(Emphasis added).

The Court interjected itself in the questioning of Ms. Anderson to inquire about special requirements for Eddie and his ongoing medical care needs:

THE COURT: We’ve — let me interrupt for a second: From the testimony of Mrs. Miller [Eddie’s foster mother], I get the impression that Eddie has a lot more problems than Tristynn does.
THE WITNESS: That’s correct.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: Tristynn does still have some developmental delays, ...
THE COURT: I understand that.
THE WITNESS: ... but not enough to warrant services from the Infant and Toddler Program.
THE COURT: Right. So, Eddie, because of his past medical problems and probably future medical problems, really needs some — someone caring for him who is going to devote practically .full-time to him. I mean, that’s the impression that I get from Mrs. Miller.
THE WITNESS: I — I think that he has — because of his sensitive skin, he had gastro reflux ...
THE COURT: Right.
THE WITNESS: ... when he was younger, still has some problems with vomiting. I do believe he needs someone who’s very sensitive to the warning signs ...
THE COURT: Right.
*713THE WITNESS: ... as to when to get him medical attention.
THE COURT: From your contacts ivith his father, Mr. F, do you feel that, at the present or anytime in the future, that Mr. F could provide that level of special care that Eddie needs?
THE WITNESS: I do not.

(Emphasis added).

Resuming her re-direct examination, DSS’s trial counsel completed her interrogation of Ms. Anderson by establishing:

Q. As a follow-up, do you believe that Mr. F will possess adequate parenting skills to parent Tristynn?
A. I — I don’t believe so. 1 — I think the issue of being able to give medication and recognize warning signs and appropriate toys and appropriate food by knowing the expiration dates is important, no matter what the age of the child.
Q. Is Mr. F financially able to care for the boys’ needs?
A. He has not — although he has a Child Support Order, he has not been paying regularly. He made a payment on February 10th of '98 and then did not make another payment until June 5th of 1998, so he has not regularly been paying child support, which would, from my point of view, call into question his financial ability.

Dana Pflugrad, the current DSS caseworker responsible for Tristynn and Eddie, testified next. She, citing specific examples, reinforced the point that Mr. F, even with the improved parenting skills he had attained, continued to have difficulties keeping up with the changing and evolving needs of his sons, who were ages four and three at that time. As one example, Mr. F, given an opportunity to teach Tristynn that certain conduct he was engaging in should be discontinued promptly or he would be placed in a “time-out” chair, simply started counting out loud, without telling Tristynn how long he was going to count or what the consequences would be if the conduct did not cease before the counting, at whatever number, stopped.

*714In response to cross-examination by Mr. F’s trial counsel as to why DSS had not offered Mr. F specialized services in view of his intellectual impairment and failed to inquire where such services could be found outside of those offered by DSS, Ms. Pflugrad explained “because it’s my belief that Mr. F would need twenty-four hour/one-on-one help with the children if they were placed in his home, and I don’t believe that that service exists. There may be some places that would offer some limited services, but I’m not aware of them.”

Mr. F testified on his own behalf. Rather than attempt to characterize his testimony, I set it forth verbatim, at least in pertinent part, and note occasionally by footnote in what respects it was contradicted by other witnesses (including those who testified in support of Mr. F):

THE WITNESS: Yes, my name is Edward F____
DIRECT EXAMINATION
Q. All right. How old are you?
A. I’m thirty-seven.
Q. Since you mentioned work, let’s — let’s talk about work. How long have you worked at Western Maryland College?
A. I work at Western Maryland college for about five— five years.
Q. Okay.
A. I started in '90 — I mean, '94.
Q. All right. What do you do up there?
A. Well, I cook, I clean, and I work on the beverage line mostly.
Q. Okay. So, you work in the kitchen?
A. Yeah, I work inside the kitchen.
Q. All right. What do you make an hour?
A. I make six-fifty.
* * * :¡s * *
Q. Okay. Now, let’s go back to your — your first real job. Do you remember when that was?
*715A. Well, I were go to like education center.
Q. The education center?
A. Yeah.
Q. What’s that?
A. The education center — that’s a place for like a handicap and for like disabled kids.
Q. Okay. How long did you work there?
A. Well, I’ve been working there — I was like in school and plus I was working there like all through school and till I got out of school, I’ve been — they hired me on like on full-time.
Q. Okay. What did you do there?
A. Well, I take the clients in — inside the gym and show them puzzles, and stuff, and take them to the bathroom a lot and I potty train them.
Q. How old were these people?
[interruption of approximately 12 minutes while Court handles another matter.]
Q. Okay. Now, I take you back to your first job. Where was that?
A. At United Cerebral Palsy.
Q. Was — was that your first ...
A. I’m not — over to the center.
Q. Okay. Okay. Now, you were a counselor there?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Okay. What age group were the people that you worked with?
A. One all the ways up to — it’s about thirty.
Q. Okay. What kind of disabilities do those people have?
A. They have like a Down’s syndrome and a — a—United Cerebral Palsy and — and that’s it.
Q. Okay. What did you do for United Cerebral Palsy?
A. I was a house counselor.
*716Q. Okay. And, as a house counselor, what did you do?
A. Well, I feed the clients and take them over to the mall, push them around inside in a wheelchair and ...
Q. How — how did you get them to the mall?
A. Inside a van.
Q. You drove the van?
A. Yeah, uh-huh.
Q. Do you have a driver’s license?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. What else did you do with them?
A. Plus, I feed them and they couldn’t even move their arms and their legs and showered them and cook, clean, give them their medicine.
Q. You don’t read too well, do you?
A. No, I don’t. I read ...
Q. Go ahead.
A.... I read kids book.13
Q. Are you taking reading classes now?
A. Yeah. Uh-huh.
Q. So, how do you know what medication to give them?
A. Well, see I got one client named Chuck Parks, you know, and look there for first initials, C for Chuck.
Q. Well, how did you know how much of the medication to give and when to give it to him?
A. Well, on the — I mean, like, on the bottle they have like a time and a date and all that. If I have any problem, I call up to — down to the office.
Q. Okay. All right. So, did you ever have any problems giving the wrong medication?
A. No, I haven’t.14
*717Q. How many years did you work there?
A. About — about five-and-a-half years.
Q. Okay. All right. So, were some of the people that you worked with at United Cerebral Palsy children or were they all adults?
A. There was like adult.
Q. And, at the center, there was some children?
A. Children, yeah.15
Q. Okay. Now, tell — tell the Judge what you’re doing, as far as your reading?
A. Well — well, I’ve been going to classes and .. .
Q. What have you been doing to help yourself learn?
A. Help myself?
Q. Uh-huh. What have you been reading?
A. I’ve been reading like a kids book and sometime I was like go to a library and I went down last week at like hooked on phonic . ..
Q. Hooked on Phonics.
A. Yeah.
Q. Does that help you?
A. Yeah, helped me pretty good.
Q. So, you know your letters?
A. Yeah, I know my letters.
Q. You know the sounds?
A. Yeah. I mean, my main problem like get down to the sound of the work (unintelligible) like to — like together.
*718Q. Okay. All right. Let’s talk about where you live. Is that a house or is it an apartment, a town house, or what?
A. It’s a town house.
Q. How many bedrooms?
A. Two bedrooms.
Q. Does anyone live there with you?
A. Just me by myself.
Ot Of ❖ * -1: :¡:
Q. Do you have a telephone there?
A. No. Uh-uh. I can’t afford it.
at a: sit at at
Q. Okay. All right. Now, when this case first started, started by you turning the children into the Department. Is that correct?
A. Yeah.16
Q. Why — why did you do that?
A. Well, you see, the mother, you know, she like very much into drinking, drugging and I didn’t have no electricity and — and I didn’t have no food in there and I — I took them down to the Department of Social Service and I thought I was going to get my kids back once I got my electricity turned back on.
Q. It didn’t happen, though, did it?
A. It didn’t even happen. I had to go through all of this program and stuff and ...
Q. What programs have you done?
A. I’ve done a parenting class and a parent — parenting (unintelligible) and I go to parenting class about two time in the week, tryin’ — tryiri to learn how to be a better father towards my kids.
Q. Okay. How long did you go to parenting classes?
*719A. For about a — about three-and-a-half years.
Q. And, did you go to Parents Anonymous, also?
A. Yeah.
Q. What’s that like?
A. Parents Anonymous — that where you come in, you know, talking about relationships to your kids, you know, and when they’re kids, I mean, how you control your kids and when the kids being bad, they tell you how — in what way how you — how you handle your kids.
Q. If you were to have the children, who would you call if you had any questions about what to do with them?
A. Well, first of all, you know, I would call like — like my parents and if I had any problem, I would call like Department of Social Service if I had any problem.17
Q. Now, you haven’t missed any visits with the . ..
A. No, I haven’t . ..
Q .... —with the children.
A .... ‘cause since this — since my kid been into a custody, I never miss any visit at all, never.18
Q. Okay, so, do you think there’s been any problems with the visits?
A. No, I never.
Q. Okay. Do you discipline the children?
A. Yeah. Yes, I have.
*720Q. How do you discipline them?
A. Well, you see, my oldest one is Tristynn. He kinda hyper, he wanna play and sometime he holler and make noise and sometime he like throw stuff and I’m trying to not to keep them from throwing stuff and I tell him like about three time not to throw stuff and he keep on going it, you know. I tell him, you know, I’m gonna sit you inside at the time-out room. I mean, that’s like — like chair corner and 19
Q. How long do you put them in time out?
A. Well, two years old like — like about two minutes and three years old like about three minutes.
Q. So, ...
A. I go by a certain age.
Q .... where — where did you learn that?
A. Well, I learned that like a — number one, I like go to the center like go to school and they bring [unintelligible] like a parenting class.
Q. All right. Do you think you have the ability to raise the children?
A. Yeah. Yes, I do.
* * * * * *
Q .... — so, you work full-time, right?
A. Yeah, I work full-time.
Q. Well, who would watch the — the children when you’re at work?
A. My mom or my sister, Pat; she ain’t workin’.
THE COURT: How old is your mother?
THE WITNESS: My mom, she about seventy. My sister, Pat, and she’s like — she’s watching my niece right *721now and I asked her could she watch my two kids? And, she say yeah.
BY [Mr. F’s trial counsel]:
Q. You’ve already had a discussion with her?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Has the Department of Social Services ever talked, to you about what help might be out there for you in case you got the children?
A. No, they haven’t.
Q. Have they told you about ARC program or given you any numbers to call or anything?
A. No, uh-huh. You see, someway, again, I’ve got to find out like on my own or like — or like ask around, you know, or go over there where I work at like in the (unintelligible) or get like a little bit of advice. I mean, they never bring that up towards me.
[CROSS-EXAMINATION]
Q. Okay. And, you had talked to Ms. Pflugrad about having a birthday party for [the boys]?
A. Yeah. Uh-huh.
Q. Why didn’t you give her more information about that?
A. More information? You see like, number one, you know — and I didn’t even have any money, you know, to throw a party and — and, plus, I got bills like rent and stuff.
Q. But, didn’t Ms. Pflugrad ...
A. Yeah.
Q .... ask if you needed help with paying for a cake or for a party?
Q. Do you remember Ms. Pflugrad asking you .. .
A. Yes, she did.
Q .... about whether you needed some financial help with that?
*722A. Yeah. You say why should I, you know, come to you all, you know, and ask you all, you know, well, for some help. I mean — -I mean, they are my sponsibility and — and, anyway, you know, I mean, that — I mean, I do wanna throw a party for my kids. I mean, that way, you know, I was kinda short ■ on money — I mean, money ‘cause I got to pay rent.
* * ❖ * * *
Q. What services have you asked for from the Department?
A. What service?
Q. Is there any help you want from the Department?
A. Yeah. Uh-huh. Yeah. Some help I wanted — I wanted to ask from Department of Social Services. You know, I just wanted to — them, you know, how and what way, you know — how would I provide for my kids and all that, I mean, like they do with Vena,20 and they don’t — I mean — I mean, the only thing they want to do — you know, they want to terminate — well, I mean-excuse me — the way I feel, you know, I mean, they want to terminate my rights. Right now, you know, I’m kinda afraid of Department of Social Services.21
Q. All right. Now, you recognize that when you testified with [your attorney] that, you, yourself, have some special learning problems. Is that correct?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. It’s my reading.
Q. It’s your reading.
Now, if you were given some — some special services, do you think that you’ could handle the problems of taking two children and — and caring for them, aside from paying child *723support, and aside from going to domestic violence classes, do you think that you — that you could raise these children and get them going every single day to school? Do you think that you could do that on your own?
A. Yes, I could.
Q. Okay. How are you going to handle the problem of — for instance, since you haven’t read, if there are medicines that need to be given, how are you gonna be able to handle that problem?
A. Well — well, you see, I could read a little bit, you know. I mean, the only thing in my problem is sound the word, you know. Well, you see, like, anyway, you know, sit down with me like what time, you know — like my younger son, he probably need medicine about five o’clock in the morning, wake up and give it to him.
Q. All right. So, if you needed to give your child medicine once every four hours, how would you know to do that?
A. Every four hours?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, like watch the time and — and just give it to them.
Q. Okay. Now, do you — do you drive?
A. Yeah. Uh-huh. I got my license and everything.
Q. Do you have an automobile?
A. I did have one.
Q. How would you transport your children?
A. How I would transport my kids? Well, my father, he would let me borrow his car or I could take a taxi.
Q. Okay. Do you know where the nearest schools are to your home?
A. Nearest school?
Q. Yes.
A. Yeah.
Q. All right. How far is the school from your home?
A. They go (unintelligible) Westminster High School round about three miles.
*724Q. Okay. Now, for — for little kids, is there a school nearby?
A. School for little kids? There’s one downtown like in front of the post office use to be at; there’s one down there.
Q. Okay. Now, how do you do your shopping right now?
A. How do I do my shopping? Well, why this only me, I mean, I’m by myself, I usually eat like from my job and, plus, like on my day off, I go to the store and buy some food and stuff.
Q. Okay. Do you have a refrigerator in your home.
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. All right. Now, with two children, have you made any plans as to how you would shop and pay for food for two children?
A.' Yeah.
Q. And, what are those plans?
A. Well, I take them along with me. Well, you see, I would like — I just wanna show my kid how and what way I would shop and I would like — I mean, especially my — my oldest son and, I mean, I’d just put both of them like inside like a push cart and I just say to them, I mean, “What you want, you want cereal, and just tell me what you’d like to eat and what daddy like to eat and all that.”
* * * * * *
Q. All right. Now, do you know how — do you know who young Eddie’s doctor is right now?
A. Well, you see, they never told me none of that stuff. You see, I asked Ms. Dana [Pflugrad] about his — about his — about his history, like his records and stuff, and I think she gave me — gave it to me one time and that was like about a while ago and, plus, I wanted his record like — like every month, like they see little Eddie, you know, I want to get to know my son, I just wanna study their weakness and I wanna know about there — I mean, like, when they cough, you know, when they go to the bathroom, and stuff. I *725mean, I just wanna know the time like when they go to sleep.
Q. Okay. All right. Now, do you know if little Eddie still has any problems because of this cyst in his brain?
A. They never tell me that.22
Q. Okay. Do you know if he still has — if he’s behind other children in his development?
A. They did tell me that.
Q. All right. Do you — do you see that he’s behind other children? Does he seem to be a little slower than other children?
A. Well, you see, Eddie — he’s just that type of kid; he need like 1-0-1 — 1-0-123 and, you see, little Eddie he’s that type of kid, you know, I mean, my other son, he’s all right. He — like, when I take him to the bathroom and I keep my eye on both of them.
Q. All right. Mr. F, when I last was speaking with you, I was asking you about how you were going to take care of your children and we’ve covered feeding them and transporting them and taking to — them to the doctor’s. Do you know if young Eddie has any special needs that you might need to address?
A. Well, I just wanna know how his habits is like eatin’ habits, and stuff.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
Q. [Mr. F] has the Department explained to you in detail what little Eddie’s special needs are?
A. No.
*726Q. If they told you that you had to measure his head every day, could you do that?
A. Yeah.
Q. If they told you that you had to keep him on certain medication every day, could you do that?
A. Yeah.
Q. If the doctor told you certain things to look out for to see if he was reacting poorly to a food or to anything else, could you figure that out?
A. Yeah.
Hs Hi Hs sj! Hi Hi
Q. Now, do you intend to move anytime soon.
A. I was planning on to.
Q. Planning on moving out of the area?
A. Yeah. Uh-huh.
Q. Where to?
A. Probably someplace quiet.
Q. Are you gonna move out of the Westminster area?
A. Oh, no (unintelligible).
Q. Okay. Well, how come — how come you’re gonna stay here?
A. Well, more close ...
THE COURT: Let me — let me interrupt just for a second then you get right back on the same thought.
You’re living on South Center Street now?
THE WITNESS: South Center Street, yeah.
THE COURT: What — what was that number?
THE WITNESS: One-fifty-two.
THE COURT: That’s gotta be below Green Street going down the hill ...
THE WITNESS: Ah, ...
THE COURT: ... or not?
THE WITNESS: ... below Charles Street, right ...
THE COURT: But, below Charles?
*727THE WITNESS: ... beside the church?
Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. A little noisy in there, isn’t it?
THE WITNESS: Yes, it is, drinking, drugging.
THE COURT: Where does your mother — your parents live?
THE WITNESS: They live over on Charles Street.
THE COURT: Okay.
Okay [Mr. F’s trial attorney], go ahead.
Q. So, you’re not gonna move out of Westminster, but you’d like to move to a different neighborhood?
A. Yeah, a different neighborhood.
Q. Okay. Now, you said that you had a car but you don’t have one now?
A. Don’t have one now.
Q. Could you get one?
A. Yes, I could.24
Q. Why don’t you have one?
A. Well, I don’t have no need for a car right now because everything’s so close, my job and pi ...
THE COURT: How do you get to work?
THE WITNESS: Like on my bicycle every day.

Mr. Hardesty, Mr. F’s former employer at United Cerebral Palsy, testified in support of Mr. F. No longer employed by United Cerebral Palsy, Mr. Hardesty was, at the time of his testimony below, the Executive Vice President of Flying Colors of Success, Inc., a private non-profit organization serving people with disabilities. He had worked full-time since 1983 with people with disabilities.

Based on his work experience with developmentally disabled married couples with children in the Washington and Balti*728more areas,25 he opined that the Developmental Disabilities Administration (DDA) of the Maryland Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (DHMH) offered “a variety of different services” that “involve drop-in support supervision or assistance in the individual’s ... or family home based on his or her individual needs.” Such services, however, were not “setup for somebody that needs around-the-clock supervision.” Mr. Hardesty “thought” Mr. F would be eligible for and benefit from these types of DDA services, which he characterized for the trial judge as “help with budgeting, [and] certain other things that you and I take for granted, but wouldn’t necessarily keep us from living independently in the community.”

After criticizing Dr. Blumberg for offering his opinion of Mr. F’s parental fitness based only on 3 hours of clinical interviews of Mr. F,26 Mr. Hardesty suggested that such analysis of developmentally disabled persons by PhD.’s and M.D.’s served only to emphasize the negatives and overlooked the strengths of their study subjects.27 According to him, the medical professionals simply end-up institutionalizing people, many of whom, had a more pro-active and positive approach been utilized, could live in the community-at-large with varying degrees of external support. Advocates for the developmentally disabled, such as the witness, argue for concentrating on the strengths of the disabled individuals and viewing them in their home and work environments, not strictly in clinical settings.

Mr. Hardesty acknowledged that Mr. F “has some obvious deficiencies.” Invited by the trial judge to list Mr. F’s defi*729ciencies and then his strengths, Mr. Hardesty failed to respond to the inquiry about deficiencies, but instead identified as Mr. F’s strengths: trustworthiness, a strong work ethic, a hard worker, and a desire to help other people.

In cross-examination, Mr. Hardesty acknowledged that he had never seen Mr. F with his children. He also seemed to contradict his earlier testimony regarding DDA not offering around-the-clock support services to developmentally disabled persons,28 yet he appeared to concede that his current employer, Flying Colors of Success, offered its services only to adults without children.29 Redirected to his criticism of Dr. Blum-berg’s task and opinion, Mr. Hardesty, grudgingly admitting that Dr. Blumberg was not asked to perform a “developmental disability analysis, but a psychological and parenting assessment,” maintained that Mr. F may have tested higher or better had Dr. Blumberg interviewed him in a more familiar setting to Mr. F.

*730Invited to opine on a time line for the prospects of Mr. F becoming a fit custodial parent, Mr. Hardesty explained during cross-examination:

Q. Okay. Now, with regard to that, the issue of why Mr. F wasn’t referred for additional services, if Mr. F were referred to any other organization for additional services, how long do you think it would take him to become an appropriate parent for his children?
A. I don’t know what an appropriate parent is.
Q. Well, I don’t know what an appropriate parent is either.
If additional services were given to — to Mr. F, is it likely that he’ll be able to provide for the needs of his children within say a three-to-six month period?
A. I’m thinking three to six months is an awful quick period of time.
Quick. I mean, that’s a short period of time. I — you know, I think that if [Mr. F] could access the supports available within six months to a year, he could develop a number of the skills. The — the supports that — that are funded through D.D.A. are ongoing supports. Usually you get into their system. They don’t just forget about you after six months or a year, you know. There’re — there’re folks that may receive a Thousand or Two Thousand Dollars in supports across the whole year. That may be somebody stopping in to check on them once a week, or something like that. D.D.A. has the resources for these kinds of things and if [Mr. F] needs ...
Q. Do you — do you think that Mr. F would need somebody to come into his home twenty-four hours a day or what kind of services, based on your observations of Mr. F — what kinds of services would he need?
A. I would believe that [Mr. F] would need some supports that are of a drop-in nature, maybe ten/fifteen hours a week, you know, check on [Mr. F] to see if he needs any supports with anything, if he’s got questions, if one of the children is displaying this kind of behavior or a symptom or something, *731this happens or that happens at school or at day care, or whatever, and [Mr. F’s] unsure about it ... There — there would be a resource person with — with things that he may not know about, but that resource could also be for [Mr. F] to help him with shopping to make sure he’s making good nutritional decisions for the — for the kids when he’s shopping. It could be helping [Mr. F] with his personal finances. It could be helping [Mr. F] with any entitlements for himself or the children. Drop-in supports can address any number of issues that — that [Mr. F] would — would need some — some assistance with.
Q. Do you think that this is something the Department of Social Services would normally provide to someone with developmental delays?
A. I’m not familiar with what DSS does. Generally, there’s a pretty significant separation between DSS, DHR, and the Developmental Disabilities Administration. We — I mean, we — we work with DSS for entitlements for people that are in our program but, by and large, we don’t access any other services available through DSS. [Mr. F], if he was in the DDA funding system, [he] would have a services coordinator or case manager assigned to him who is, basically, an expert in developmental disabilities. [He] would receive support through an agency and he would also receive periodic follow-up from people at the regional office of DDA.

Ms. Peggy Roland testified next for Mr. F. By work and family experience, Ms. Roland had become a special education teacher and advocate for developmentally disabled persons. Although she met Mr. F initially several years earlier while performing volunteer work with Special Olympics, her current and relevant exposure to him, and his children, came as a result of being asked by a DSS caseworker to consult on Mr. F’s and his children’s situation.30 Asked what services she provided to Mr. F over the last 2-3 months,31 she replied:

*732I have, I hope, helped Mr. F by becoming an advocate for him on my own time, I’m doing this strictly on. a personal basis, and helping him to find services within the community, also to help him with some of his reading, to understand and interpret documents, information that he would need— excuse me — also, to develop some skills — some life skills, that he may be able to use to maintain his personal life better, using a calendar, getting other supports, financial service, advising, that kind of thing.

She thought her efforts resulted in Mr. F not being so hesitant in asking for help and information when he needed it. She described in a positive light her observations of two of Mr. F’s most recent visitations with his sons at DSS (a combined time of less than 3 hours).32

Asked by Mr. F’s trial counsel to describe what kind of programs were available in the “community at large” to help Mr. F if he were to gain custody of his children, Ms. Roland responded:

I’m not sure that I can give a very, very informed answer, fortunately, that’s not something I’ve gotten into in my personal life yet, my daughter is not a parent yet.33 But, I do know that financial advising-type services are available, any of the family support programs, independent living programs available through different agencies, Change, Flying Colors to Success, Target, ARC, and they are constantly developing new and different support services for custodial parents that would require, I’m sure, a lot of intense services. But, I believe that the questions could easily be asked, but I know that support is available for Mr. F as an individual in the community.

When asked on cross-examination, however, whether the “intense services” she referred to were “twenty-four hour super*733vision kind of services,” she stated she could not answer the question if the object were to support a custodial parent. She acknowledged she was unable to address what actual parenting services might be available. Probing further regarding the availability of other support services in the Westminster area, the following exchange occurred during cross-examination:

Q. Okay. Are you aware, does — does the ARC — the Association For Retarded Citizens, do they offer parenting classes specifically addressed to — to developmental^ delayed parents?
A. I’m sorry, I can’t answer the question. But, I do know that, within the Westminster community, there are several families where one parent or the other is developmentally disabled ...
Q. And — and, they need ...
A .... and they are ...
Q ... .• — those families would offer assistance to other families?
A. Oh, I think that’s a very strong possibility, yes.
There’s a — if I may — there’s a — a program within several of the agencies, I know of at least two, it’s called Community Supported Living Assistance, and that’s a program designed to help a person with disabilities maintain their level — appropriate level of independent living, and the program is designed to meet the needs of the individual, and I think that — I strongly believe that Change, Target, Flying Colors, and ARC would all be very interested and would do whatever they could, financially, as — as well as staff-wise, to develop a program to support a parent in their attempt to be a parent.

Even the Majority opinion, op. at 694, apparently acknowledges that the best that can be said for Mr. Hardesty’s and Ms. Roland’s testimony is that “[t]he evidence is unclear as to whether additional services, specific to petitioner’s needs, would bring about lasting parental adjustments facilitating reunification.”

*734Although unqualifiedly optimistic, on a personal level, regarding Mr. F’s future ability to acquire additional or more refined living skills and, with support, cope successfully with the emerging needs of his growing children, Ms. Roland was less optimistic that he was ready to assume custody presently:

Q. Ms. Roland, do you believe that, were Mr. F to be permitted to have unsupervised visitation with his children, would he be able to understand and address the children’s medical needs if there — if there were medical problems?
A. At this point in time, it’s something I’ve talked to Mr. F about, I do not think that would be advisable for unsupervised visits because of the possibility of hurt children and knowing what to do.
Q. All right. So — so, at this time, you don’t believe that Mr. F has the judgment to address medical needs for the children?
A. No, I don’t.

Mr. F’s final witness, Margaret F., his aunt and Eddie’s foster mother, testified that she would like to adopt Eddie, and Tristynn if given the chance. She expressed her intention to allow Mr. F, as well as Mr. F’s family, to play a role in the children’s lives so they would know their heritage.34 Asked by the court whether she thought Mr. F could handle the boys by himself, Margaret F., who has known Mr. F for 28-29 years, replied, “I think, at this time, he’s kind of unstable ... You know, if he starts to do things ... functions where he can learn a little bit more with his abilities, I think, you know, that he would be a better person.”

This is the record that was before the trial judge. On appeal, Mr. F’s appellate counsel and Amicus seek informally to supplement that record through their briefs, and understandably so. The limited attack mounted on Dr. Blumberg’s opinion in the circuit court has ballooned into a legal question *735beyond all proportion to the objection actually made below. The availability of support services asserted on appeal has taken on a crystalline clarity and certainty that belies what the trial judge was told below. Essentially unargued statutes and laws have become the foundation for legal arguments, augmented by law review articles,35 to the end that we should reverse the judgment below on points of law not placed fairly before or decided by the trial judge.

I do not blame Mr. F’s appellate counsel or Amicus for trying. The zeal of their advocacy is admirable and understandable. The client is appealing and, obviously, the arguments are beguiling. Perhaps, if Mr. F’s appellate and Ami-cus counsel had tried the case in the trial court, we would have the record before us they argue in their briefs, from which the Majority opinion borrows heavily. Unfortunately, the case they argue is not the record before us, nor was it before the trial judge.

I fault the Majority of this Court, however, for listening to the music, but not the words. The Majority opinion succumbs to the siren call of the Amicus brief, in particular, and becomes a bully pulpit for the promotion of select societal, moral, and legal truths and values (most of which reasonable people, whether judges or not, recognize as self-evident), but which is not justified by an objective reading of the record nor implicated by the reasons DSS sought, and the circuit court granted, termination of Mr. F’s parental rights. Tristynn and Eddie originally were declared children in need of assistance (an adjudication that was not appealed) because Mr. F was unable to care properly for them. DSS presented a wealth of evidence why that situation was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.36 The trial judge was unpersuaded by Mr. *736F’s evidence to the contrary. The Majority opinion, however, at various points, implies, in digressive homilies, that DSS’s “drive toward termination” (Maj. op. at 683) may have been influenced by Mr. F being considered “poor” (Maj. op. at 669, 673-674, 686, 700), and/or “illiterate” (at 686); or that DSS was paying blind obéisance to federal regulatory or funding requirements (at 669, 700);37 or that the trial court and DSS avoided a proper weighing of Mr. F’s rights and the best interests standard because they feared the uncertainties inherent in ever returning the. children to him (the “safer course” doctrine) (at 669). Nor does the termination of Mr. F’s parental rights, on this record, constitute an intentional or inadvertent diminution of the rights of the developmentally disabled as a class of our citizenry (Maj. op. at 669, 674-675, 683-684). This case involves an appraisal of a particular developmentally disabled parent, his particular children, and on a particular record.

The Majority opinion ignores much of what our job is about. It cherry-picks certain facts, ignores others, and finds a few new ones as suits its objective. It, in at least one instance, strategically edits an authority38 to avoid a principle, previous7 *737ly acknowledged by this Court, that cuts against the Majority’s reasoning. It disdains even to state the issues framed by Mr. F, upon which certiorari was granted, in favor of its own unstated conceptualization of the “questions” it would like to answer.39 Finally, it strives to make out of this record something that is not present in this case, the trampling of a parent’s right to raise his child.

The trial judge’s conclusions were supported by clear and convincing evidence, as recounted supra. Clear and convincing evidence, as explained in Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 318, 413 A.2d, 170, 177-78 (1980), involves “a degree of belief greater than ... a preponderance of the evidence, but less than ... proof beyond a reasonable doubt.... It has been said that [such] proof must be ‘strong, positive and free from doubt’ and ‘full, clear and decisive.’ ” (citations omitted). DSS met that burden.

*738The Majority opinion directs, in essence, a “do-over” and justifies that result by engaging in its own fact-finding.40 The transparency of the Majority opinion’s supplantation of the trial judge’s fact-finding role is not concealed adequately by its digressive legal discourses on the unchallenged legal principles applied in a termination of parental rights case. Of course, what makes this case inherently challenging is that it involves a developmentally disabled parent. It is difficult to imagine how the tensions between the legal principles of the best interests of the children and the constitutional right to raise one’s children could be heightened further. This is precisely why disciplined appellate analysis is so critically necessary lest we become swept up in the rhetoric.

*739The trial judge was correct as to the applicable law and he applied that law to the facts as he found them to be. Neither he nor DSS violated Mr. F’s parental rights, except insofar as it may be said the law permits when the “best interest of the child may take precedence over the parent’s liberty interest in the course of a custody, visitation, or adoption dispute.” In Re Mark, 365 Md. 687, 706, 782 A.2d 332, 343 (2001); Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 219, 721 A.2d 662, 669 (1998). This is such a case.

I would affirm the judgments of the Court of Special Appeals and the Circuit Court for Carroll County. Judges RAKER and WILNER authorize me to state that they join in this dissent.

. John Campbell, Lord Chief Justice, in Ex parte Long, 3 W.R. 19 (1854), wrote "Hard cases, it is said, make bad law.”

. .Trial judge’s Memorandum And Order, Page 10, dated 23 August 2000.

. The estimates by some of Mr. F's witnesses of the temporal intensity of such needed services ranged from 6 to 15 jhours per week.

. As does the Majority opinion (see op. at 689, n. 19), all references in the dissent to § 5-313 are to Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 5-313 of the Family Law Article (FL).

. Amicus and Petitioner’s appellate counsel’s efforts to supplement the trial court record notwithstanding, the trial judge was not presented *707adequately with either the specificity, number, or relative certitude of sources for outside assistance as now urged are available.

. The only objection noted by Mr. F’s trial counsel to the testimony of Dr. Blumberg, who was accepted without objection as an expert in psychiatiy, was one lodged technically and without argument or support. In context, it could be argued from the context of the point' in the proceedings when the objection was raised that it amounted to a challenge to Dr. Blumberg's training and experience to express such an opinion; however, if that were the case, the record demonstrates the objection to be baseless. As to his specific experience and training, Dr. Blumberg testified that he had performed six parental fitness evaluations for the Supreme Bench for Baltimore City (now the Circuit Court for Baltimore City) during his forensic fellowship at the University of Maryland Medical School and an additional 20-30 such evaluations in the course of his subsequent private practice, mostly in cases in the Circuit Courts for Carroll and Harford counties.

. Dr. Blumberg stated he could not administer the usual Minnesota Multi-Facet Personality Inventory (MMFI) to Mr. F because Mr. F was unable to read well enough. Mr. F’s trial counsel, unlike his appellate counsel and Amicus, mounted no contention that the MMFI could have been administered nonetheless. In any event, the lack of an MMFI test result has not been argued, in and of itself, to invalidate Dr. Blumberg's opinions.

. Mr. F's trial counsel noted that its receipt was "only subject to my prior objection,” which, as we noted infra at n. 6, was largely unarticu-lated.

. Through the efforts of their respective foster parents, the children’s developmental delays were overcome or under control by the time of the hearings below.

. Another DSS caseworker witness, Dana Pflugrad, testified to Eddie’s last affliction.

. The one service agreement entered into with Mr. F included that he undergo a drug and alcohol evaluation. According to Ms. Ramelmeier, he told the evaluator that he never drank alcohol and did not use drugs. Accordingly, the evaluator rated Mr. F a non-user and no further action was thought necessary by the evaluator. Indeed, when Mr. F testified below, he asserted he drank only one time in his life and that was two beers on his previous birthday, 25 April 1999.

Ms. Ramelmeier, however, testified that, upon learning of Mr. F's alcohol evaluation result, she questioned Mr. F because he had acknowledged to her in an earlier meeting that alcohol played a larger part in his life than he had stated in the evaluation. She asked that he submit to another evaluation, which he initially slated that he would do, but never followed-up on having another evaluation.

. Of passing interest because Mr. F complains vehemently of the lack of services offered him by DSS, I note that, in his trial counsel's closing argument before the trial judge at the end of the exceptions hearing on 23 June 1998 regarding the Master’s recommendation as to visitation, counsel stated "[sjince [turning the children over to DSS], he’s [Mr. F] gotten a lot. of services.” Ms. Ramelmeier confirmed this in her testimony at that hearing as she did not "recall that [Mr. F] asked for any other services.” When one considers that Mr. F apparently was represented by counsel (not the same one as represents him on appeal) at least as of the time he rejected tire April 1997 proposed services *710agreement, a failure to complain then about the services offered makes the related arguments mounted during the trial and appellate stages of this matter appear somewhat less genuine.

. There was doubt that this assessment was entirely accurate. Ms. Ramelmeier testified previously that on one occasion she gave ,Mr. F a Dr. Seuss book, “Are You My Mother,” to read to Eddie, but Mr. F was unable to do so.

. Charles M. Hardesty, the person who hired Mr. F to work at United Cerebral Palsy and who testified in support of Mr. F, indicated that Mr. *717F “wouldn’t have been responsible for [administering medication]” to the clienls. A house manager would have done that.

. Mr. Hardesty indicated that United Cerebral Palsy ran "homes for adults that have quadriplegic and other very serious physical disabilities.” (emphasis added).

. As noted in the Majority opinion (slip op. at 11), Tristynn was brought by Mr. F to DSS on 28 December 1995. Eddie had not yet been born at that time. When Eddie was born on 30 May 1996, he went directly from the hospital into foster care, through DSS.

. Mr. F’s feelings towards DSS appear to wax and wane. As his appellate counsel emphasizes, and to a certain degree Mr. F later portrays in his testimony, he was suspicious and distrustful of DSS (and with cause, it is argued). Yet, at this juncture in his testimony, he professed a willingness to call upon DSS if he "had any problem” which impliedly his parents could not address. The trial judge, however, was not obligated to believe that Mr. F viewed DSS as a resource.

. DSS records and its witnesses refute this categorical claim. Nonetheless, DSS conceded that, after a while, Mr. F's visits became regular and frequent.

. As Ms. Anderson’s testimony revealed, it was questionable whether Mr. F, although apparently aware of this particular educational and disciplinary technique, was able consistently to apply it effectively to its intended ends.

. Vena is the biological mother of Tristynn and Eddie. She and Mr. F were not married.

. See n. 17, supra at 19, at-.

. Ms. Ramelmeier testified previously that she had "extensive conversations” with Mr. F about Eddie’s health issues, but that he showed no interest in Eddie's medical care at those times.

. I infer this to be a reference to "one-on-one” attention.

. Mr. F testified earlier he could not afford to have a telephone in his townhouse. Thus, there may have existed for the trial judge just cause to doubt the certitude of Mr. F’s apparent conviction that he could “get” and maintain a car.

. He was unaware of any developmentally disabled adults, married or single, living in the Westminster area .who had children.

. Mr. Hardesty was unaware that Dr. Blumberg also had received and reviewed DSS’s extensive files on Mr. F and the children.

. Mr. Hardesty was accepted by the court as an expert on “developmental disabilities” for purposes of his critique of Dr. Blumberg’s methodologies and opinion.

. Q. And, you talked about the supports that might be available in the community for him through Developmental Disabilities Administration and that's a part of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, correct?

A. That’s correct.
Q. That's not a part of the Department of Human Resources or Social Services?
A. No.
Q. And, you said that they're not- -they don’t have round-the-clock supervision available?
A. There are all levels of supervision available through D — D.D.A. Flying Colors of Success is licensed to provide a variety of different services. We have, up to very recently, provided drop-in supervision and supports which may entail six or seven hours a week to somebody and we also, on the other end, have supervision that's twenty-four hours a day with awake-overnight supports.
Q. And, that would be for peo — people with children — young children?
A. It's — it's for — it's for adults right now.

. See n. 28 supra. Also, in light, of Mr. F's more refined appellate criticism of DSS for not tailoring its services to his needs, it should be noted that Mr. Hardesty, Mr. F's witness, former employer, advocate, and old friend, admitted that he failed to talk to Mr. F about applying for any services that DDA might offer.

. Ms. Roland was a DSS employee herself at the time.

. Her testimony was given on 20 July 1999.

. She conceded on cross-examination that there had been "a hundred to two hundred” such visitations, but she had observed only two of them.

. Ms. Roland’s daughter, 22 years old at the time of the hearings below, is developmentally disabled.

. At some point in the proceedings below, Mr. F’s trial counsel had advanced an alternative that Margaret F. and her husband could adopt both boys, a possibility Mr. F might accept. This notion did not bear fruit ultimately.

. Some of which may be, in, academic and experiential parlance, more learned than others. For example, a piece from a 1995 California Law Review, cited and quoted by the Majority (from the Amicus brief) op. at 674-675 and 685, n. 17, appears to have been authored by a law student.

. The Majority appears to extend the relevant temporal time frame for consideration under FL § 5 — 313(d)(i) (the impact of the parent's dis*736ability on child care must endure "for long periods of time”) when it concludes, op. at 697-698, that "there was not ample evidence to properly conclude that Mr. F’s disability, even if it exists, renders him permanently incapable of caring for his children in an unsupervised setting.” (Emphasis added).

. It seems fairly clear, at least from the trial court’s perspective, that federal funding and oversight requirements were not driving its consideration of this case. At a 29 January 1999 hearing, when DSS’s counsel proffered for the record various reasons why the petition was "long overdue in being ruled upon,” so that the "federal auditors” would know “that the delays are appropriate in this case,” the trial judge commented, ”[w]ell, I could care less about the federal auditors.”

. In the Majority opinion's extensive block quote (Maj. op. at 675-678) from the Court’s opinion in In re: Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 103-06, 642 A.2d 201, 203-05 (1994), the following highlighted sentence is omitted (op. at 677-678):

The overriding theme of both the federal and state legislation is that a child should have permanency in his or her life. The valid premise *737is that it is in the child's best interest to be placed in a permanent home and spend as little time as possible in foster care. Thus, Title 5 of the Family Law Article seeks 1o prevent the need for removal of a child from its home, to return a child 1o its home when possible, and where returning home is not possible, to place the child in another permanent placement that has legal status. [Some citations omitted.]

Of course, the omitted language is exactly the principle served by the trial court's decision in the instant case.

. Mr. F's certiorari petition framed and argued one question:

Whether the lower court was clearly erroneous in its finding that petitioner’s intellectual limitations required termination of his parental rights, absent a determination of abandonment, abuse, or neglect. In his brief to the Court, Mr. F presented and argued two questions:

I. Whether the trial court erroneously found that the [petitioner] had a disability that rendered him consistently unable to care for the immediate and ongoing physical or psychological needs of the children[?]

II. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the appellee provided [petitioner] with timely and adequate services to facilitate reunification of [petitioner] and his childrenf?]

Obviously, Mr. F conceived his appellate challenges as attacking the sufficiency of the evidence. The Majority's omission of these questions from its opinion becomes significant in light of Petitioner's and Ami-cus's supplementation of the record and the Majority's tendencies toward appellate fact-finding and substituting its weighing of testimony and documents for that of the trial judge.

. Examples of the Majority opinion's factual embellishments and substituted judgment conclusions include:

(a) The Majority opinion, op. at 19-20 and again at 686 and again at 694-695, states that the application and use of the Minnesota Multi-Facet Personality Inventory test, which Dr. Blumberg did not administer to Mr. F because he could not read adequately, "are not limited to people that can read.” There is no evidence in the record to support this conclusion.
(b) Extrapolating apparently from the facts that Mr. F earns $6.50 per hour from his present job, rents a 2 bedroom townhouse (but is unable to afford a telephone in it), and possesses a bicycle, the Majority concludes he is “able ... to now financially provide for Tristynn and Edward's care and maintenance.” (op. at 701).
(c) The Majority seems to attribute to DSS, op. at 701-702, testimony "that reunification in the future was reasonably possible, if not probable.” It fails to note, however, that this was not DSS's position in this matter, but rather that of one of Mr. F’s witnesses, Peggy Roland (see Dissent, supra, at 698-701, for discussion of Mr. Roland’s views).
(d) Of greatest significance, the Majority opinion states certain major factual conclusions at 700 ("[Mr. F] may well be able, with properly tailored services, to care for his children.”), 700 ("CCDSS had at its disposition better suited services for petitioner”), and 701 ("[Mr. F’s] ability to care for those with severe disabilities [while employed at United Cerebral Palsy in the early 90’s] might be an indicator that petitioner’s immediate parenting problems, if they exist, would dissipate within the near time, with the aging of the children and petitioner’s continued growth in his parenting skills.”). For the Majority to reach these conclusions necessarily requires it to place itself in the shoes of the fact-finder and elect to credit Mr. F's evidence, rather than that adduced by DSS. These are prime examples of impermissible appellate fact-finding.