(dissenting) — The thesis of this dissent is based on three tenets:
*470First: Laws of 1957, chapter 5, p. 11 (hereafter referred to as initiative No. 199), is constitutional; (section D, infra)
Second: Laws of 1957, chapter 289, p. 1147, is an unconstitutional repeal of initiative No. 199; (section E, infra)
Third: Laws of 1957, chapter 289, is unconstitutional regardless of any relation it may have to initiative No. 199. (section F, infra).
A. Ultimate Question
The ultimate question is whether senatorial and representative districts established by initiative No. 199, or senatorial and representative districts established by Laws of 1957, chapter 289, shall control “at the general election to be held in 1958, and every four years thereafter, ...” (First sentence of § 1 of both laws.)
B. Background of the Problem
The problem of securing and preserving equality of representation in legislative bodies has plagued representative government from an.early time. For example, in England, many cities that were established during the industrial revolution found themselves with representation in Parliament woefully disproportionate to their population. On the other hand, rural regions found themselves with the same number of representatives in Parliament as they had before the growth of the cities. Those regions retaining representation out of all proportion to their population were frequently referred to as “rotten boroughs.” Popular dissatisfaction grew as disproportionate representation increased. A national crisis forced passage of the reform act of 1832, which redistributed seats in Parliament; thus, the pressure that had accumulated for a century was eased. A. L. Cross, A Shorter History of England and Greater Britain, chapter L.
The same problem came to our shores at an early date. It was first crystalized in the Declaration of Independence.
“He has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of representation in the legislature, — a right *471inestimable to them, and formidable to tyrants only.” Rem. Rev. Stat., Vol. I, p. 180.
Thus, the concept of equality of representation in legislative bodies became basic in the American ideal of representative government. A classic description of the importance of this principle is found in the opinion of Judge Willis of the court of appeals of Kentucky. Speaking for the court, he said:
“Equality of representation in the legislative bodies of the state is a right preservative of all other rights. The source of the laws that govern the daily lives of the people, the control of the public purse from which the money of the taxpayer is distributed, and the power to make and measure the levy of taxes, are so essential, all-inclusive, and vital that the consent of the governed ought to be obtained through representatives chosen at equal, free and fair elections. If the principle of equality is denied, the spirit, purpose, and the very terms of the Constitution are emasculated. The failure to give a county or a district equal representation is not merely a matter of partisan strategy. It rises above any question of party, and reaches the very vitals of democracy itself.” Stiglitz v. Schardien, 239 Ky. 799, 811, 40 S. W. (2d) 315 (1931). (Italics mine.)
When Washington was admitted to the Union on November 11, 1889, as the forty-second state, and our constitution became operative, thirty-five states had constitutional provisions which required or empowered their state legislatures, at the session following the Federal census, to reapportion the districts from which their members were elected. The drafters of those constitutions felt it important, with few exceptions, to require the legislatures to take action at least every ten years. Such a requirement was to cause public opinion in general, and areas entitled to more representation in particular, to re-examine the distribution of membership in the state’s major policy-determining body. Four states, later admitted to the Union, adopted similar constitutional provisions.
With this background, it is not unusual that our constitution provides:
“The Census. The legislature shall provide by law for *472an enumeration of the inhabitants of the state in the year one thousand eight hundred and ninety-five and every ten years thereafter; and at the first session after such enumeration and also after each enumeration made by the authority of the United States, the legislature shall apportion and district anew the members of the senate and house of representatives, according to the number of inhabitants, excluding Indians not taxed, soldiers, sailors and officers of the United States army and navy in active service.” Washington constitution — Art. II, § 3.
C. Apportionment and Districting in Washington
The legislative history of reapportionment and redistricting in Washington is short, as it is in most states, because the constitutional provisions, to which I have referred, have been more honored in their breach than in their observance.
The first state legislature (1889-90) adjourned without accomplishing the constitutional task of districting and apportionment assigned it. This was done at a special session of the legislature September 3 through 11, 1890. Laws of 1890, special session, p. 1 (1 Hill’s Code, § 37 et seq.)
In 1901, the legislature reapportioned and redistricted “anew the members of the senate and house of representatives.” Laws of 1901, chapter 60, p. 79. (The act was passed over the governor’s veto.)
For fifty-six years — from 1901 until 1957 when the legislature .passed Laws of 1957, chapter 289, which is involved in the present problem — our successive legislatures ignored the provisions of Art. II, § 3, of the state constitution, quoted supra. It is true that throughout the years many mechanical and boundary changes of particular districts have been made by legislative acts, but none of them acquired the dignity of apportionment “anew . . . according to the number of inhabitants” as described in the constitution.
The reasons for this legislative lethargy are neither simple nor clear cut. They are a fusion of conflicting political, social, economic, and geographic considerations sprinkled with partisan interests and the influences of special groupings of population. To a great extent, these various forces have canceled each other.
*473Lest this be interpreted as a criticism of our past legislatures, I hasten to point out that the experience of this state parallels the experience of most states. In varying degrees, they have all been affected by this system of “silent gerrymandering.” See Todd: “The Apportionment Problem Faced by the States.” 17 Law and Contemporary Problems 314 et seq. (1952).
In 1930, the people, by initiative No. 57, redistricted the state and reapportioned seats in the legislature. Laws of 1931, chapter 2, p. 31. (See, Webster: “Voters Take the Law in Hand,” 35 National Municipal Review 240 (1946).) It required a writ of mandate of this court to compel the secretary of state to file the initiative petition. State ex rel. Miller v. Hinkle, 156 Wash. 289, 286 Pac. 839 (1930). The constitutionality of the initiative was upheld in State ex rel. Christensen v. Hinkle, 169 Wash. 1, 13 P. (2d) 42 (1932).
In the legislation to which I have alluded, a combination of various geographic units has been used to define the boundaries and areas of senatorial and representative districts. These units consist, in the main, of (a) counties or a combination of two or more contiguous counties, (b) voting precincts, (c) towns, (d) townships, and (e) areas described in terms of Federal land surveys. (See Laws of 1933, chapter 74, p. 358.)
In Washington, the voting precinct is of a transitory nature. If, at any election, more than three hundred voters cast ballots, the proper authorities “shall divide such precincts into two or more precincts with two hundred fifty voters or less in each precinct.” RCW 29.04.040. This is to equalize the work of precinct election boards. The boundaries of such precincts are established either by the city council, the board of county commissioners, or the board of supervisors of a township — for voting purposes. RCW 29.01.120. In addition, if ten or more voters reside more than ten miles from the polling place, upon petition, “the board of county commissioners shall establish a separate voting, precinct therefor.” RCW 29.04.040.
It was proper for previous legislation to use the voting *474or election precinct as a unit of population in grouping legislative districts, because all Federal censuses, prior to the census of 1950, enumerated the inhabitants upon that basis.
Volume I, Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940, Population, Number of Inhabitants, is an official publication of the United States department of commerce, bureau of census. The contents of this volume may be judicially noticed by us. (Martin v. Tollefson, 24 Wn. (2d) 211, 219, 163 P. (2d) 594 (1945).)
On page 1123 appears the following:
“Minor civil divisions.- — To the primary political divisions into which the counties are subdivided the Census Bureau applies the general term ‘minor civil divisions.’ The primary divisions of the counties in Washington are the election precincts, townships, and some of the cities and towns. (Only Spokane and Whatcom Counties have townships, cities, and towns as primary divisions, though there is also one township in King County.)” (Italics mine.)
The 1950 Federal census — an actual “enumeration of the inhabitants” — discontinued the use of the election precinct ás a unit of population for the reasons hereafter noted.
On page XII of Census of Population: 1950, Vol. II, Characteristics of the Population, Part 47, Washington, appears the following:
“Minor civil divisions. — To the primary political divisions into which counties are divided, the Bureau of the Census applies the general term ‘minor civil divisions.’ The minor civil divisions shown for the State of Washington in previous censuses were the election precincts, a few townships, and some of the cities and towns. The election precincts are unsatisfactory for statistical purposes, because their boundaries change so frequently as to make comparisons of data from one period to another impossible. Accordingly, these minor civil divisions were replaced in the 1950 Census by census county divisions, which are newly established special areas which will remain as relatively permanent statistical areas comparable to the minor civil divisions in other states.” (Italics mine.)
Table 6 of this volume (pp. 47-10 to 47-13) sets forth the 1950 population of each county in the state. Under the name *475of each county is listed the population of each county census tract and the population of each town used as a unit of population. County population equals the total number of inhabitants in the “minor civil divisions” into which each county has been divided.
Pages 47-21 to 47-39 contain the “Census County Division Descriptions”; tables 7, 8, and 9 (pp. 47-14 to 47-16) set forth the population of towns and cities. The tables are followed by boundary descriptions of the census tracts of the more heavily populated urbanized areas, (pp. 47-17 et seq.) Thus, the number of inhabitants and geographic boundaries of each county census tract are determined.
This brings me to a consideration of initiative No. 199, which the voters of this state approved at the general election November 6, 1956. A month later, the governor proclaimed the measure to be law. Laws of 1957, chapter 5.
Initiative No. 199 does not use the election precinct as a unit of population for the purpose of forming senatorial and legislative districts.
The heart of the initiative, which establishes the theory of redistricting and reapportionment, reads:
“Sec. 56. Census tracts referred to herein are all the political divisions, subdivisions, census tracts and other terms to describe census divisions used in the current census division system used and approved by the United States Bureau of the Census of the United States Department of Commerce and the detailed descriptions of said division together with detailed maps are one file and available in the Office of Population Research and Washington State Census Board or United States Bureau of Census and the boundaries of census tracts referred to herein are the same boundaries as are shown upon the official documents or maps maintained by or for the United States Bureau of the Census existing as of January 1, 1956, having the same corresponding numbers or names as given to census political divisions.” Laws of 1957, chapter 5, p. 17.
The remaining fifty-seven sections of the initiative implement § 56 and establish senatorial and representative districts by grouping census tracts and towns, instead of election precincts, where necessary. For example, § 41 of the *476initiative provides that the 39th senatorial district shall be composed of census tracts 6, 7, 8, 15, 16, 17, 18 of Snohomish county and the city of Everett. The population of each tract and the city of Everett appears in the source material to which I have referred.
Initiative No. 199 does not abolish the election precinct. If a precinct should be divided by a boundary line of a new senatorial or legislative district, the proper authorities would have to make the proper adjustment; otherwise, initiative No. 199 would appear not to disturb them.
D. Initiative No. 199 Is Constitutional
The question of the constitutionality of initiative No. 199 has played a larger role in the outcome of the instant case than appears in the majority opinion, which chooses not to discuss the question.
An unsuccessful attempt was made to enjoin the secretary of state from certifying initiative No. 199 for inclusion on the ballot. State ex rel. Donohue v. Coe, 49 Wn. (2d) 410, 302 P. (2d) 202 (1956). Although the briefs of the parties in the Donohue case presented certain questions relating to the constitutionality of initiative No. 199, both the trial court and this court refused to consider them on the authority of State ex rel. Griffiths v. Superior Court, 92 Wash. 44, 47, 159 Pac. 101, 162 Pac. 360 (1916), wherein this court said:
“With the ultimate question of the validity of this proposed legislation, we have no present concern. Courts will not determine such questions as to contemplated legislation which may, perchance, never be enacted.”
A careful reading of the return of respondent Victor A. Meyers, as secretary of state, to the order to show cause, discloses that respondent does not question the constitutionality of initiative No. 199.
Respondent states in his return:
“Chapter 5 of the Laws of 1957, prior to amendment by Chapter 289 of the Laws of 1957, contained gross ambiguities, errors and uncertainties, and without the amendment ac*477complished by Chapter 289, Laws of 1957, would have presented difficult problems of administration. . . .
ÍÍ “In addition, there were doubts of the validity of the proceedings by which the initiative had been adopted in connection with the petitions and supporting papers, which doubts it was in the public interest to eliminate by legislative action.”
“Difficult problems of administration” do not render the initiative unconstitutional. Any doubts “in connection with the petitions and supporting papers” were disposed of by this court in State ex rel. Donohue v. Coe, supra.
Further, on the tape recording of oral argument, the following colloquy appears between one of respondent’s counsel and members of the bench.
“First Judge: Do you concede that there is an inconsistency between 199 and 289? Mr. Iverson: No question that 289 amended 199 and made a change. First Judge: One or the other has to be followed? Mr. Iverson: That’s correct. No question about it.
a “Second. Judge: Regarding your statement that 199 has to be followed, one of your colleagues is contending that 199 is unconstitutional; so how can you say that a-. Mr. Iverson: He is one of the interveners, Your Honor. I am not responsible for him. I will let him speak for himself. He will be on here in a little while.”
It is abundantly apparent that respondent does not question the constitutionality of initiative No. 199.
However, several interveners attack its validity on the ground that the legislative title of the initiative, as supplied by its sponsors to the secretary of state, was omitted from the printed form of the petitions circulated and presented to voters for signature.
There is no merit in this contention for the following reasons:
First: The constitution requires that “ . . . such petition shall include the full text of the measure so proposed.” Washington constitution — Art. II, §1 (amendment No. 7). *478(Italics mine.) The word “text” refers to the main body of matter contained therein. It does not include a title.
Second: In Senior Citizens League, Inc. v. Department of Social Security, 38 Wn. (2d) 142, 173, 228 P. (2d) 478 (1951), this court said:
“The legislative title [on an initiative] is mere surplusage, since the constitutional provision quoted above [Art. II, § 19] applies only to ‘bills.’ A bill is a ‘form or draft of a law presented to the legislature for enactment.’ . . . The term refers to proposed laws pending in the legislature. [Citing authorities.] Many initiatives which have been passed by the people of this state have had no legislative title.”
Third: It does not appear in the record before us how or why the proposed legislative title was omitted from the printed forms of the petitions. An analogous situation appears in Randles v. Washington State Liquor Control Board, 33 Wn. (2d) 688, 206 P. (2d) 1209 (1949). It was alleged, and admitted by the demurrer, that the secretary of state had not mailed to the voters, within the statutory time, a pamphlet containing a copy of the initiative. The initiative was approved by the voters. This court held it could not consider the allegation and said:
“If such a rule is not adopted and followed,'then laws enacted by the law-making bodies are open to scrutiny by the courts to see if every official having any duty to perform in the course of the enactment of the statute did as directed; and if it is found he failed in any respect, the courts must approve his frustration of the will of the people or the legislature. This would enable a careless, inefficient, or corrupt official to nullify legislation by his inaction in the performance of some ministerial duty.” (p. 693)
E. Laws of 1957, Chapter 289, Is an Unconstitutional Repeal of Initiative No. 199
In my mind, the crux of the majority opinion is found in the following quotation from it:
“Since chapter 289 deals with the same subject matter as that contained in initiative 199, namely, redistricting, the legislature had the unlimited power to establish methods of redistricting, and to alter, modify, take away, add to, or *479change the various districts in such manner as it saw fit” (Italics mine.)
This effects a drastic change in the power of the people to exercise their right of the initiative. For all practical purposes, it relegates an initiative — no matter what its subject matter — to a position less than an advisory opinion of the public. Assume an initiative is passed by the people in a general election in November. It becomes a law thirty days later. The following January, the legislature meets, and, under the theory of the majority opinion, it may immediately “alter, modify, take away, add to, or change [the in-itiátive] in such manner as it saw fit.” This interpretation makes a mockery of the initiative provisions of the constitution, and, therefore, I find myself unable to join in giving judicial sanction to such an interpretation.
After passage by the legislature, the governor permitted Laws of 1957, chapter 289 (substitute senate bill No. 374), to become law without his signature. He stated:
“Reluctantly, I have allowed Substitute Senate Bill No. 374 to become law without my signature. My personal inclination is to oppose any move on the part of the legislature to change substantially an initiative passed by the people of the state.
“There exists in my mind a serious question as to whether or not Substitute Senate Bill No. 374 merely amends Initiative 199 or whether it in effect repeals the Initiative ...” Laws of 1957, p. 1162.
In all respects, except one, Laws of 1957, chapter 289, purports to be a legislative amendment of initiative No. 199.
In the title to chapter 289, the legislature used the words:
“. . . amending sections 4 . . . and 58, chapter 5, Laws of 1957; and repealing section 56 of said chapter and reenacting all other sections of said chapter.” Laws of 1957, chapter 289, p. 1147. (Section 56, Laws of 1957, chapter 5, is the same as § 56 of Initiative No. 199, quoted supra.)
I have not overlooked the fact that chapter 289 re-enacts eleven sections of initiative No. 199. Five of the sections reenacted establish a county (§§ 14, 22, 24) or a combination *480of counties (§§ 3, 20) as a district; six of the sections reenacted fix mechanical details common to both. Having repealed § 56 of the initiative, which establishes its modus operandi (census tracts in which the number of inhabitants is enumerated), the amendatory sections of chapter 289 substitute election precincts for census tracts. Thus, the heart of initiative No. 199 was cut out, its theory emasculated by repeal, and the constitutional process thwarted.
I believe that the interpretation which the majority opinion places upon Laws of 1957, chapter 289, is contrary to the provisions of the constitution of this state.
The right of the people to initiate legislation was established in 1912 by amendment to the state constitution. The amendment (amendment No. 7) provides in part:
“Art. 2 § 1. Legislative Powers, Where Vested. The legislative authority of the State of Washington shall be vested in the legislature, . . . but the people reserve to themselves the power to propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the legislature
“(a) Initiative: The first power reserved by the people is the initiative. . . .
“(b) Referendum: The second power reserved by the people is the referendum, . . .
“(c) . . . No act, law, or bill approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon shall be amended or repealed by the legislature within a period of two years following such enactment. But such enactment may be amended or repealed at any general regular or special election by direct vote of the people thereon.
“(d) . . . This section is self-executing, but legislation may be enacted especially to facilitate its operation.” (Italics mine.)
In State ex rel. Donohue v. Coe, supra, this court quoted with approval from State ex rel. Case v. Superior Court, 81 Wash. 623, 632, 143 Pac. 461 (1914), as follows:
“There is strongly suggested, in the language of the constitution and this law, a required liberal construction, to the end that this constitutional right of the people [the initiative] may be facilitated, and not hampered by either technical statutory provisions or technical construction thereof, *481further than is necessary to fairly guard against fraud and mistake in the exercise by the people of this constitutional right.” (Italics mine.)
In 1952, amendment No. 26 to the state constitution was adopted. It superseded amendment No. 7 (c), quoted supra, and provides, in part:
“No act, law, or bill approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon shall be amended or repealed by the legislature within a period of two years following such enactment: Provided, That any such act, law or bill may be amended within two years after such enactment at any regular or special session of the legislature by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house with full compliance with section 12, Article III, of the Washington Constitution, and no amendatory law adopted in accordance with this provision shall be subject to referendum. But such enactment may be amended or repealed at any general regular or special election by direct vote of the people thereon.” (Italics mine.)
Amendment No. 26 does but one thing: it inserts the proviso (which I have italicized above) between the two quoted sentences of amendment No. 7 (c). It only grants the right to amend. The constitutional prohibition against legislative repeal of an initiative within two years of its enactment is still retained unimpaired, as well as the right of the people to repeal an initiative “by direct vote of the people thereon.”
A proviso in a constitution usually refers to the clause or portion of the instrument immediately preceding it. Its office is not to enlarge or extend the section of the constitution of which it is a part, but to restrict the sense, or clarify the meaning of the preceding language. 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, § 25.
The language of this court in State v. Collins, 94 Wash. 310, 313, 162 Pac. 556 (1917), is applicable to the instant case.
“A constitutional or statutory proviso is a restraint or limitation upon, and not an addition to, that which precedes it.” (Italics mine.)
All three parts of amendment No. 26 must be recognized. The proviso should not be interpreted to exclude that which *482precedes it; hence, under the circumstances presented by the problem before us, I cannot join in the reasoning of the majority opinion that the right to amend includes the right to repeal, for such a conclusion nullifies a portion of amendment No. 26. As Judge Chadwick said in State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, 107 Wash. 167, 173, 181 Pac. 920 (1919), a case relating to the right of referendum, “This case sounds in fundamentals, not in definitions.”
The interpretation which the majority opinion places upon this proviso neither preserves nor renders effective the constitutional right of the people to exercise the initiative— “The first power reserved by the people ...” Amendment No. 7 (a).
“Whatever divergence of opinion there may be among the courts touching the meaning of constitutional or statutory provisions relating to the initiative and referendum, we think it safe to say that all courts that have spoken upon the subject agree that such provisions are to be liberally construed, to the end that these popular legislative rights of the people reserved in the several constitutions where found may he preserved and rendered effective.” (Italics mine.) State ex rel. Howell v. Superior Court, 97 Wash. 569, 577, 166 Pac. 1126 (1917).
It is neither necessary nor proper for me to attempt to define the word amend, as it is used in the proviso of amendment. No. 26 to the state constitution, for Laws of 1957, chapter 289, is not an amendment of initiative No. 199. It destroys and repeals it; hence, Laws of 1957, chapter 289, is unconstitutional.
F. Laws op 1957, Chapter 289, Is Unconstitutional, Regardless op any Relation It May Have to Initiative No. 199.
I agree with the majority opinion that “courts will not inquire into a legislative factual determination, beyond consideration of that which appears upon the face of the act, aided by judicial notice”; but this does not mean that “the courts must perpetually remain in ignorance of what everybody else in the state knows.”
As I have previously pointed out, the Federal censuses *483for the state of Washington, prior to the 1950 census, were based upon the number of inhabitants in election precincts; hence, districting and apportionment by election precincts, under those censuses, meet our constitutional requirement.
The following facts “are capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy”:
(a) The legislature has never authorized an enumeration of the inhabitants of this state, by election precincts or otherwise;
(b) The public records disclose only the number of registered voters in an election precinct — not the number of inhabitants;
(c) Unless resort is made to the Federal census of 1940— now almost eighteen years old — there is no place to which the legislature or anyone else can turn to determine the number of inhabitants in an election precinct. This deficiency carries over into the legislative districts established by Laws of 1957, chapter 289. For example, § 41 of chapter 289 establishes the thirty-ninth senatorial district as
“. . . that part of Snohomish county not included in the thirty-eighth district, and Camano Island of Island County.”
Unless the legislature authorizes an enumeration of inhabitants by election precincts, it is my considered opinion that any districting and apportionment based upon election precincts as component parts of a senatorial or'legislative district — as in Laws of 1957, chapter 289 — fails to meet the constitutional requirement of Art. II, § 3.
I believe that respondent should be directed to proceed as chief election officer for all state, city, and town elections and carry out his statutory duties relating thereto in a manner consistent with Laws of 1957, chapter 5 (initiative No. 199).
Hill, C. J., Donworth, and Foster, JJ., concur with Weaver, J.