St. Ex Rel. De Concini v. City Ct. of City of Tucson, Pima County

GORDON FARLEY, Superior Court Judge

(specially concurring).

While I agree generally with the conclusions reached by Judge MOLLOY, that no right of trial by jury is available to the real party in interest under the circumstances in this case, since I do not have any reluctance for the reasons hereinafter noted in reaching such conclusions, I think it appropriate to state briefly matters that I deem pertinent to a proper resolution of the issue presented.

The City Attorney has suggested, and I think properly so, that judicial notice should be taken that defendants are rarely —if ever — sentenced for a first offense to any imprisonment in moving traffic violations, but merely are subjected to the payment of a fine. Consequently, no question of the seriousness of the penalty should be involved.

Practical considerations furthermore require our adherence to the rule announced, in O’Neill v. Mangum, limiting jury trials to serious offenses. The petitioner has pointed out that there are approximately 3,600 cases of petty traffic offenses alone set for trial each year. If jury trials were requested in just ten percent of such cases, in addition to the normal case load of the City Court, the resulting delay in the disposition of cases, apart from any consideration of the expense and inconvenience to jurors, litigants, and the Court, compels my wholehearted endorsement of the reasoning in O’Neill v. Mangum.

While theoretically the interpretation placed upon statutory and constitutional provisions should be upon a basis without regard to practical consequences in most cases, it is my feeling that the Court should not ignore the vast problem that would be presented in the administration of justice if carte blanche authority is granted every minor traffic offender to request a jury trial.

With the exceptions hereinabove noted, I respectfully concur in the conclusions reached by Judge MOLLOY.